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P a r t I. 
Introduction and Pr.eliminaa matters. 
Chapter I. 
The purpose of this thesis is to-treat of the general 
principles and doctrines of the law on divorce which 
prevail in the Anglo- American common law units and in 
certain continental systems of law, the French, A.ustri an , 
German, Sidss and Italian., with particular regard to the 
fundamentals and applications of the rules as to conflict 
-of laws governing this subject matter. 
In contrasting these laws and rules the diversity or 
similarity of the views on these problems in the different 
systems of laws will be set out : 
In Part I some important preliminary matters, such as 
sources of law,interpretation and characterization, 
further the doctrine of renvoi, the law on domicil and 
nationality as the principal tests of jurisdiction and 
of choice of law, and the law on hasband and wife will be 
discussed; the doctrine of renvoi and the law on domicil 
and nationality will be analysed,' more fully in respect 
of their important bearing on the topic of conflict of 
laws; the fuller treatment of the latter subject,namely law 
on domicil and nationality is the more necessary because 
domicil is the test of jurisdiction and of choice of law in 
the Anglo- American systems of law and nationality princi- 
pally is used as such test in the Continental systems of law. 
The internal law on divorce of the countries concerned 
will be stated and the rules as to choice of law which 
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relate to them will be attached thereto in Part II. 
'An outline .of the rules governing procedure in causes of 
divorce will be given in art III where only the most 
striking features of these rules will be shown insofar 
as they contrast with those relating to ordinary pro- 
ceedings in civil matters. 
Since international jurisdiction of the court rendering 
a. , judgment of divorce is the most important requirement 
its recognition, the subject matter of recognition df 
foreign judgments of divorce will be discussed in 
connection. with that of jurisdiction in Bart IV. 
Finally, Bart V will cover enforcement .of foretn orders 
and judgments concerning matters ancillary to divorce. 
In the following pages the word 7T d o m i cil ", written 
thus,-is used in the Anglo- American sense of the term, 
whereas the word " d o m i c i l e " will be used in the 
Oontinental connotation, as far as possible; for the 
i.istinction between these terms reference is made to 
gage 62 
Further, the word " d i v o r c e TT used without any 
qualification will mean divorce " a vinculo matrimonii TT 
( from bond of matrimonY ) . 
-3- 
Cha pter II._ 
S p u r c e s of l a w on d i v o r c e . 
Zngland, before 1857. 
I. Canon law. After the Norman Conquest ecclesi ,sticai [©Oi 
its 
mercised jurisdiction in matrimonial matters; the old 
arriage customs were superseded by the canon law. Since 
he canon law did not recognise the dissolubility of the 
arriage bond, a divorce a vinculo matrimonii ( i.e. 
divorce absolute with the right to marry again) could n 
' e obtained from those courts; they granted among other 
reliefs divorce a mensa et thoro i.e. from bed and boar ä. 
Divorce a vinculo matrimonii could be procured only iby 
Means of a private act of Parliament dissolving the 
Ì 
marriage bond. From 1669, when the first divorce a vinc'lo 
matrimonii by act of Parliament was granted, till 1857,, 
about 150 private acts of Parliament granting divorces 
a vinculo matrimonii were passed. The essential require- 
. 
ents for such a "legislative" divorce were (1) a divorce 
mensa et thoro on the ground of adultery obtained from 
he ecclesiastical court and (2) a successful action for 
ciriminal vonversat9_on against the adulterer brought in 
the King's Bench; in very few cases such a private act of 
Parliament was passed in favour of a wife after she had 
rocured a decree a mensa et thoro against her husband of 
t e ground of adultery committed under aggravated circum- 
stances. 
-3- 
C h a pt er II. 
S p u r g e s of l a w on d i v o r c e . 
England, before 1857, 
i 




e: :ercised jurisdiction in matrimonial matters; the old 
Í 
i 
Marriage customs were superseded by the canon law. Since¡ 
the canon law did not recognise the dissolubility of thel 
1 
harriage bond, a divorce a vinculo matrimonii ( i.e. 
`divorce absolute with the right to marry again) could n¢t 
'roe obtained from those courts; they granted among other 
Feliefs divorce a mensa et thoro i.e. from bed and board, 
Divorce a vinculo matrimonii could be procured only lby 
means of a private act of Parliament dissolving the 
marriage bond. From 1669, when the first divorce a vinculo 
1 
iatrimonii by act of Parliament was granted, till 1857,,! 
bout 150 private acts of Parliament granting divorces 
vinculo matrimonii were passed. The essential require 
ents for such a "legislative" divorce were (1) a divorce 
mensa et thoro on the ground of adultery obtained from 
he ecclesiastical court and (2) a successful action for 
4((riminal 'conversation against the adulterer brought in 
the King's Bench; in very few cases such a private act o 
Parliament was passed in favour of a wife after she had 
rocured a decree a mensa et thoro against her husband on 
t¡he ground of adultery committed under aggravated circum -6 
stances. 
II. Since 1857,. 
(A) Case law and statute. 
By the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, the jurisdiction. 
of the ecclesiastical courts in matrimonial matters was 
conferred 1lroi the Matrimonial Causes Court created by 
the Act; taus the latter court exercised jurisdiction it 
Matrimonial matters as suits of divorce a mensa et thora, 
to which was given the name of suits for judidiTlseparation, 
suits of nullity, restitution of conjugal rights, 
jactitation, and ancillary.:matters, as custody of chil en, 
alimony and maintenance. 
By that Act was also assigned to the court above named 
he powers of graiiting absolute divorce, equivalent to 
those exercised by way of the private acts of Parliamen 
Mentioned above. 
Section 22 of the Act of 1857 directs the MC Court in all 
proceedings other than :roceedings for divorce absolute,. 
to proceed on principles and rules which shall be as 7mci h 
as may be conformable to the principles and rules of the 
ecclesiastical courts, laid down in their judgements. 
Again, s.27 of the sane Act states that when a wife shall 
ask for divorce on' the around of adultery coupled with 
cruelty., the cruelty must be such cruelty as without 
adultery Would have entitled. her to divorce a menses et 
thoro, now termed judicial separation, As the House of 
tords had, in dealing with private bills for dissolution 
of marriage, an established practice on this subject 
based mainly on canon law rules, it was held by the 
'courts that in cases where the principles of its 
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procediire were at variance with those of the ecclesiasti- 
cal courts in suits for dissolution of marriage the 
authorities of the House of Lords were preferred, while 
in all other suits the principles of the ecclesiastical 
courts were to be observed. 
(B) Common law. The Matrimonial Causes legislation is f 
from covering the entire field of these matters and a 
11 
arge body of case law has Frown up, ruling ciuestions o 
divorce, founded to a great extent, on common law rules 
since most of the relative concertions are based on the 
common law of husband and. wife. It must be borne in mild 
that the divorce petition is not a common law -action bu$ 
a statutory one; an the other hand, the common law on 
ausband end wife afforded the relevant conceptions for 
the judgments 0f. divorce. 
Theory of the binding power of precedent. 
he theory of the binding power of judicial pre - 
edents, also called the theory of the rr stare decisisrr 
.s the most important feature of English case law; Wher 
la' 
case involves a clear principle which has been the 
subject of a decision by the House of Lords, or the 
Court of Appeal, that decisbn must be followed by every 
ther court below it. 
rench v. Mecal 1842, 2 Ducry and War 269. 
The theory of the binding power of precedents applies 
to precedents relating to common law as well as to 
statutes; it is this theory of the binding power of pre 
cedents coupled with the extraordinary concentration of 
the English courts that brought about that most important 




- The binding power of precedents was acknowledged by t 
House of Lords even with regard to its own decisions 
and it was laid down in Wilson v. Wilson ( 1854) 
Ha. Cases 40, that its decision, when. once _pronounce 
in a particular case, was conclusive in that case and 
that it would not be reversed except by Act of larlia 
but, if the House should afterwardsbe of opinion that 
an erroneous principle had been adopted in the first 
case, the House could not be bound in any other to 
adhere to such princir.le.See also Tormuey v.White ( 185 
And it fact, the courts dealing with a proper case wil 
not hesitate to reconsider a principle laid down in a 
previous case and by such restating of guiding principes 
operates that other element necessary for the progress ve 
trend of law i.e. its flexibility. Mention may be made 
in this connection of the decisions of Le Mesóurier v. 
Aq ,Itl 
rte.**. ,-;4 
C ,, 1 
4' 
.. . c 
)  }ILO 3/3/ 
Le Mesourier (1895) AC 517 and Armitage v.Attorney 
General ( 1906) F 135 on the question of domicil as test 
of jurisdiction in divorce proceedings. 
A previous decision of the Court of Appeal will be 
followed on precisely similar facts, if that decision 
is not expressly overruled by the House of Lords, though 
that tribunal may have disapproved the reasoning on which 
the decision. iS* founded. Cor.sett Industrial Society v. 
Con.sett Co. ( 1922) 2 Ch/ 135 ( CA). 
Finally, every court is absolutely bound by the decisions 




thority for what it actually decides, as Lord Halsbur 
ut it in Quinn v. Leatham (1901) AC 495, 506. 
C. Equity. 
Family law has apart from the field- covered by 
common 1 
developed to some extent through the jurisdiction of th 
Chancellors who were till 1529 ( Cardinal Wolsey) 
ecclesiastics and exercised jurisdiction in Equity in th 
ourt of Chancery. This court was a court of conscience- 
) 
1 i&ere the rigidity of Common Law was irreconciL X11§ with 
/. 
Eood conscience, relief could be obtained in Chancery 
in three ways i.e. by granting (1) an equitable remedy 
aid of equitable rights as, e.g. remedies in trust 
ses ( exclusive jurisdiction), (2) an equitable remedy 
aid of a legal right e.g,, injunctions ( concurrent 
jurisdiction ) and ( 3) equitable assistance, e.g. for 
discovery ( auxiliary jurisdiction ). 
B the relief granted in Equity to married women, some oí) 
theory of 
e " unity of husband and wife " were gradually removed; 
tiei'r disabilities, based on the Common La 
t 
thus has developed the doctrines of t' separate use" ,ßí;d 
i) 
f 
rr equity to a settlement " which greatly improved the 
legal position of married women. Hence the body of subst:ua- 
tive and procedural rules of Equity covers various branches 
of family law, especially those of the equitable rights 
of married Women and guardianship. Till 1857 jurisdiction 
over custody and maintenance o -' children which, since 
then, as ancillary matters to divorce, comes within the 
jurisdiction of the divorce court, was exclusively 
-8- 
4exercised by the Court of Chancery. By 
the Judicature 
Act, 1873, the admi.istration of 
common law and equity 
was fused into one system. The distinction 
between law 
and equity was not abolished and the courts 
must, in 
ealing with either of them, consider the corresponding 
nies. By s. 25, subs. 11 of the Judicature Act, 1873, 
't was provided that, in any case in which there is any 
onflict between rules of equity and the rules of law 
With reference to the same matter, the rules of equity 
hall prevail. 
The Judicature( Consolidation ) Act of 1925 sec 44 
contains the same provision with special reference to 
questions relating to the custody end education of { 
òhild. ' 
í 
he reasons for this prfereht1ltreatment of Equity and{ 
for the rule that the older judicial precedents in Equi y 
tare of little value, whereas at Common Law the contrary 
1 
ule as to the value of precedents prevails, are most 
Jdearly given by/4.,George Jessel, Master of the Rolls in 
e Hallett LR 13 CH D 718 as follows: Tr It must not be 
orgotten that the rules of equity are not, like the rules 
f Common Law, supposed to have been established from time 
.mmemoria.l. It is perfectly well known that they have been 
stablished from time to time. In many cases we know the 
21 
ame of the Chancellor who invented them. Undoubtedly th y 
viere invented to secure the best application of justice, 
b'ut nevertheless they were invented. Take such things as 
those: The separate use of a married woman, the restrai t 
-9- 
on :alienation, "e can state the date when they were 
first introduced into equity jurisprudence,, and there 
'fore i.n cases of this kind, the older precedents in 
equity -re of very littl value. The doctrines are pro?- _ 
gressive, refined, and improved: and if we want to 
I_now what the rules in "e uitÿ are, we must look, of 
course, rather to the modern than to the More ancient 
cases;" 
Finally, it is to 7., noticed that some equity maxims 
are the bases for -rules of divorce law, as for 
instance, rules coLcerning bars to divorce. 
See p102. 
(d.) Rules of Court; The power a.f delegate legislation 
to make rules on -procedure in matrimonial matters was 
conferred upon the Divorce Court by sec. 53 of the ETC, 
Act of 1857, now superseded by es. 99.100 and 213 of 
the Judicature ( Consolidation ) Act, ±925. 
The Matr. Causes Rules 1924 have been superseded ty the 
M.C. Rules 1937 ; :CC Rule 81 states that subject to the 
provisions of those rules and any statute, the Rules of 
Ithe Supreme Court shall notwithstanding the provision of 
!Order 68 thereof apply with the necessary modifications 
to the practiee and procedure inmatrimonial matters. 
Order 68, rule 1 mentioned above lays down that,subject 
to the provisions of that Order, nothing in those rules, 
!save 
as expressly provided, shall affect the procedure 
br practice proceedings Matrimonial in , for divorce or other 
Causes. 
-10- 
ources of law on divorce in U.S.A.: 
s in England, common law and statutes 
prevail as souroes 
of law on divorce in U.S.A. ; 
the statutes often lay d 
only the settled rules of common law. 
Most states of U.S.A. have constitutional 
provisions 
relating to divorce, for instance,South Carolina 
enacted 
the constitutional provision prohibiting 
divorce from 
bortlof matrimony; in Georgia a constitutional 
enactment 
provides that " no total divorce shall be 
Eb 
on the concurrent verdicts of two juries at different 
terms of the court ";income jurisidictions " legislative" 
divorces are prohibited by such constitutional provisions. 
It may be noted that " legislative " divorces are stil 
available in a few states of the Unión. 
ON.the rest, the above observations as to binding powe 
of precedent and as to interpretation apply also to 
American law. 
The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of laws, edited 
by the American Law Institute in 1934, is only of pers a- 
sive character to be used for the interpretation cif. 
American law, but not as part of the law itself. 
Sources of law in the Continental systems. 
Whereas English law consists to a considerable extent 
of judge- made law, the law of the Continental systems 
is wholly codified; the divorce - law is codified 
(a) in France in the Civil Code of 1804, in the sixth j 
1 
I 
title of its book I, as amended by subsequent leg. - 
lati.on; the divorce clauses of the Civil Code were 
abolished in 1816 and. restored to it in 1848,subject to 
some modifications. 
( b) In Austria andGermany in the law of July 6,19 a, 
Imperial Law Gazette I, p. 807; and 
(c) In Switzerland in the Swiss Civil Code of Dec.10,1907, 
arts. 137 - 188. The fact that the law is wholly codi- 
fied excludes any preponderance of case - law over the 
statutes; the codification per se makes for certainty 
in the law, since it is considered all- sufficient. 
Yet the statutory provisions are often obscure and in- 
complete, and the question arises whether judicial de- 
cisions are binding upon the judges on deciding subse- 
quent causes ; as will presently be shown, by the conti- 
nental laws judicial precedents have no binding power on 
the courts, they are generally of persuasive character 
only; this is the fundamental distinction between the 
nglish and 6ontinental method. 
0n the other hand, where a settled line of decisions con- 
tains an interpretation on a point of anÔbsctxe: 
statutory provision or establishes a certain doctrine by 
the superior courts this will be followed by the lower 
courts in subsequent causes. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Continental precedents have 
have 
o' force of law as /the English ones, and cannot therefore 
be called a source of law,a series of such decisions 
showjg a settled practice of the courts may be termed 
a " ç ua. i - sourceT1 of law. 
Although the courts lack the power to legislate by cassi- 
law and have to expound only the spirit of the codes,itl 
-12- 
is the authority of the Supreme Courts of the countries 
weight of the reasons of their o in_ioris concerned and. the ti.elgh p 
that induces the lower courts to follow judicial prece- 
dents and that exercises an important unifying influence 
in interpreting the aegle .: 
rench law: In France, after the Revolution, a tendency 
revailed against case- law which led to the article 5 CC 
16 which judges are not allowed to decide cases submitted 
to them, by way of general and set decisions. Thus the 
decision of a French court is binding only in the same 
cause and the courts are prevented from making law by 
way of " authoritative" precedents. 
Yet the Cour de Cassation, although not bound by law to 
follow its own decisions, has, in fact, in many a respect o 1"4"'-' 
laid down a system of coherent principles in its decisions 
r 
which are followed by the lower courts. 
Thus the decisions of the Cour de Cassation are,theore- 
tically, not authoritative and the lower courts conform 
to those principles in_respect of the weight of the 
reasons given in the relative precedents, 
erman law : The binding force of precedent is unknown 
o German law. Each Senate (Division) of the German 
mperial Court may depart from its own decisions , when 
it thinks 
' 
fit : yet the departure from the former 
decisions of another Senate was subject to certain 
restrictions; by the qudicature ( Amendment) Act of 
June28, 1935 it was enacted as follows : 
On deciding a point of law the Imperial Court may d.epar 
from a decision which was rendered. before that Act came 
-13- 
into force. 
This rule facilitates the departure from former decisions 
of the Imperial Courts in order to enable the judges 
to conform to the new ideas of the National Socialistic 
Iret ime. 
s to. future decisions of the Imperial Court the Act.of 
Jwné,28, 1935 Imp.iaw Gazette I , 844. lays down : 
Art. 136 : When a Civil Senate of the Imperial Court 
intends to depart from a decision of another Civil 
Senate or of the Great Senate on a point of law the 
Great Senate is to decide the question. 
Art,! 137: A Civil Senate seized of a matter involving 
a ouestion of law.which is of fundamental importance may 
invoke the Great Senate to decide the question of law 
if it thinks fit to do so for reason of the evolution o; 
law or of securing uniformity of decision. 
Although the doctrine of the binding force of precedent 
does not obtain under German law the lower courts follow 
the decisions of the superior courts and of the Imperial 
Court for the following reasons : 
( 1) if the judges depart from a settled line of decisions, 
they may become liable for damages to the parties con - 
cerned under certain conditions, 
( 2) a judgment 6f a lower court departing from a 
settled practice will be reversed on appeal from it. 
Swiss law : The binding power of precedents does not 
obtain under Swiss law either. Here too, it is the 
function of the Supreme Court, viz. the Federal Court 
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to.secure the uniformity of the administration of law. 
The Federal Court exercises in civil causes to a certain 
extent a concurrent jurisdiction with the Cantonal courts 
and it is the Court of Appeal from the judgments of the 
appellate Cantonal Courts. The Federal Court also need 
:not follow its own precedents. Swiss law does not recognise 
recedents as binding on the judge, yet it allows the judge, 
here no statutory provision is applicable, to decide 
a case according to the existing Customary law, and 
lin 
default thereof, according to the rules which he would 
lay down if he had himself to act as legislator; 
the._judge mist then be Luidedherein by approved 
egal doctrine and case law. ( Sec.I CC). Thus c a s e -law 
's recognised as a: potential guide for the judge in de- 
ciding a case.. 
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e r III. 
1.Interpretation of statutes. 
(1) The English method. 
((a) For interpretation of a statute, first of all, 
the preamble and the interpretation- section of the 
relative statute as well as the general Interpretatic-: 
Acts 1850 and 1889 are to be used. 
(b) It is to be borne in mind that there is the old 
theory that the statutes are exceptions to the common 
law and therefore to be limited by a strict interpretation. 
This is in accordance with the common law theory towards 
legislative innovation whereunder a statute is to be 
applied to those cases only which it covers expressly. 
although a statute. can abolish any rule of common law, 
it can only do so by express words which alone are to be 
regarded, whereas in the absence of a manifest intention 
the common law governs. Hence the old. common law rule 
crE the literal ( grammatical) canon, also called the 
tolden rule, still applies to the interpretation of 
,tatutes. If by application of the literal rule the 
pecial part of the enactment were inconsistent with the 
nest, 
it may be interpreted in such a way as to avoid 
absurdity ( logical interpretation.) 
(c) The point must further be stressed that by a well 
settled rule the courts interpreting a statute are,in 
'general, not to seek the aid of parliamentary debates, 
reports of Royal Commissions or other preliminary documents. 
In Hildr v. Dexter. ( 1902) AC 474, at p.477 Earl of 
Halsbury said: " I have more than once had occasion to 
day that in construing a statute I believe the worst 
person to construe it is the person who is responsible 
for drafting. He is very much disposed to confuse what 
he intended to with the effect of the language which in 
k 
}Fact has been employed." 
(d) In some cases,however, the courts make use of the 
so called mischief rule in order to interpret obscure 
enactments. This rule laid down in Heydonts case (1584) 
Rep. 76 directs the judge to consider in the interpretation 
of statutes the following things: 
(1) ighat was the common law before passing of the Act? 
(2) What .was the mischief or defect for which the 
common law did not provide? 
What remedy )Jarllamailt had resolved upon and 
appointed? ' 
(4) The true reason of the remedy. 
Even by employing the mischief rule the use of 
analogy is excluded. 
(5) Finally,there are certain presumptions of parti- 
cular importance for the interpretation of social 
reform enactments: that is presumption against 
(a) taking away a common law right; 
(b) barring the subject from the court; 
(c) interfering with the personal liberty of the 
individual. 
Since the petition for divorce a vinculo matrimonii is 
not a common law action but a statutory one, introduced 
by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, the rules as to 
interpretation do not apply to it, in so far as they 
relate to the conflict or rivalry between common law 
and statutes. 
Concluding this chapter it may be observed that it is 
very important that the ri.rht interpretation of a new 
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statute should take place at the start of its administra- 
tion since a decision relating to the statute carries 
with it a new precedent to which the binding powerof 
precedents is attached, and the removal of a wrong inter- 
pretation would meet insurmountable difficulties as above 
stated. 
(2). The Continental method. 
It must be emphasised that under the continental systems, 
since the law is there nearly wholly codified, there is 
no exceptional character attached to a statute as under 
English law which latter leads to a most restrictive 
interpretation of statutes in order to preserve common 
law as far as possible, 
There are three chief theories on this subject 
(a). The TT classical" theory of the completeness of 
legislation.By this theory a statutory provision always 
exists to meet every case and the judge subordinate to 
it is merely to apply the general terms of a statute to 
the specific factual situation. This is also called the 
analytical - dogmatic method as opposed to the 
historo- sociological method. 
(b) The theory of the incompleteness of legislation 
( theory of the school of.legal free- thinkers). By this 
theory there are in every legal system gaps i,e.there 
are often no statutory rules to be found which might 
be applicable to certain sets of circumstances, and 
therefore it is left to the insight of the judge to 
decide the matters brought before him , independently of 
-18- 
4he statutes, according to justiare and equity. In_ all 
the other cases of obscure statutory provisions the ge- 
-e Nl rules as to- interpretation i.e. grammatical and 
logical method obtain In order to ascertain the true 
purpose of the legislature in passing the relative statue 
and the social background of the enactment, the historidal 
interpretation is to be applied andin this connection á 
study of the parliamentary debates and the preliminary 
drafts cannot be overlooked. 
ì 
(c) Lastly, the Viennese school of the so- called 'itheoriT 
Qf .. e law" takes the view that by the true notion 
of "positive " law there is no room for a theoretic 
existence of gaps in the law. At any rate, gaps in the 
law which may be such as arise from the difference 
between positive and desired law, or ambiguities which 
are due to the frame character of the " norm" cannot bel 
solvedby the diverse methods applied by the "jurisprudence 
of conceptions ", such as by the use of argumentum a 
contrario, analogy or the evaluation of interests. The 
"jurisprudence of conceptions" conceives the law as a fixë.d 
order determining i;' human behaviour in every direction 
and seeks to make new from existing norms by means of 
interpretation. The " theor filnr6 law ",on the contrary, 
¡is concerned only with the "posi_tive law" as it is a a 
not with the law as it ought to be nor with evaluation, 
(morals or justice,.- It rejects therefore that traditiokal 
P.egal theory and its illusion of security .in. law,' 
'Vrom the point of view of the theory of pu7eolaWa'. " the 
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7aryiUg, solutions in case of such gaps and ambiguities 
are of er.ual value and there does rot exist any test 
determining which of them is to be nreferr2d to the 
others. Such solutions by way of interpretation found 
in scientific commentaries are in reality pro:osa s 
only to the legislature or to the law making act of 
the judge. It is emphasised that the making of the 
" individual norm" viz. judicial decision is a 12rodue 
of both intellect and will, a fact overlooked by the 
other theories. 
By ,the " theory of pure law" it is left to the un- 
fettered discretion of the judge who is bouna by law 
to decide every case brought before him, and the judg 
in delivering the decision ( individual norm) makes 
law. 
(3). Whether interpretation creates new rules or makes 
only preparatory work, a certain method as to the 
approach is necessary. The most modern solution is to 
be found in para. 1 of the Swiss Code which runs: 
" The law must be applied in all cases which come 
within the letter or the spirit of any of its 
provisions. Whcre nol provision is applicable the 
judge shall decide according to the -existing 
customary law, and in default thereof,according 
to the rules which he would lay dorm if he had 
himself to act es legislator. Herein he must be 
guided by approved 1e,78,1 doctrine and case law." 
The Swiss law thus takes a middle course between thos 
two conflicting theories in points (4) and (b) . On thL 
one hand, it requires the judge to apply the staute;,ibo 
the case in dispt.te, and, on the 
other hand,it leaves it to his insight- if there is 
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o statutory or customary provision applicable,to decide 
he case according to the rules which he would lay down 
f he had himself to act as legislator. 
Under the Austrian law, para. 6 of the Austrian Civil Cade, 
the judge is required in default of a statutory rrovisi n 
to decide the case according to principles of "natural aw". 
he writers on this ¿ubject take the view that by- .thxsoptovi- 
ionc3 is meant that the judge is to endeavour to ascertaiin 
ow the legislators- ' »ould have decided the case if he hald 
hought of it. 
he German Civil Code does not contain any rule relatin 
o its interpretation. The framers of the Oode re`ard_edi 
t as useless to lay down a c:rtain method of interpre- 
ation. Thus it is,left to the discretion of the judge 
o decide a case which is not covered by the Qode, as he 
hinks just and eo.uitable. 
he French Civil Code is equally lacking in rules con - 
erning methods of its intepretation. On the other hand, 
rt. 4 of the French Civil Code provides that " a judge 
ho refuses to decide a case, on the pretext that the 
aw is silent, obscure, or insufficient, may be prose - 
uted as being guilty of a denial of justice." Since the 
hence of the Code on some subject is no reason for re- 
usal of a decision the Code confers thereby upon the 
judge the power of judicial discretion with regard to such 
ases of gaps in the law or of ambiguous -provisions. 
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2.AJharacterization. 
It is often doubtful whether a matter is of judicial 
or administrative nature, or whether a rule is of 
procedural or substantive character, and thus sometime 
arises a conflict of the lows as to the interrretation 
of legal terms or as to classification of doctrines. 
In order to decide any such question of conflict of la rs 
one must use a certain mode of approach to that questi n 
of characterization, as it is generally termed by the 
writers on this subject. 
(a) Primary characterization_. A court which has to dec de 
a case containing a foreign element is required, first 
of all, to ascertain into which legal category a f_aztu 
situation or a rule of law or an institution falls. 
Thus, ;:hen, for instance, an action is brought for 
dissolution of a foreign marriage in an English Court, 
this court will investi5ate whether that marriage is 
capable of divorce proceedings being instituted at all 
in other words, whether that foreign institution may b 
deemed to be a monogamous marriage which alone is capa 
of a divorce proceeding under English law. 
See the cases of Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) 
I,R 1 P and D 130,133.- Nachimson v.TTachimson (1939) 
P 85, 217 CA. R.v. Hammersmith Spt. Registrar,ex p.Mir- 
Anwarrudin ( 1917) 1 KB 634. 
,There re three theories to reach a solution of the 
problem: 
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1) the theory that the foreign later is to beapplied to 
the so- called primary characterization; 
(2) the theory that the lex fori is applicable to it; 
(3) the theory of analytical jurisprudence. 
The for .ign law theory is to be rejected as illogical ; 
for one cannot characterise a matter, rule or instituti n 
by applying a foreign law that is to be selected an the 
basis of that characterization. 
The authorities are unanimously of opinion_ that for 
primary characterization the internal la: of the forum 
viz. in the case above supposed,English internal. law 
is:7the criterion. 
In cases only where no similar concept exists in the system 
of the forum, some writers suggest as a proper principlT 
that the internal law of the forum 
hould for this purpose he enlarged by an analytical 
ramework of general rules built up on the basis of 
nalytical jurisprudence and comparative law: they point 
iut chiefly that only conceptions of such a general 
haracter in connection with the internal law will enable 
he court to -ecide such questions as between different 
yste_as of law. The suggestion for this proper principle 
f rmary classification was first made 1,7 Rabel. 
v 
o 
(b) The next step is to select the connecting factor 
rhich leads to the designation of the law appropriate 
o the determ nation of the cuestion. The characterization 
f the connecting factor is to be effectuate, in the same 
way as in point ka) above, by applying the law of the 
,forum. 
-23- 
As will be discussed.in detail later, the domicil of t e 
spouses is, in general, the criterion for the jurisdic' ion 
as well as for the choice of law ay y.licable to procee- 
dings for divorce under the .nglo -.Ln ericar_ lEr sz stemq 
while in most continental syst,: rs nationality of the 
spouses is that criterion. The English concept of domicil differs 
from that of the continental systems; see p 62 
Hence where an action for divorce is brought in an 
English court, the English conception of domicil will 
be employed to the determination of the question_ of 
whether an English a omicil of the spouses, as test of 
the prisdiction of the court, is established. The same 
applies to a easy ̂here a foreign decree of divorce 
is sought to be recognised or enforced in England;if It_.. 
is ascertained that by English law the spouses have not 
been domiciled in the country whose court rronounced the 
decree in question, the recognition and enforcement of 
the foreign decree will be refused by an English court 
for want of jurisdiction, unless it were valid under th 
law of the ' spouses T domicil in the English sense of the 
term, as will be explained below. 
(c) Choice of the proper law and its delimitation.. 
lkfter the connecting factor has been selected the law 
applicable to the matter is to be chosen by means of th .t 
connecting factor. 
"Jhereas the states' (a) and (b), the so- called primary 
characterization, are performed in accordance with the 
lex fori in the wider sense as above exylained,the 
Characterization in point (c),the selutioncifthe secondary F 
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characterization is effected according to the chosen 
law, the lex causae, with one exception, that is, wherei 
a rule is to be characterised which under the characterï- 
zation adopted by the lex fori fells within the category 
of procedure; in this event the lex fori is exclusivelyi 
applicable. This applies, for instance, to questions 
such as concerning limitation of actions for maintenanc, 




s -.:T::. limitation Qf aç -9 see P 
The court has then to decide how much of that law chose4 
by means of the connecting factor is to be applied as 
substantive, and how much of the law of the forum as 
67 Procedural. See p.... 
The writers do not Agree as to the scope of these two 
kinds of characterization. Whereas Cheshire includes the 
question of capacity or formality under the primary 
characterization; Robertson takes the view that this 
f 
- question is to be dealt with ander the secondary charac y 
t .;rizati on. 
Illustrative applications of rules of characterization : ?lso 
are the following French divorce- cases. 
(1). In the famous case Levincon ( Cass.May 29,1905) 
the question arose whether religious rites as to divorce 
of Russian Jews were a matter of substance governed by 
national law of the parties concerned or of form governed 
by the lex fori. Under Russian law such matters are of 
substantive nature while French law regards them as 
'procedural; the French court held that, since Russian 
law was applicable to ttic case, Russian rules as to 
characterization were to be applied: accordingly,having 
no power to perform such rites as to divorce as the 
Russian ecclesiastical courts could, the court dismissed 
the suit. 
(2). A French court took the opposite view in the case 
Seine Tr. February 15, 1922,Clun1922, p. 396 in which 
the court granted a divorce to Polish citizens domicile. 
in Paris and married in Belgium, in .s1 ite of the fß,Ò1= tliat marriage 
was void for lack of a religious solemnisation required 
by Polish law, and that the latter forbidsdivorce between 
a Catholic and a Jewish spouse. 
As under French law religious disability is deemed to be 
of procedural nature, that decision is in accordance 
with the rules stated above whereunder the rules of the 
lex fori as to characterization are to be applied to 
such cases. 
The reason given by the French court for that decision 
was that the national ( Polish ) law was repugnant' to the 




The prOliminary question. 
In the course of the process of characterization of a 
jurai matter after the conflict rules as to choice of 
law have been selected, sometimes a question of a secon- 
dary jurai matter happens to arise upon which the solution 
of that principal jurai matter detiend.s. It is to be no- 
ted that the " secondary" matter concerns a subject matter 
that is also governed by its own conflict rules in the 
different systems of law; but since tuie secondary jurai 
matter has in the case supposed subsequently arisen,while 
the characterization of the principal matter has taken 
place, the question arises which law is to govern the 
secondary matter, the law that has been selected with re- 
gard to the principal matter or the law to be selected 
with regard to the secondary matter by its own rules of 
conflict of laws. 
Among the German writers on this subject Melchior and 
Wengler take the view that the law which governs the 
principal matter also applies to the secondary matter 
while Raape takes the opposite view. 
The English writers Cheshire and A.H. Robertson hold that 
the law selected for the determination of the principal 
matter should equally control the secondary matter, 
although some English decisions are the other way. The 
correct answer seems to be to follow a middle course, 
namely, that the solution depends also on the nature 
of the secondary matter itself; matters of marriage and 
divorce, for instance, are of so important a character 
With regard to the public interests inhttent :in-.thiaid "that they 
cannot be made subordinate to the r-1es, for instance 
of succession, which are of merely pecuniary character. 
The preliminary question is also a problem of the renvoi 
in the wider sense because there is a similar reference 
to the foreign law, yet it differs there -from in that the 
reference is not made to the same principal question but 
to the secondary one. In Shaw v.Gould (1868)I,R 3 HZ 55 
in which a Scottish divorce was the preliminary question 
to a principal question of the legitimacy of children 
born from the second marriage, the court held that the 
conflict rules as to divorce and not those as to legiti- 
macy control the secondary question; although the second 
marriage was valid according to the law of the domicil 
the second husband, the children were adjudged ille- 
gitimate, since the preceding Scottish divorce was held 
invalid by English law. The same rule was applied in In 
re Stirling ( 1908) 2 Ch 344. No doubt about the solution 
of such preliminary questions can, of course, arise when 
the law ordains that specific rules are to control them. 
See the case of In re Askew ( 1930) 2 Ch 259 referred to 
blow on discussing renvoi. The facts of the case are 
as follows: By an English marriage settlement the husband 
reserved the right to revoke the settled trusts and make 
a new appointment if he married wain. Then in 1911,he 
acquired a German domicil and after having procured a 
divorce, he married another woman with whom he had an 
association some time before; a daughter was born to them 
before the divorce. In 1913 he exercised his power of 
appointment in favour 6f that daughter. The proceedings 
taken at his death in 1929 to test the validity of that 
appointment turned upon the point whether the child could 
be deemed to be his legitimate daughter. Since by sec.8 
of the Legitimacy Act 1926 the question of legitimation 
of a child by virtue of a subsequent marriage is governed 
by the law of the childb domicil at the time of the 
marriage, the English court,holding that it was bound to 
decide the case as a German court would, found that German 
law would refer the matter to the national law i.e. 
English law, which in turn would refer back to the German 
as the domiciliary law, accepted that remission and 
applied German law. Since by German law legitimacy per 
subse uene matrimonium is recognised, the daughter was 
deemed to be legitimate and the appointmentt.herefore 
valid. 
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C h t e r IV. 
The D o c t r i n e of R e n v o i (R e m i s s i n). 
JI XV,4et; 
(2). In general. sC')13- 
>) 're 
As will in detail be explair_ed below, there are under 
the different systems of law three principles govern, - 
the choice of law as to divorce, that is to say, 
as to the question ( 1 ) whether a divorce is ad- 
missible at all, or ( 2 ) if so, upon what grounds ar_a 
under what circumstances it is obtainable. 
a) Under the law of legal units based upon the grin - 
ciple of domicil.( those questions (1) and (2) are 
governed both as to their own citizens and as to the 
foreigners domiciled within 1rheir territory by the le 
fori ; this rule obtains in the Anglo- American law 
systems. 
b) Under the law of legal units based upon the prin- 
ciple of nationality, the above questions (1) and (2) 
are controlled by the national law of the individuals 
concerned ; this is the rule under French and Ita - 
lien law. 
e) There are., lastly, some legal units under whose 
laws some kind of a combination of the principles of 
domicil and nationality controls one of the questions! 
(1) and (2). 
`Thus under German law art. 17 (IV) of the Introductory; 
Statute to the Civil Code the question (1) is ruled by 
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both the lex fori and the national lair of the 
persons 
concerned while Question (2) is controlled by the 
national law of those persons. 
Under Swiss law, on the other hand, question (1) is 
governed. by both national law and lex fori( 7 h I of 
the Federal law of 1891 as amended by the Final Title t 
the Swiss Civil Code), while question ( 2) is controlled 
by the lex fori. ( 7 h III 1.c.) 
LI) . Where then a court of one of the legal units is 
dealing with a divorce matter containing a foreign ele- 
Iment, it is often required by the rules of conflict of 
!laws to apply the law of some other legal unit. There 
arises, however, the question whether by the "law of th 
ILegal unit" is meant the internal law of the unit exclu 
live of its conflict rules or the internal law of that 
unit including its conflict rules. 
(A) The method of approach to this questi -on may be 
threefold. 
4(1) . The French method. 
There, for instance, a French court, on dealing with a 
divorce matter. of U.S.A. citizens domiciled in France, 
I 
is by its law, based upon the principle of nationality, 
required to resort to the law of a legal unit of the 
merican Union in order to decide the case, will find 
!that the law of that legal unit refers back to the law of 
France as the domiciliary law which, by the conflict rule 
of the American unit, governs questions of status. The 
French court will then accept this reference back to its 
Law and det,ide the case by applying internal French law. 
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The reason given for the application of this method of 
the so called "acceptance of the renvoi (remission ) " 
is that, since the reference to the law of the second 
legal unit ( American unit) did not procure a way for 
t' -e solution of the question, the reference back to its 
own law js to be accepted and its own internal law 
applied to the decision of the case in dispute. 
The vast majority of French writers on this subject re- 
ject the renvoi, but the opinions of the courts are the 
other way. The doctrine of the renvoi was applied by 
French courts, for the first time, ta the Forgo case, 
âinal.ly decided in 1882 ( Cass. June 24. 1878. D 1879,1, +4 
C ass.Febr.22 1882, S 1882,1,393).( 10 Clunet 1883,p 64). 
Another argument for the method of approach to the 
problem, resulting in the application of the internal 
law of the forum to the case supposed is as follows : 
rom the reference by the French courts to the law of a 
legal unit of the American Valor, (by "law" , as above 
stated,is meant the law of that American legal unit in 
lits totality, i.e. its internal law plus its conflict 
of laws rule as regards divorce matters), it appears 
that the law of the American legal ,alit has not any rut= 
relating to divorce matters of its n a t i o n a l s, 
pince its basis of such matters is the principle of 
I 
d 
o m i c _i. 1. As, thus, the foreign law to which re- 
terer.ce has been made does not afford any solution of 
Ole case supposed for want of any respective rule, there 
Í 
w, by the view of the supporters of this theory, nothing 
eft but to decide the case by applying the law of the 
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forum; this is called the desistment theory. 
4 (2). The American method. 
IJet us suppose a court of a State of U.S.A., dealing wit 
a matter containing a foreign (French)element, is requir d 
to refer to French law. The American court takes the 
view that lais reference to French law means the internal 
law of the foreign (French) legal unit exclusive of its 
conflict rules end consequently applies the foreign 
¡(French) internal law in that narrow sense. 
A(3). The English method. 
Where, lastly, an English court which is seized of a 
jur.al matter containing a foreign, for instence, French 
element, is required by the English rules of conflict 
of laws to refer to.French law, there arises the same 
question whether or not that foreign (French) law go- 
verning the case is to be administered in its totality 
i.e. including its rules on conflict of laws. The 
English courts take the view that they are reruired.:to 
administer French law in such a way as a French court 
would do, that is to say: Whether a French court by reaon 
of the theory of renvoi adopted by French law administers 
French internal law or w,,u d decide the case by ayplyin 
nglish internal law, because it follows the American 
method explained in point A (2) above, in either event, 
the English court woif1,d dispose of the case in the same way 
as if it were TT sitting in France. TT The three leading 
eases of this English method are: In re Annesley (1926) 
Ch. 692, In re Askew (1930) 2 Ch 259, In re Ross(1930) 
1 Ch 377; reference has been made in the two former 
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'cases to French and German law respectively, which both 
recognise the doctrine of renvoi, and the solution re- 
sulted in applying French and German internal law 
respectively; in the case In re Ross, where it was re- 
ferred to Italian law, to which the doctrine of renvoi 
is unknown, the English court applied its own internal 
law. 
In re Ross has been followed by a recent deaision In re 
O'Keefe, Poingdestre v. Sherman (1940) Ch. 124. 
B. German law has adopted the renvoi theory in part. 
By art. 27 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code 
( E.G.B.G.B.) in respect to certain matters specified by 
articles cited below.provided that, if under the conflicts 
rule of a foroj gn legal unit whose law is declared by 
those articles cited below to be controlling, the German 
lavis are to be applied, the latter laws have application. 
The articles mentioned in article 27 are: art.7 (1) 
(concerning capacity,) art.13(1) relating to marriage), 
art. 15(2) concerning marital property), art.17(1) ±e- 
ating to di.vorce),art.25 ( concerning succession). 
rticle 17 (1) referred to above has the following wor- 
ding: " as to the dissolution of the marriage the laws 
of that state are applicable, to which the husband belongs 
i.t the time of the commencement of the action." 
Thus by virtue of these statutdryprovisions the doctrine 
of renvoi applies in part, to matters of divorce in 
Germany. 
he provision of article 27 of the Introductory Act ta 
he Civil Code was made with the express intent to redu 
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thereby the number of conflict cases resulting from the 
conflict of laws, especially from those as between the 
rinciple of nationality, cf German law and that of domicil 
f other systems of law. 
As regards property relations of spouses, succession, 
capacity and marriage otherconnecting factors are the 
potential elements that may give rise to the renvoi to 
lerman law and thus make it applicable according to 
.rticle 27 of the Introductory Statute to the German Civil 
bode.For those articles cited above provide that, in 
general, the law of nationaliti is to govern the questions 
ust specified; where however the law of nationality for 
.pome reason refers the matter back, the German internal 
law will be applied to those questions. The adoption of 
the principle of renvoi in those cases results, there- 
fore, in.the substitution of the lex domicilii for tho 
law of nationality with regard to matters cf divorce. 
Hence by this acceptance of renvoi ordainedby article 27 
in connection with article 17 (1) of the Introductory Apt 
of the Civil Code from a legal unit of the Anglo - 
American systems baggy -upoÌ the principle of domicil as to 
questions of divorce, German law is to be applied to 
matters of divorce of British and U.S.A. subjects domi- 
ciled in Germany, while such matters of French or Italian 
citizens domiciled. in Germany are governed by their 
national law since it is based on the principle of 
nationality. 
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Renvoi of the second degree of Transmission. 
where an,. English court which is seized of a jurai matter 
involving a foreign element is required by its rules o 
conflict of laws to refer to a foreign law in the wider 
sense, i.e, including also the respective foreign 
conflict rule, the latter law sometimes happens to re- 
fer the matter on to the law of some third legal unit; 
this reference on to the law of a third legal unit is 
called transmission or renvoi of the second degree 
( German: Weiterverweisung). 
One of the most important progressive rules of English 
conflict of laws as to divorce has been established 
through the English method as to renvoi of the second 
degree, namely, the rule laid down in Armitage v. 
Attorney- General (1906)P 135 where_tnzder the validity 
of a foreign decree of divorce is to re recognised by j 
English courts even if rendered by an incompetent forei n 
court, provided. that the decree is deemed valid under t1ie 
law of the domicil of the srouses concerned. 
Fqr detailed discussion of this ruie is hereby referred 
to p 44. 
Reference may now be made to the illustration of a renvo 
of the second degree in In re Trufort, Trafford v. 
Blanc ( 1887) 36 Ch D 600, a case concerning the validit 
of a Swiss judgment: Since under English law jurisdictiln 
as regards the movable estate of a deceased exists in tI.e 
courts of his last domicil, the English court with rege, 
to the testator's last domicil in France referred to 
d. 
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French law end found under the latter law 
the matter 
referred on to the national law of the testator, 
i.e. 
to Swiss law. Accordingly, the English court held 
that 
the judgments of the Zuerich Federal District Court an 
of the Zuerich Court of Appeal in that matter were 
deemed to be final a-nd conclusive and therefore binding 
upon it. 
(Iv), In order to find the legal basis of the renvoi , 
if any, one must seek to ascertain the nature of the 
rules of conflict of laws. 
a) In the view of the TTinternationglistsTT the rules of 
conflict of laws are ;part of the law of nations; the 
law of nations determines the limits of the legislative 
power of the states. This power extends to all persons, 
things and legal relations subject to it under the law 
of nations. 
The rules of conflict of laws constitute e whole uni- 
versally operative system, sufficient to solve all 
¡questions which contain e. foreign element. By this view 
the system of private international law is founded upon 
a supernational basis and is bi re rg the states, 
v .i there exists an international duty of applying these 
rules. 
The Apposite view rejects the theory that the rules 
f conflict of laws are part of the law, of nations and 
that the system of these rules is binding upon the states. 
Úrader their view the legislative competency, viz, the 1 w- 
Making power of the states as regards conflict rules, 
unrestricted a.rd each state may make provisions relati 
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`to this subject at pleasure. This 
view regards the rules 
of conflict of laws as part of the municipal 
law of the - 
relative state derived from its sovereignty and 
thi 
branch of the municipal law the conditions are 
determined 
upon which foreign law is tobe applied. According;.to the 
view of the TT internationalistdT the theory of the renvoi 
is recognised with r.egara to the universally binding 
power of private international law upon the states and 
their courts respectively ; and the reference to a foreign 
law means reference to the totality of that law, thus 
including the system Of Private International law. If 
the purely interne 'law of the foreign legal unit,i.e, 
exclusive of the foreign conflict rules, be applied., 
the decision would be wrong, because a law was applied 
to the case, that according to the foreign conflict 
rules must not be applied to the case in litigation. 
The opposite school, on the other hand, rejects the 
doctrine of renvoi on the following reasoning: 
a) The definite conflict; rule of the forum must not be 
rendered conditional upon the corresponding conflict 
rule of the foreign law, demanding renvoi. Where the la 
a matter to a foreign law, the foreign internal 
law only concerning the point in n.uestion is to be 
applied, and the foreign conflict rule is to be dis - 
regarded. 
) As there is no universally recognised system of private 
international law, founded upon a ,sp@rnàtional law, thére 
does not obtain ei i;her an international duty of applying 
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foreign law and accord'.n_gly no such duty of regarding 
the remission or transmission as binding. 
) . The function of the conflict rule of the forum is, 
by applying to the case in dispute and by referring to he 
oreignn law, exhausted with regard to its selective 
hsracter and cannot be invoked a second or third time 
y means of the renvoi. ( remission). 
. The application of the renvoi doctrine produces un- 
certainty in law, because the matter depends often on 
the doubtful and conflicting evidence of foreign experts.' 
e). The renvoi is, as a rule, unworkable, because there 
is often an endless chain of references. 
(V) . Having given the above survey of the views on this 
subject I now pass to the determination the legal 
basis of the renvoi. 
Although the rules of conflict of laws cannot be said to 
be derived from the law of rations ( public international 
law) or even to be a port t`ier ,f,yet it is undeniable that 
there is in many a respect some connexion between them. 
First of all, there exists a series of bilateral and 
multilateral Conventions treating of some questions of 
private international law. 
In addition, there are Tàri:ous international tribunals 
Of justice which deal with jurai matters to which the 
rules of conflict of laws have to be applied. 
Those rules and decisions, founded. upon Public inter- 
national law, are first of persuasive character and be- 
come eventually binding upon the courts which then 
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..extend their application beyond the purview of 
the 
treaties to analogous factual situations. 
This applies also to a number of rules of conflict 
of 
laws which have been in this way, i.e. by means of 
the 
communis opinio of the courts of diverse legal units, 
universally recognised. 
The objections, referred to in point (c) and (d), seem 
to be erroneous. From the selective character of a 
conflict; rule of itself,does not follow that the 
function of this rule is exhausted by the first reference. 
As tothe further arguments put forward against the 
doctrine of renvoi it may be stressed that there now 
'exists a comprehensive literature on both international 
private law and co tp8rative law by which the attitude of 
the courts towards the question of renvoi can easily be 
asce_°ta.i.ned, and the experts on this subject will assist 
the court in arriving at the right view on this point. 
At any rate, it cannot be denied that in most cases the 
application of the method explained in point A (3) above, 
by the Enrlish courts, shows so far that it promotes 
certainty in law ; for by this method a partylinvoking 
a foreign court can hardly recover a judgment 'different 
from that which an English court would render by appiyi .g 
its method. A further advantage consequential to the 
recedent is that a person who obtains a judgment based on 
envoi from a competent court of one of the countries 
'evolved in the renvoi would not find any difficulty in 
enforcing it in the other country,, since the judgment 
rould have been pronounced according to the law 
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prevailing in the latter country. 
(VI). The foregoing observations were necessary before 
attempting to find the correct answer as to the legal 
basis of the English method. 
(1). On deciding a case, for instance, a divorce case,there 
is not only the particular provision of the divorce law 
to be considered but also the fundamental rules as to 
interpretation, capacity and all the other general rule 
of the system, since they are presuppositions for the 
correct construction of the provision and its applicaticin 
to the case. 
f 
imilarly, in the case of a reference to a foreign law 
ll those fundamental rules and the rules of conflict 
f laws which combined form the general part of the 
oreign law system, are equally to be taken into consi- 
deration , as the specific provision of the foreign 
municipal law depends upon them.. That specific provision 
can fully be understood only in connection with those 
general rules of the foreign law; for it applies tc an 
ordinary case only and cannot be deemed applicable to a 
case containing a foreign element without having regard 
to the relative rules of conflict of laws. 
Thus the doctrine of renvoi is a consequence of that 
view that the private international law is part of the 
private municipal law. 
Pillet, an opponent of the doctrine of renvoi, equally' 
points out that it is only the latter view as to private 
international law which leads to the adoption of the 
'doctrine of renvoi ; he also opposes this view and is 
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bof opinion that private international 
law is part of the 
law of nations. ( Pillet, Principes 
de Droit Inter - 
Inetional Pr.ivê (1903) page 166). 
'Another foundation of the doctrine of renvoi 
is the 
'vested rights theory ; for the detailed discussion 
of 
this theory may be referred to p. 
Mere it may only be noted that the existence of a veste 
'right can only be ascertained by reference to the law 
óf the country where it had its origin, and thus, in 
case of a foreign judgment that is conclusive of the 
ight,it decided this vested right arising from that 
judgment can equally only be ascertained by reference t 
1 
the law of the country whose courts pronounced it. 
(rowdson v. Leon and 4 Cranch 434, Dalrympe v Dalrympe 
? 12 I aggConsist.54. In logical consequence of the rule 
of the Anglo- American law systems whereunder domicil 
is the criterion as to jurisdiction and choice of law i 
;matters of divorce, by application of the doctrine of 
¡ 
i 
renvoi in cases where a court other than that of the 
'domicil of the spouses pronounced a decree of divorce,t e 
'law of the spouses domicil is applied to the question o 
the validity of that decree. 
4rmitage v. Attorney General ( 1906 ) P 135 and the cads 
cited above. Hence it is the municipal law that demands 
the application of the foreign law and by the English ethod 
the courts have to apply that doctrine whenever the 
foreign law to which reference has been made adopts: th s 
doctrine. 
English courts applying the method above described 
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followed as ever their own conceptions of utility and 
justicei and not some " inconvenient doctrine" as the 
opponents thereof assert ; for at the time when to the 
case of Collier v. Rivaz ( 1841) 2 Curt. Ecc 855 the first 
time the renvoi was applied there was not any theory of 
benvoi known. 
.1cr all these reasons every objection' to the general 
admissibility of the doctrine of renvoi seems to be 
erroneous; this doctrine is a just and pratticable method 
of the solution of questions as to conflict of laws. 
VII. There are, of course, cases in which the doctrine 
of renvoi has no application. 
(1). Since the municipal law of each legal unit has to 
determine the scope of the applicability of its rules of 
conflict of laws, it may make a statement to the effeci 
that its reference to the foreign law of a legal unit mans 
the reference to the purely internal law exclusive of the 
onflict rules of the latter law and may in this way ex- 
pressly or impliedly exclude the applicatbn of the renvoi 
altogether or in part only. The courts are thus required 
simply to follow such provisions of the law. 
(2). Further where the same connecting factor and the 
same choice of law rule are tO be applied under the law 
cf the forum as by the foreign law to which reference is 
made, there is no room for the application of renvoi. 
(3) Again there may be some cases in which the renvoi 
might lead to an endless chain. of references to and bac 
as for instance, in the case where both the lex fors an 
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the foreign law to which reference is made require the 
application of the doctrine of renvoi. The course of 
such references could be stop:I?ed at the first remission 
or the first transmission where the law to which reference 
had been made would for reasons stated in points (1) 
and (2) above refer the matter to the purely internal 
law. Otherwise such a case must be treated as if the 
proof of the foreign law which had to be applied -cannot 
be established and English internal law is to be applied 
to the case according to the decisions in Brown v. 
Gracey ( 1821) Dow & Ry TJ 41 and Smith v. Gould (1842)' 
4 MoPC 21, Lloyd v. Guibert LR 1Q B 129 cited by West- 
lake, 5, ed.p. 423'; in those decisions the rule has been 
laid down that where the proof of foreign law fails, 
English law is to be applied. 
(4). The opponents of the doctrine of the renvoi point 
out that the English method leads to an endless chain 
cf references and is therefore impracticable where the 
foreign law to which reference has been made adopted. the 
same method as the English courts have. The solution of 
the question may be found as stated above in point (3). 
The same result can be arrived at on the following 
easoning; The v-gwtaken in some decisions on the- subject 
enies that renvoi is art of English law. The attitude 
f the English courts towards this question is, in fact, 
noncommittal and depends solely upon the foreign law to, 
which English law refers the partic,ilar case containing a 
foreign element. Hence if a foreign law applied the same 
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approach to the subject es English 
law, the renvoi doct$'ine 
consequently must be deemed to be 
ro part of that foreign 
law as it is none of English law, according 
to decisions 
above mentioned. Accordingl7 , such a case is 
similar to 
that we dealt with in discussing In Te Ross, 
in which 
case it was referred to Italian law which does not accept 
renvoi. 
(VIII) . (a) The English method explained above is 
applied also to the question of the validity of foreign 
ivorce decrees. 
Under the English choice of law rule the test of the 
validity of a foreign decree of divorce is the law of the 
domicil of the spouses at the date of instituting divorce 
proceedings, thus the English courts refer in; cases where 
a decree has not been rendered by the court of the 
domicil to the law of the foreign domicil of the spouses, 
in other 
would administer if the question as to the validity of 
41.ecree arose before them. 
This is a reference td the law of the domicil of the 
spouses in its totality, viz. 
eluding the rules of conflict 
words to the law which the courts of the domicil 
such 
to the municipal law in- 
of laws, thus if under the 
latter the decree of divorce is valid, the English courts 
qually recognize its validity, although that decree has 
een pronounced by a court that has under English law 
110 jurisdiction to pronounce that decree and _the groiund cf'f 
divorce is reCognise$either under English internal law, 
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nor under the internal law of the domicil. This methodlof 
dgeidtAg the question of validity of a divorce decree 
in the same way as the courts of the domicil would, was 
first applied to the case of Armitage v. Attorney Ge 
neral (1906) P 135 in which Sir Gorell Barnes P. pointd 
out as follows : 
TT The only question that remains for consideration 
" is the question of English law. Are we to reco riize 
TT in this countrÿ the binding effect of a decree 
Tr obtainedin a State in whichthe husband is not 
TT domiciled, if the Courts of the State in which 
" is domiciled recognized the validity of that 
TT decree? This point has not been distinctly de- 
TT termined in the Courts' of this country. The 
" nearest decision is to be found in the somewhat 
TT analogous case of Harvey v. Farnie ( 1882) 8 App. 
" Cas. 43, in which it was held 
'that the English Courts recognise as valid. the 
'decision of a competent foreign Christian tribuw- 
'nal dissolving the marriage between a domiciled 
'native in the country where such tribunal has 
'juryd ction, and an English woman, when the 
'decree of divorce is not impeached by any species 
'of collusion or fraud. And this, although the 
'marriage may have been solemnised in England and 
'may have been dissolved for a cause which would 
'not have been sufficient to obtain a divorce in 
' Engl n,î d . 
','T'he evidence in the present case shows that in the 
TT State of New York the decision of the Court of 
TT South Dakota would be recognised as valid. The TT point then is this : Are we in this country to 
TT recognise She validity of a divorce which is re- 
" cognised as valid by the law of the domicil? In Tr my View, this question must be answered in the TT affd.rmative. It seems to me impossible to come to " any other conclusion, because the status is affected " and determined by the decree that is recognised in 
TT the State of New York - the Stab of the domicil - TT as having affected and determined it. T' 
Cb) I now pass to some other decisions of English courts 
concerning the validity of decrees of divorce which are 
ápplicaions of the rule stated above under point (a). 
bl). The facts in Cass v.Cass (otherwise Pfaff) (1910) 
26 TI,R 305 were as follows: 
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A wife after procuring a divorce in South Dakota from her 
husband who was domiciled in Massachusetts and had re- 
ceived no notice of her suit, married in New York an 
Englishman, domiciled in England. The latter then peti- 
tioned for annulment of that marriage on the ground that 
his wife's divorce was invalid and therefore the second 
u arriage void, since the former husband was living at t4e 
date of the second marriage. The evidence showed that the 
divorce was invalid under the law of the domicil i.e. 
Massachusetts. The court held that it should determine 
the validity of the divorce as a court of Massachusetts 
would, and accordingly declared that decree invalid. 
(2) . Shute v.Shute (1930) Times March 11. 
An English woman hid been domiciled with her husbend,an 
Englishman, in England. Over 20 years after the marriage) 
the went to California and obtained a divorce there ; btit 
without domicil,on the ground of non -support. The former 
husband petitioned for divorce in England and the court 
í 
held, on the same reasoning as above, the Californian 
decree invalid. 
3). Stirling v. Stirling (1908) 2 Ch. 344. 
]1n that case the wife procured a divorce in North Dakota 
Irom her husband, domiciled in Scotland, on grounds that 
4ere neither under the law of Canada, where the marriage 
took place, nor under the law of Scotland, recognised as 
sufficient to obtain a divorce. Since that decree was 
not recognised as valid under Scottish law, the English 
court equally held the decree of di;o.rce invalid. 
(4) Clark fir. Clark : ( 1921) T.L.R. 
815. 
The wife domiciled in New York, having married 
in England 
a husband of the same domicil, obtained in France 
a 
decree of divorce which was binding between the partiesl 
in the State of New York. She subsequently filed a peti 
tion for restitution of conjugal rights in the English 
I©cw2rt. She did. not appear at the hearing and the court 
having found, on expert evidence, that the French decree 
of divorce was valid in the court of the State of 
New York, dismissed the petition. 
(c). U.S.A. Method. 
By this method the forum's conflict of laws rule is 
simply a reference to the appropriate internal leNJ of 
the foreign legal unit. 
The first case decided in that way was the case of 
Talmadge 109 Misc. 696; 181 NY. 336, 1919. This was a 
Case concerning succession. 
divorce cases, however, American courts apply the same 
iethod as the English courts in the case of Armitage v. 
t 
ttorney General. See the cases : 
all v. Cross 231 NY. 329, 332; 132 NE 106,107 (1921). 
can v. Dean 241 NY. 240; 149 NE 844 (1925). 
!Powell v. Powell, 211 App. Div. 750; 208 NY Supp.152 (1925) 
,ando v. Lando, 112 Minn. 257; 127 NW 1125 ( 1910 
( a case as to the validity of a marriage) . 
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 1934, which is of 
Persuasive character only, rejects the doctrir of renvoi 
subject to the qualification contained in i8: 
TT 
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(i). All questions of title to land are decided in 
accordance with the law of the state where the land is, 
including the conflict of laws rules of that state. 
(2). All questions concerning the validity of a decree 
of divorce are decided. in accordance with the law of t] e 
domicil of the parties, including the conflict of laws 
rules of that state." 
There appears recently to be a trend in U.S.A. to apply 
the doctrine of renvoi also to contract cases. 
See the case University of Chicago v. Dater, 2'70 NT l75 
( Mich. 1936) . The Supreme Court of Michigan found that, 
by the Michigan choice of law rule, the matter was re- 
ferred to the law of Illinois, which referred it back tó 
Michigan law. The Supreme Court of Michigan accepted thé 
remission and applied Michigan law. 
(d) French courtsapply the doctrine of renvoi to all 
I 
branches of law, particularly to suits for divorce brought 
before them by foreigners domicled in France. 
Under French law which is based on the principle of natio- 
nality the national law of the foreigners concernedi applies 
in general to the question whether divorce is admissible 
and on what ground it la ,yet in case of application of 
the dectrine of renvoi French law alone controls these 
questions.. 
Tr. Seine,Febr. 11, 1913,Clunet 1913,1233 in which case 
renvoi was applied to a divorce between British subject ; 
lyon,July 24, 1898, Clunet 1899, 569. 
paris, March 15, 1899,Clunet 1899, 794. 
Rennes, July 24, 1923, Gazette Palais 1923,2,545. For the details reference is made to DX? 
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(e). Under German law, as stated above,the statutory 
renvoi applies to causes of divorce where the national 
law of the spouses concerned refers the matter back to German p Lam, 
law. ( Art. 27 of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code). 
It was doubtful whether this statutory provision includes 
7 ;I 
also transmission (TTweiterverweisungTT ) ; the decision . 
of the Second Senate of the German Imperial Court of ,as 
and the Court held that on administering foreign law its K 
conflict rules must " also be applied because not` °'` s  ply.  It was 
November 30, 1906, RG. 64,393, was in the affirmative 
feasible to applyfragmentaryTTparts only of the proper 
foreign law to the case in ligitc t :ö .:. 
For details reference is made to p.177. 
The doctrine of renvoi is not recognised by Italian law; 
see decision of Naples June 5, 1920, Revue de droit 
international privê 1921, pag. 269. 
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Chapter V.. 
Domicil and nationality. 
In general. 
Among the great number of connecting factors due l' -ivy thel 
diverse laws on conflict of laws for the determination 1 
of jurisdiction in matters of divorce and for the selection 
of the law governing them there are both legal notions nd 
: domicil, nationality, residence, Xactsf_y namely.,:, 
place of celebration of marriage, place where the cause 
of divorce has occured, etc. 
'he legal conceptions of domicil and nationality are of 
-the utmost imp,, tance to this subject. The essentials of 
these legal conceptions, domicil and nationality, are 
not uniformly fixed, as will be shown below. 
The use of those tìvo notions as connecting factors 
carries with it some advantages and disadvantages: 
(1) By the principle of domicil all persons domiciled 
;within the respective legal unit are subject to the 
law thereof, whereas, in case of nationality being the 
'test oil _: choice of law, different national laws have 
to be applied according to the nationality of the in- 
dividuals concerned 
(2) By the use of domicil as test, the difficultiea are 
.l:soavbided arising out of the Principle of nationality 
with regard to persons of double or more nationality an4 
apatrids; those difficulties are increasing : 
(a) since the modern legislation. of States: ' on 
nationality grants the married women nationality diffe- 
rent from that of their husbands, by allowing the married 
Women to retain their original nationality on marriage 
4/ 
 
or to acquire a different nationality during marriage; 
(b) There are nattralisati on laws permitting expatriation 
before theloond of allegiance to the original state ha4 
been severed ; this carries with it that a person may 
be of doable nationality while deprivation_ of nationality 
ac^ording to statutory provisions of sóme states or 
the renonncment of nationality creates the status of 
apatrides. Domicile, as a subsidiary test is sometimes 
applied to questions of status of stateless persons 
under the laws of those countries which generally re-. 
coenise nationality as test of such questions. 
(3) The disadvantage of dòmicil' béing" stchF tebt tib:I that the 
citizens of the relative legal unit by acquiring a 
foreign domicil, become subject to an alien law. 
(4) A disadvantage common to both these connecting 
factors is this, that the individuals concerned can 
change the domicil and nationality respectively. Yet ince 
the trend of post -war legislation is to render the 
naturalisation of foreigners most difficult, further 
disadvantage of domicil may be that it can be esj,gr 9n41. e e4,4,LZ.7 
changed and thus there is more opportunity for a hus 
basi.d to change his domicil to the prejudice of his wife. 
73sß now a combination of those two tests provided by 
the laws of Germany and Switgerland seeps to avoid thel 
difficulties outlined above - see p.zz.. 
In the Anglo- American systems of law domicil is the 
sole test in matters of divorce both as regards juris- 
diction and choice of law, as will be discussed in oNQ 
detail below, p.10,235. z. 
Vii, 
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40n the other hand, in those countries which adopt 
nationality as test with regard to choice of law in 
matters of divorce the national law of the individuals 
concerned is to be applied. There are two exceptions to 
this rule : 
(1) Wher_ _ito s' rppug tanieto the public policy of the 
/1ex fori,the national law is not applicable; thus 
Italian Courts eventually refused to grant divorce a 
vinculo matrimonii to foreigners as being against the 
undam.ntgl principles of Italian law that does not 
recognise divorce a vinculo matrimonii : 
(2) Where the law of the legal unit to which the 
roreigner belongs adopts domicil as a test of choice of 
law and the lex Pori adopts the .doctrine of renvoi ; 
hence French Courts refer in cases of divorce of U.S.A. 
citizens domiciled in France, to the la. of U.S.A. ,i_.e. 
6f the relative State of the American Union as the 
ational law which refers the matter back to French law 
s the domiciliary law. The French courts then.accept the 
renvoi on the reasoning that a refusal to do so would 
eau. A denial of.. jústice . 
hat the difficulties arising from the principle of 
nationality being the test of choice of law in matters 
of divo_.ce appear to be increasilag with regard to the 
general trend towards equality of married women in 
questions of nationality is shown by the respective 
provisions cited, prose tly: 
(1) The former "c1assiu" principle that the wife un- 
conditionally loses her nationality by marriage to a 
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oreigier and acquires that of her husband, obtains in 
0-ermany E Law of Nationality, July 1913 ss6, 17 (6). 
(2) Some nationality laws provide the so- called "negative" 
clause i. e, the conditional rule under which the woma 
loses her nationality only in case she acquires the 
nationality of her hus1Dan_d, as-in Great Britain ( Na- 
tionality Act,19i4, sec. 10 as amended by Acts of 1918 
and 1922), in Italy ( Law of Nationality Act 1912,192 ). 
in Switzerland ( Swiss Constitution Art. 54,IV. and Ci it 
Code Art. 16 
(3) Finally, there is a third type of laws, of nationality, 
which contain the so- called T' positive" clause,by whit 
it is declared that marria °e to a foreigner does not 
affect the nationality of a woman,except by an express 
;declaration by her to the contrary. Thus under French 
-law, art. VIII of the Nationality Law of August lo. 
1927, a French woman marrying a foreigner maintains her 
French nationality unless she expressly declares a wish 
to acquire his nationality in accordance with the pro- 
visions of the national law of the husband; she loses 
French nationality if the spouses fix their first domicile 
out of France afterthe celebration of the marriage and 
if the woman necessarily acquires the nationality of the 
husband, in virtue of hin national law. 
In U.S.A. under the so- called Cable Act of Sept. 1922 
's. 3(a)equally the citizenship of awoman marrying a 
foreigner remains unaffected unless she makes a formal 
renunciation of it before a court having jurisdiction 
9Vt.T. naturalisation of foreigners. 
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4,s a rule, the nationality of a. wife is not affected by 
the dissolution of the marriage. This is the ride in 
Great Britain ( s.7a 1.g.). 
`Under American Cable .Act of 1922 a wife who has acquire 
merican citizenship by marriage retain it, after ter - 
mination of the marital status, if she continues to re- 
side in USA, unless she formally renounces it; residing 
abroad, she may retain her American citizenship, by 
registering as an American citizen before an American 
consul within one year after termination of the marri ag: 
n Germany the law provides for the unconditional loss 
áf nationality by the wife upon loss of nationality by 
he husband, whereas Italian and Swiss law provide thai 
the wife loses her nationality only if she acquires a 
new nationality with her husband; under Italian CC art.1l 
She may retain her Italian nationality if she continues 
Ito reside in Italy. 
krther, ir. Great Britain, under the Nationality Act as 
amended by Act of Nov. 17, 1933 it is provided that the 
vifefs loss of nationality through her husband is condi- 
,ional, upon that she failed to elect, under the form 
rescribed by the law, to retain her o- iginal nationelit 
i.nally, in U.S.A. it is provided, by impli.cation,under 
Brie Cable Act of 1922 , s.3. (a) as amended by the Act 
Qf March 3, 1931, that a change of nationality by the hub- 
! 





English Co3nmon Law on. Domicil. 
" Domicil is impossible of definition," said Sir Georg 
Jessel in DoA44 v. GeogYegan ( 1878) Z.R. 9 Ch.D.441,4'6, uzet All 
The common law theory of domicil distinguishes between 
domicil of origin and that of choice. The former is inH 
voluntarily acquired,( by operation of law) whereas the' 
latter is voluntarily adopted. Since by that theory the e 
can he no person without a domicil, everyone must have 
either a domicil of origin or one of choice. But no 
person can at the same time have more than one domicil. 
An independent person of full age and capacity may 
change his domicil by his own act; a dependent's domicill 
can. be changed only by the act of the person on whom he 
or she is dependent. 
Domicil of origin. Every person has by law a domicil of 
origin_. It may however be some time in abeyance as will 
be explained below, but it can, at any rate, be ascer- 
tained by the following rule: The domicil of origin of 
a child who descends from lawfully married parents is 
determined by the domicil of his ( her) father. The 
domicil of origin of a posthumJ child is the domicil 
t 
of the mother; the same applies to an illegitimate chilli. 
l'A- 
foundling has the domicil of origin in the place 
he or she was born or found. Lauderdale Peerage (1885) 
10 App.Cas/ 647, 692. 
Abandonment of the domicil of oriEin. 
A domicil of origin cannot be destroyed by the will or 
act of the party,as Lord Westbury put it in 
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-Udny v. Udny ( 1869) Z.R. 1 Sc. Ap. 457: 
TT It ( the domicil of origin ) may be extinguished by 
act of law, as, for example, by sentence of death or 
exile for life, which puts an end to the status civilis 
bf the criminal, but it cannot be destroyed by th °will 
Dr act of the party." 
domicil of choice can be acquired by every in_dependeni 
erson of full age and capacity. For acquisition of a 
omicil of choice two essentials are required, a factual 
nd an intentional one, that is to say, the establishment 
bf a new actual residence ( factum ) with the intention 
remain for an indefinite time ( animus manendi) ; if 
such a domicil of choice is abandoned without a new do- 
micil of choice being established by both elements men- 
tioned above, the domicil of origin revives. 
Froof of change of domicil. 
Domicil is as stated above, the country where a person has 
tstablished his residence -ith the intention to remain 
there for an indefinite time. A person may be domiciled 
in a country although having to special place which can 
1,e termed his home. From the decisions Bell v. Kennedy 
1868) 1 Sc.App. 307. Winans v. Attorney General (1904) 
I. C . 387 and Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary (1930) 
.C. 588 it is apparent how difficult it is to discharge' 
dhe burden of proof as to the fact that the domicil of 
:rigin has been superseded by a domicil of choice. 
In the decision of Winans v. Attorney General it was la d 
down that TT it must be proved with perfect clearness ani 
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Wily v. Udny ( 1869) L.R. 1 Sc. Ap. 457: 
" Ii.-. ( the domicil of origin ) may be extinguished by 
act of law, f for example, by sentence of death or 
exile for life, which puts an end to the status civilis 
of the criminal, but it cannot be destroyed by the will 
o - act of the party." 
A. domicil of choice can be acquired by every independen 
person of full age and capacity. For acquisition of a 
domicil of choice two essentials are required, a factua 
and an intentional one, that is to say, the establishme t 
if a new actual residence ( factum ) with the intention 
o remain for an indefinite time ( animus manendi) ; if 
Such a domicil of choice is abandoned without a new do- 
nicil of choice being established by both elements men- 
tioned above, the domicil of origin revives. 
goof of change of domicil. 
i)omicil is as stated above, the country where a person as 
established his residence Yith the intention to remain 
there for an indefinite time. A person may be domiciled 
in a country althouçh having to special place which can 
be termed his home. From the decisions Bell v. Kennedy 
( 1868) 1 Sc.App. 307. Winans v. Attorney General (1904) 
A.C. 387 and Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary (1930) 
A.C. 588 it is apparent how difficult it is to discharge 
he burden of proof as to the fact that the domicil of 
origin has been superseded by a domicil of choice. 
In the decision of Winans v. Attorney Generel it was la d 
down that T' it must be proved with perfect clearness an 
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satisfaction to the court that a person had formed a 
fixed and settled purpose to abandon his domicil and to 
settle in the new country. 'T In the case of BOidrini v. 
BOid_rini ( 1931) 48 T.L.R.94, it was laid down that the 
Aliens Order 1920 did not prevent an alien from acquiring 
an English domicil, provided that both essentials animus 
and factum were established. 
It is, however, less difficult to prove that a domicil 
of choice has been changed. In general,change of nationa- 
lity of itself is no unroof of change of domicil. 
Stanley v.Bernes (1830) 3 Hag.Ecc.373. 
Effect of change of domicil in matters of divorce. 
Where the essentials as to the acquisition of a new domicil 
of choice (taking up the residence and intention to change 
the domicil) are proved,the courts will not inquire into 
the motive,This is definitely settled by the decision 
of Drexel v.Drexel(1916) 1 Ch.251,where Neville held 
that a husband abandoned his English domicil by residence 
in France though he had settled there merely to get a 
divorce. 
Scottish Law. Effect of change of domicil. 
As the decisionscited above show,the law on domicil is 
now in Scotland the same as in Englan.d.If a change of 
domicil takes place after committing a matrimoiial offence 
domicil is not lost: Redding v.Redding (1888) 15 R 1102 
(fraudulent,malicious change),Jack v.Jack (1862),24 D 4;7. 
But it is nowa'settled rule of Scottish law that the 
courts do not make inquiries into the motive of the 
change of domicil since the decision of Carswell v.Ca. swell 
(1881) 8 R 901 in which case it was held. that 
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1 Scottish court would 
grant a decree in favour of a 
husband who has become domiciled in Scotland for the put - 
hose of obtaining divorce from his wife on some ground 
which is not admitted as a ground of divorce by the law 
of his former domicil. 
his was followed by Stavert v. Stavert ( 1882) R 519 
pteel v. Steel ( 1888) 15 R 896,904; Ross v. Ross (1940) 
$.C. ( BI ) 1. The decision in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesuridr 
( 1895) AC 517 has not altered the position since the 
onception of domicil 'n the strict sense of this term ap 
inderstood by that decision excludes collusion or fraud. 
.S.A. Lam on Domicil. 
. ) Common law doctrine. The common law theory of domi 
it obtains with some modifications: There is less strelps 
aid upon the requirement of a permanent intention to make 
1 
home with regard to the fact that in America the condif 
ions are less stable and permanent. As Parker J. stated! 
i 
it in Putnam v. Johnson 10 Massachusetts 488, 501(1813) 
" In this new and enterprising country, it is doubtful 
whether one half of the young men, at the time of their 
emancipation, fix themselves in any tom with an inten- 
,ion of alvays staying there.'They settle in a place by 
ay of experiment, to see whether it will suit their virw 
f business and advancement in life ; and with an in- 
ention of removing to some more advantageous position 
'f they should be disappointed. Nevertheless, they have 
their home in their chosen abode while they remain." 
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n this case it was held that a student in a theological 
school taking a course, which by its nature came to an 
end in three years, mi'ht nevertheless acquire a domicil 
in the school. 
n Winans v. Winans 205 Massachusetts 388 the court 
ound that requirement of " the intention of taking 
p residence either permanently or for an indefin to 
imr " to be subsisting and decided that the husband whd 
ame with his wife to a hotel in Boston and stopped thee 
or a few days while house- hunting and before a house hd,d 
een chosen, deserted her, had acquired a domicil in 
oston. Similarly, it was declared by the court 6f New. Jersey 
in Harral v. Harral 39 N.J. Eq. 279 : 
" That place is a domicil of a.person in which he 
has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a 
mere temporary or special purpose, but with a 
present intention of making it his home, unless 
and until something which is uncertain and un- 
expected shall happen to induce him to adopt some 
other permanent home." 
B). Restatement of conflict of laws. 
In the definition of domicil given in the Restatement of 
conflict of laws it is_a190 mentioned : " an intention to 
make the new dwelling -place his home." 
(a).Statutes 
As will be more fully discussed later, the jurisdiction 
to grant a divorce in U.S.A. is entirely statutory; in 
these statutes generally residence or domicil is made 
the basis of jurisdiction for divorce proceedings, but 
the term " residence " is construed by the courts to 
be euivalent to the legal term " domicil " in the 
UMW 
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American sense of that term, explained above. Thus thee. 
courts of New York held in Barber v. Barber 89 Misc.5119, 
De Meli v. Meli 120 N.Y. 485 and the courts of New.Jersey in 
Magowan v. Magowan 57 N.J. Eq. 322 and Harrel v.Harrel 
39 N.J. Eq. 279 that " residence TT required of the 
Plaintiff by the relative statute is synonymous with 
"domicil".. 
U.S.A. Law on change of domicil. 
Parties to a marriage frequently change their domicil 
to another state in order to get there a divorce on a 
gr.ound'that is not suffice_ nt in the court of their pre - 
vious domicil. In such cases there arises a presumptions 
that the animus of remaining in the new domicil is not 
definite, but determinate upon the termination of the 
divorce proveedings. Hence where parties lef-ve one juri.s- 
.d.ic.tion, and take up. a domicil in another, there is 
ï 
part from the requirements as to domicil set out above, 
'a. further essential required, namely, the bona fides of 
the change of domicil i.e.. absolute good. faith in the 
taking up of such domicil and of the animus mane;idi.There 
s a general rule not to grant a divorce unless such 
omicil has been acquired._ under circumstances showing si,ffi- 
cifmt and. controlling xcasons for its acquisition other 
Shan the desire to procure a divorce. 
On the other hind, a person may move to another state, 
Giirder to avail himself of the laws of that state; the 
vowed purpose of seeking a new domicil so as to get a 
ivorce there doestot show illegalsty or even impropriet Y 
-61- 
of motive, although it may well induce the court to re -_. 
quire strict proof of domicil in good faith and. it must 
proved as fully as other material facts are required 
to be proved.See the decisions Streitwolf v.Streit ?golf X58 NJEq 563. 
Wallace v.VWallace 65 NJ Eq .359,Andrews v.Andrews 188 US: 14. 
The Continental Definitions of Domicile. 
The following definitions of domicile are given by the 
statutory enactments mentioned above : 
(1). By French law art. 102 Cc: 
" The domicile of every Frenchmen,as to the err a eme t La-ß 4 
of civil rights, is at the place of his priñcipa- 
establishment." 
Prior to 1927 a foreigner could acquire a domicile in 
France only by express governmental authorisation.. 
(art.l3 Cc). The domicile of a foreigner not having such 
authorisation has been termed " domicile in fact. " 
By the law of August 10, 1927 the article 13 was re - 
pealed and since then the difference between " domicile 
in fact " andTTdomicile in law " of foreigners has dis - 
appeared and the rules concerning acquisition of domi- 
ciles by foreigners are now on the same footing as those 
-laid down in art.102 Cc with regard to the domicile of 
Frenchmen. 
Decision of. March 22,1929, Journal 1930/ 360, 
decision of the Court at Pau, March 19,1934. 
Gazette du Tribunaux,April 29, 1934. 
(2). Austrian law, rara.66 (I)of the Jurisdiction Rules rims: 
TT A person establishes his domicile in the place where 
he has settled with the intention, provable or inferable 
from the circumstances, to take up permannt residence there." 
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(-3) German law, art. 7 B.G.B.: 
YT,A person who resides permanently in a place estab- 
lishes his domicile in that place. TT 
(4) swiss law art. 23 Z.G.B. : 
TT The domicile of a person is established in that 
place where he or she resides with the intention of 
remaining there permanently." 
Prom the reasoi1 set out above it may be concluded that 
the conception of domicile in the continental sense is 
rather equal to that of residence under common law. 
The chief points of difference between the common law 
¡theory of domicil and the conception of domicile under 
the continental systems of law. 
;Unknown to continental - systems of law are : 
(l). The legal idea of domicil of origin which is 
in abeyance during the continuance of a domicil of choice 
and which revives when ;a domicil of choice is abandoned 
!without acquiring another domicil of choice. 
(2),The common law rule that no person can at any time 
be without domicil, 
(3) The common law rule that absence of animus reverters i 
is a condition of the acquisition of a new domicil of 
choice. 
(4). Whereas by common law a person may be domiciled in 
a country without having a special place that can be 
termed his home, it is enessential of the notion of 
domicile in the continental sense to have a special plate 
as permanent home in a country. 
( 
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5) Finally, in regard to the common law rule that no 
erson can have at the same time more than one domicil, 
't is to be observed as follows ; 
nder French law ( art. 102 Cc) and Swiss law (art.23 I ZCB) 
he same rule obtains as under common law, whereas br-a,: 
German and Austrian law are express statutory enactment 44-t.?... 
that a person may -have two or more domiciles. 
Th 
(6) Whereas,in the case of changing the domicil of choice 
until both elements, the factual and the intentional, 
,re complied with, there is under the continental laws, 
he presumption of continuance of the previous domicile 
f choice; no such presumption prevails under common 
aw, at least under English common law, where-under in 
uch case the domicil of origin revives. The common law, 
he French law and the Swiss law differ from theGerman 
nd Austrian law in that under former laws no person can 
ave at the same time more than one domicil, whereas, by 
he latter laws, a pE:rson may have his domicile simul- 
aneously in oeveral places. 
Married women's separate domicil. 
glish law. The domicil of a married woman is by 
operaron of law dependent upon her husband's domicil. 
For t';e legal fiction of unity of husband and wife 
reference may be made to p..7.5. 
Under English common law the rule still obtains that a 
wife's domicil always follows that of her husband till 
divorce a vinculo matrimoyiii; even judicial separation 




ee Warrender v. Warreder ( 1835) 2 Cl F 488; 
olohin v. Robbins ( 1859) 7 HI C 390 
nd Attorney General y. Cock. ( 1926) AC 444. 
the attempt to alter the position of married women 
n this respect and on the final rejection of those 
attempts by the decisions in H.v.H. ( 1928) P 206 and 
erd v. Herd ( 1936) P 205, see pp.M 
it1 out altering this legal position sec. 13 of the 
Iatrimoni_a.i Causes Act. 1937, provides for some mitigation 
(bf the hardship, arising out of this inab}lity of the wife 
f acquiring a separate domicil from her husband, but 
his only for the pùrpose of an ae-t -i-on for divorce; this 
rovision lags down an exception to the prïnciple of 
omicil as the stile test of jurisdiction in proceedings 
or divorce. See pp.w39.. . 
(2) Scottish law. Scottish Law does not recognise a 
separate domicil of a married. woman. By the decision of 
ackinnons Tr.v. Inland Revenue ( 1920) S c (I-11) 171 
it was laid down that it however clear the facts may be 
that the wife was not botund to adhere, this cannot of 
itNelf suffice to prevent the wife's domicil being that 
f her husband." See also Mangrulkar v. Mangrulkar ( 1939) 
C 239, in which case the court expressly declined tò. 
xercise jurisdiction ex necessitate " in proceedings 
or divorce by a deserted Wife. For the details referen 
made to p.247.. 
(3) U.S.A. Law. 
erican courts recognise the right of a wife to acquir 
n independent domicil subject to some qualifications; 
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iee p.251. 
Yet a wife at fault is usually unable to acquire a 
separate domicil ( Williamson v. Osenton ( 1914) 
Rep. 232 US 619. Feuerstein v.Feuerstein.,183 At1.705; 
Del.Sup. Court 1936), and. the courts equally refuse to 
allow a deserting husband to retain the power to change 
his wifeTs domicil. ( Morris v. Morris 160 Misc.59, 
289 NY Supp. 636; Dom. Rel. Court 1936). 
( nder French Law ( art. 108) a woman separated from 
bed and board ceases to have Choit of 11 @t. huAb4114 as her 
legal domicile. 
Yet there is not conferred thereby on the wife an inde 
pendent domicile for the purpose; of founding jurisdiction 
in divorce proceedings. 
The Tribunal of the Seine, May 14, 1926 T Affaire Crane.? 
i held that an American married woman may establish her 
own de facto domicile in France provided the requirements 
under American law are complied with. 
(5)Austrian Law. A separate domicile of a married woman 
is not recognised under Austrian law. Since the test of 
jurisdiction in divorce proceedings is the last common 
iomicileof the spouses according to para. 76 of the ju 
isdiction Rules a deserted wife may sue for divorce in 
ithe court of that place. See p,.264. 
(6) Under German Law a married wife mad :acquire an inde- 
endent domicile according to }hara.10 German Civil Code : 
a) if the husband establishes a domicile, at a place in 
a foreign country to which the wife is not bound to,. 
and does not, follow him; or 
T 
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4b) if the husband has no domicile 
No jurisdiction'Tex necessitate" for a divorce petition 
by a deserted wife of foreign nationality exists under 
'German law; for the details reference is made to p.269. 
Finally art. 25 ( 2) Swiss Civil Code states that a 
'wife may have a separate domicile: 
i(a) If the domicile of her husband is unknown; or 
(b) If she is entitled to live apart from him. 
',Thus, since according to art. 144 ,f the Swiss Civil 
',Code the test for jurisdiction is domicile of the 
aetitioner,a deserted wife may sué for divorce at her 
domicile. For the details refers -r_ce is made to a2.7?... 
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C h a p t er VI. 
Husb a n d and ,,i i f e. 
M a r r i a g e. 
English Law. Since the existence of a valid marriage is 
the presupposition of proceeding for divorce, there 
are a few statements to be made with regard to how this 
legal relationship is to be treated, at least in outline. 
(a) Only a " Christian" marriage i.e. a monogamous 
marriage can be the basis of divorce proceedings under 
'En «lish law, This rule is laid down in the case of 
,Hyde v. Hyde LR 1P & X 130 where marriage is defined 
as a " union of one man with one wife for life." 
" Marriage can well be said to be something more 
than a contract either religious or civil- to be 
an institution. It creates mutual rights and obli- 
gations as all contracts do but beyond that it 
confers a status. The position or status of 
"husband 
' and 'wife' is a recognised one 
throughout Christendom. The laws of all Christie* 
nations surround that status with a veriety of 
le al incidents during the lives of the parties, 
and invest definite rights upon their offspring." 
Although it is true that a polygamous marriage can never 
be the subject of matrimonial jurisdiction under En,_lish 
law, it may be held valid for some other purposes as, 
for instance, legitimacy of children. 
(b) There are a few elements involved in this legal 
relationship of a contractual ( consensual) nature.On 
the other hand, there are some elements quite different 
from what belonged to ordinary contracts,as will be dis- 
cussed later. 
Some confusion has arisen from confounding the contract 
to marry with the marriage relation itself. From the 
view of marriage as a contract has evolved the theory 
bf the so- called "English Marriage." 
For the details reference is made to p. 91 and 235. 
"C, 
ThE. doctrine that jurisdiction in divorce might be 
founded on a domicil called " the domicil of marriage " 
of a less permanent character than the domicil of succession 
was followed by some decisions: Yelverton v.Yelverton(1859) 
Brodie v. Brodie ( 1861) 2 Sw & Tr 259; 
Niboyet v. Niboyet ( 1878) 4 ID 1. 
No clear definition o matrimonial domicil" was 
given by those decisions as, for instance, " the place 
where it is the duty of the wife to rejoin her husband" 
or " the place where the home or seat of the marriage 
is for the time being." 
This theory was finally dismissed in Le _esurier v. 
Le Mesurier ( 1895) AC 517 where the modern rule was laid 
down that the soletest of jurisdiction in divorce is 
the domicil of the husband. 
Under Lngl sh law the use of the term " matrimonial 
domicil" is now confined to marital interests in property 
and to succession as regards movables.Thus the question 
whether a will as to movables is revoked by marriage is 
governed by the law of the matrimonial domicil i.e.by 
the law of the country where the testator was domiciled 
at the date of the marriage. 
Under American law the term " matrimonial domicil" is 
applied to the determination of the validity of a decree 
of divorce pronounced by a court of the residence of one 
party without personal service of process on the other 
party. See p...5L.. 
- 
Scottish Law. Theorz_of the Special Matrimonial Domicil. 
This doctrine was first formulated in Jack v.Jack (1862) 
24 D 467; it was held in this case that the court of the 
place of residence of the married pair for the time 
had jurisdiction in divorce, that a special matrimonial 
domicil or something less than permanent domicil is 
sufficient -tó found jurisdiction. Lord Justice Clerk 
pointed out there - " The true urgency, I appreher4in 
every such case, is - where is the home or Teat of the 
marriage for the time - where are the spouses actually 
if they be together, or if from any cause they are 
separate, what is the place in which they are under obli- 
gation to come together and renew,or commence, their 
cohabitation as man and wife ? " 
The judicial definitions of " matrimonial domicil " 
were also in the later decisions based on this theory 
wanting in precision. In Wilson v.Vlilson 10 Macph.573 
the Court took the view that the effect of the judgment 
litt 7. litt i Macph. 106 was that a matrimonial domicil 
must be held to be unknown to th0 law. 
In Low v. Low 19 R 115 ( 1891) Lord Trayner expressed a 
clear opinion that no domicil but an absolute domicil 
could confer jurisdiction in actions of divorce. 
In Dombrowitzki v. Dombrowitzki 22 R 906 ( 1895) it was 
held that Jack v. Jack 24 D 467 C1862.)W t il..a_ binding 
¡authority. This theory was finally dismissed by 
Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier ( 1895) AC 517.0x'. 
hall. v. Mall ( 189) 32 SLR 468. 
English,. Law. Status Theory. 
The marriage conctract differs in many a respect from `- 
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ordinary contracts. 
At common law, marriage has only a few elements of 
contract: E.g. no other contract merged the legal 
existence of the parties into one, as the fiction oz 
uhe unity of husband and wife at common lay.It cannot 
be rescinded or its fundamental terms changed by 
agreement. The rights and obligations arising from 
this relation are not assignable nor transferable.It 
is not a mercontract; it is a status of great public 
interest; it is founded upon consent and contract of 
the parties... but once create.. every country 
declares the rights, duties and obligations.See p.l,.. 
Sottomayer v. De Barros, 1879, PD 94 at p. 101 per 
President; " Marriage is a status arising out of 
contract to which each country is entitled to attach 
its own conditions, both to its creation and duration." 
That the creation of this status is not ruled by the 
1a71oci contractus only as it was held by the contractual 
theory of marriage and that a distinction between the 
forms of entering into the contract of marriage and the 
essantials ( substance) of the contract must be made,; 
was emphasised in Brook v. Brook H.Z. Case.193,208. r/ 
(1861) by Lord Campbell who pointed out: " If contrary 
JJ 
to the law of the coaltry of domicil and declared void by 
that law, the marriage is to be regarded as void though 
not contrary to the law of the country in which it was 
celebrated." 
í.., 
Nature and Classes of Marital Offences, 
and Remedies other than Divorce. 
Marriage is first of all a spiritual and ethical union; 
not all of the ethical obligations springing from this 
marital relation however are protected by law. 
Marriage, being also an important social institution,is 
given special protection by the state and its laws,in 
some respects even by its criminal laws. 
The marital rights and duties can be classified accor- 
ding to the main divisions into such as spring 
( 1) from the personal relation of the spouses; and 
(2) from their proprietary relation. 
As it is difficult with regard to some marital matters 
to draw a strict line between these two aspects,there 
is to be added - 
( 3) a third group, comprising marital rights and duties 
of mixed character, such as maintenance,custody and 
education of children and the like matters. 
The laws of the different countries provide a series of 
measures intended to safeguard those marital obligations; 
we shall briefly state some of the remedies short of j 
1 
divorce which the different laws adopted in order to make 
common life bearable for the spouses and to avoid the last 
resort to the dissolution of marriage. In default of any 
possibility of exhausting all the remedies other than 
divorce which may be granted against an offending spouse 
under the different systems of law concerned, a brief 
outline only can be given in order to show the main 
features of this subject. 
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Remedies under the Penal Laws. 
English Law. Every country protects the marriage status 
by charging with the crime of bigamy a spouse who con- 
tracts a second marriage during the subsistence of the 
former. 
Bigamy is under Section 57 of Offences against Person Ac t, 
1861, a felony; who, being married, marries another person 
during the life of the former husband or wife,is guilty 
of that felony.The real test is not the carnal intercourse, 
but the going through of the marriage ceremony,except 
where the second marriage is contracted outside England 
or Ireland by anyone who is not a British subject. De- 
fences to bigamy are : 
(a) That the second marriage has been contracted elsewhere 
than in England and Ireland by any other than a British 
subject. 
(b) Presumption of the death of the former husband or 
wife, having been continously absent for more than seven 
years from the accused during which period he or she has not 
been known .to her or him to be living. In order to 1 
) afford a defence against a charge of bigamy, the divorce 
n 
d 4c. 
must be valid by the law of the domicil of the spouses at ,<. 
the institution of the divorce proceedings. 
For the presumption of death, underlying the new ground 
of dissolution of marriage, see p.99. In R.v,Tolson(1889) 
23 QBD. 168, it has been held that a bona fide belief on 
reasonable grounds that a spouse is dead constitutes a 
defence to a bigamy charge, but in R.v. Wheat and Stock 
(1921) 15 Cr.dpp. B. 134, it was decided that a bona fide belief 
in a supposed divorce is not a defence to such a charge. 
The discrepancy in the decisions can only be explained 
in that way that in one case the mistake is one of fact, 
in the other it is one of law, since divorce is at least 
a mixed question of law and fact. 
(e) The dissolution of the first marriage by a decree 
of divorce or nullity, 
The divorce,in order to be a good defence, must be pro- 
nounced by a court of the domicil of the husband at the 
date of marriage or must be valid by th- law of that 
domicil. See In Lolley's bigamy case ( 1812) 
Rn & Ry 237 the court refused to recognise a Scottish 
divorce concerning an ' English marriage " and the rules 
laid down in this case prevailed for some time in English 
law on divorce. For the details reference is made to 
p.... 
H. Non- support by a spouse may be punishable under the 
following conditions ( Vagrancy Act,5 Geo.IV c. 83) 
( a) A person whose wilful negelect to work causes him 
or her or any of his or her family, to become chargeable 
to the parish ; 
(b) a person running away and leaving his wife or child 
chargeable to the parish. 
III. The common law under which a spouse could tet steal 
the otherls goods, has been modified by the Married 
Women's Property Act. 1882 ss,12 and 16,Married Women's 
Property Act, 1884, c.14 and the Larceny Act, 1916, 
( 6 & 7 Geo. V c. 50) so that s spouse may now become 
chargeable with the crime of larceny for stealing the 
the otherb property , provided they do not live together. 
Under the Continental systems of law, provisions in the 
Penal Courts exist punishing infringements of marital 
infidelity. 
French Lw. Whereas the inequality of the sexes as 
regards adultery as a ground of divorce has been re- 
moved by the law of 1884, inequality still obtains with 
regare to the crime of adultery,Art.336- 9 of the 
renal .Cody, The guilty wife and her accomplice may b 
sentenced to imprisonment while the husband is liable r4/ 
of misdemeanour only if he takes his concubine into the 
conjugal home; his accomplice is not liable to any chai'ge 
for adultery, and he is liable only to a fir . In such 
cases there lies also under ' French law an action 
for special damages. 
Austrian Law. Under Austrian law adultery and other in- 
fringements of r^aritali îidelity short of adultery are 
punishable against the adulterer and his or her accomplice 
para502,525, STG. 
The injured party is left to prosecute his or her case 
before the criminal court as private prosecutor vested 
with the power of a public prosecutor subject to some 
qualifications; the same rule applies to petty assaults 
and libels. 
Since the accused is often merely bound over for a cer- 
tain p:riod,such criminal prosecution is a means of restrai- 
ning the guilty spouse from further unlawful acts. 
Non- support may become chargeable under certain conditions 
according to the French law of February 7.1924 and the 
Austrian law of February 4. 1925 Austrian Ettagrlaciikaw6G4z.69 
. 
The Common Law Fiction of t he Unity of Husband and Wife, 
Before entering into the discussion of the marital duties 
and obligations and the remedies against their infringemnt, 
reference must be made to the legal fiction of unity 
of husband and wife under Enjlish law; it was this fiction 
that influenced marital relations greatly; the theory of 
unity of husband and wife is still operative in many a 
respect. 
By the theory of the common law, husband and wife were 
" one in law ". ( Bracton lib. 5 fol.416);Cok_e in his work 
upon Littleton sect..291 cites Bracton and declares: 
" The husband and wife are but one person in law" 
and Blackstone ( 1 B1. Com.442) states that by marriage' 
husband and wife are one person in law, that is, the veiy 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during 
the marriage or, at least, is incorporated and consoli- 
dated into that of the husband." Thus the personality of 
a married woman merged on her marriage in that of her 
husband, for most purposes: 
(a) a married woman could at common law by reason of this 
theory not sue at all; she could only sue in the 
ecclesiastical courts in matrimonial matters. 
(b) She was therefore unable to sue for damages for loss 
of her husband's society,while he could in the courts 
of common law, sue the adulterer cam- criminal conversation. 
Even when this matter was transferred to the jurisdiction 
of the divorce court created by the Matrimonial Causes 
pct of 1857 there was no alteration of the legal position 
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of a married woman in this respect; this inability of 
the wife is still operative. 
(c) Husband and wife cannot sue each other in tort. The 
wife may now sue her husband for the protection and se- 
curity of her own separate property. Sec. 12 of the 
Married Woman's Property Act ,( 1882). 
Criminal proceedings may, however, be instituted by the 
spouses against each other for the protection of their 
respective persons but they cannot claim damages from 
each other as above stated, in such personal torts. 
(2) a) Although they are not any more one person in law, 
there are still consequences of that fiction operative 
apart from those stated above. For instance, in the case 
of the wife's domicil. 
(b) The wife cannot sue the husband for support without 
instituting a petition for separation or divorce, For 
further discussion reference is made to page... 
but she may act as agent of necessity and so pledge her 
husband's credit, so that a third person conctracting 
with her as regards necessaries, may sue the husband. 
(c) They still cannot bring an action against each other 
lor tort, such as for negligence, libel,slander,assault. 
See R.Lord y. Mayor of London ( 1866) 1 /QBD 772. 
(3). Duties and obligations springing from the personal 
relationship of the spouses and the civil remedies against 
their violation. 
From the personal relationship flow the reciprocal obli- 
gtions 
-( a) as to conjugal fidelity 
( b) consortium and 
( c) conjugal sexual intercourse. 
As to (a) conjugal fidelity; at common law the husband 
had, for the protection of his right in the society of 
his wife, the remedy 
( 1) of the action for criminal conversation against 
adulterer and 
(2) an action for alienating his wife or causing her to 
leave him ( enticing her away and harbouring her) against 
a third person causing the loss of the society. 
The first- named action which was an action to be brought 
in the common law courts was abolished by the î:í.0 .Act 
id 1857 by which it was enacted that an action claiming 
damages for the same tort is to be brought in the Divorce 
Court. This right is den ed to the wife since she had no 
right to sue before a court of common law with res-pect to 
the fiction of unity between husband and wife that caused 
her disability to sue at common law; that disability sti 1 
obtains. 
As regards the action of enticing away, the position has 
now changc:d,for, since the decision of Lynch v. Knight 
( 1869) HLC 589, LTR 5 ( NS) 291, the wife is now deemed 
to be entitled to sue against any party who interferes 
with her right of society and affections of her husband. 
It may be added that since 1882 the inability of a wife to 
sue at law without :Ghe joinder of her husband as a 
cow plaintiff has been removed. This requirement, too, 
p revented the commencement of any such action by 
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The wife, at common law. 
Consortium. Husband and wife are mutually 
entitled to 
each other's society. This right could be enforced 
by a 
decree for restoration of conjugal rifts and by imprison- 
ment in case of disobedience; but, since the Matrimo- 
nial Causes Aet of 1884 (47 & 48 Victoria. e. 68 ?this 
right is not enforceable any longer by attachment; 
failing to,obey such decree of restoration of conj °. gal 
rights the husband is liable, at the discretion of the 
Court, to make a proper provision for the deserted 
spouse. 
Continental systems of Law. 
Under Austrian and French Law Sato +rof restoration of 
conjugal rights may be enforced even by measures of 
physical coercion. In Austria this conjugal right is 
enforceable both against the husband and against the 
wife: Collection XI, 4323, XIV 5445, Collection 7736, 
11669. 
Under French law executory foree,may be used only against 
the husband: Lyon May 14, 1920,D. 1920, 2. 128; but 
not against the wife: Tr. Dijon, Jan. 29, 1912. 
Under French Law an action for special damages lies also 
against a deserting spouse; the damages adjudged upon 
are often of moratory character in order to compel the 
spouse to discharge his duty. Clermont- Ferrafad, 
Aug.9, 1900, Gaz. Pal. 1900, 2 - 620. 
Under Germen law an order of restoration of conjugal 
rights is not enforceable, according to para,888 Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
ight of the spouse to sexual intercourse. 
The right to dexual intercourse is at common law not 
enforceable. See Forster v. Forster ( 1790) I Hagg.Cons. 
144-, 154 and Orme v.Orme ( 1824), Hagg.Add.382. 
Its distinctive character in the marriage relation was 
emphasised by Lord Sand in CToold v. G -oold ( 1927) 
SC 177 : 
" Sexual intercourse, with the intimacy that it 
denotes, is the distinctive element in marriage. 
Bonds of the closest affection, domestic association 
of the most constant character, may exist between 
two persons of the opposite sex- mother and son, 
brother and sister. It is sexual intimacy which 
marks off, and distinguishes all such attachments 
from the marital relationship." 
In Jackson v. Jackson ( 1924) F. 19 Lord Merrivale held 
that the mere refusal and deliberate abstinence from 
seixual intercourse, while both parties continued to 
abide under one roof, was not desertion... But cf. 
Synge v. Synge ( 1900) P. 180 in which case, however, 
the spouses lived apart. 
It is noteworthy that wilful refusal to consummate the 
¡marriage has been made a ground of annulment of marriage 
under Section 7 (1) (a) of the MCA. ( 1937). 
Scottish Law : There are many authorities in Scottish law 
for the proposition that á spouse has a right of sexual 
intercourse and that its refusal constitutes desertion, 
even without any overt act of desertion; but existing 
rules of evidence preclude the protection. of this right. 
In the decision of Creditors of Watson of Damhead v. 
Cruikshank 
( 1681) M 330 it was pointed out 
" the Lords found that co- habitation wasa sufficient 
presumptive probation for the wife's converse (sexual. 
intercourse)with the husband as wife, unless the wife 
proves that though she remained in the house,she 
withdrew from the husbandTs conversation and lay in 
several room from him. IT 
In the decision referred to on p.n. Lord Sand pointed 
out: 
" The view was suggested that where a spouse refuses 
intercourse the other spouse may withdraw from 
society, and this spouse would. be entitled to divorce 
for desertion, but only four years after such with- 
drawal. There is no complete interruption of all 
relationship or of personal or domiciliary contact, 
and that sexual relations are the distinctive ele 
ment of matrimony, I have formed the opinion that 
persistent refusal of sexual intercourse for four 
years without any better reason than disinclinati n 
or distaste, and without acquiescence therein on 
the part of the other spouse, may be a relevant 
ground for divorce for desertion." 
The Court held the pleG of acquienscence on the part of 
the pursuer established and dismissed the action for divorce. 
In a recent action of divorce desertion founded upon 
refusal of marital intercourse, Robertson v.Robertson 
( O.H.) ( 1939) Sc LT 432 it was held that it would in- 
ivolve a proof not only of what happened in the marriage 
chamber but also of what happened in the marriage bed, 
kn investigation into which the court could not enter; 
Since proof of the averments requisite for relevancy 
Vas impossible without admitting incompetent evidence, 
the action has been dismissed. 
Continental Law: Under French law an action in tort or 
in quasi- tort according to art. 1382 Cr lies for damag s, 
for refusal of sexual intercourse. 
4ontpellier, Nov. 27, 1897, La Loi June 11, 1898. 
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property Relations between husband and wife and civil 
against infringment of the relative duties. 
As above stated, by the legal theory of conjugal life,the 
rife is held to be one person with her.husband. 
fy reason of this theory they could neither contract with 
nor make any gifts to each other. 
The only exception to this rule was separation agreemens, 
the validity of which was, after some decisions to the 
contrary, eventually recognised;such agreements could be. 
nforced. 
See Wilson v.Wilson ( 1841) 1 HLC. 538.(1854) 5,HIC 14, 
Bateman v. The Countess of Russ 1 Dow 235. 
Since it was impossible at common law to convey land by 
a husband to his wife for reason of that fiction of unity 
between husband and wife, he could only convey his land 
to a friend and his heirs far the TT use of his wife and 
her heirs"; in that way the equitable estate was created; 
the wifeTs interets in that estate were only enforceable 
in equity. 
quitable Separate Property of a married woman : 
(1). Land and other property which was conveyed to trustees 
" to the separate use" of the wife could be dealt with 
by her in equity as if she were unmarried.( feme sole). 
See Cooper v. MacDonald 7 ChD. 288 These rights were, 
however, usually restricted by the clause of the so- 
called " restraint of anticipation TTby which she was 
prevented from anticipating or alienating such separate 
property. See R.vjBower, 271611. 411. 
-82- 
(2). The wife's equity to a settlement. 
The courts of equity following the equitable maxim 
n he who seeks equity must do eç_uity° modified the hus- 
band's common law right to his wife's eouitable choses 
in action_`. -red him to me provision for his wife 
by a settlement of the whole or part of such property. 
'_'array v. Elibank ( 10 Ves. 84) ; 1 W and T.LC 493, 
Flibark v. ontelie-L ves. 737, 1 Wand T 541. 
After the Judica ( 1873) the wife's equity applied 
toher legal as well as to her equitable interests. 
See Boxall v. Boxall 27 Ch. 220. 
Since the iarried roman's Property Act. ( 1882) by which 
the legal position of the rife as to her property was 
entirely altered, there was no necessity any longer for 
enforcing this equitable right of the wife. 
Furthermore, since the Law Reform ( Married Woman and 
Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 and 26 Geo.6 e.30, tb_e legal 
rosition of a married woman as regards her pro_erty is the 
same as that of an unmarried woman in all respects; she 
now holds her property unaffected by any rights on the 
part of her husband. 
Finally, by reason of the common law theory of Unity 
of husband and wife, a gift of land to a husband and his 
wife and another party as joint tenants or tenants in 
common gave one half only of the land to the husband and 
wife between them, and the other half to the third party; 
Re Jupp, ( 1888) 39, Ch.D. 148; according to sec.37 of 
the law of Property Act 1925 ( 15 Geo.5 e 20) in case of 
such a gift of lard after the 1.of January 1926, to a hus- 
band and wife they are treated as two persons. 
Continental Systems of :Law. 
Under English law , as stated above, the matrimonial 
system now obtais of separate estates o, the spouses 
who do not enter into a marriage settlement. 
The same marital system exists under Austrian Law 
whereby the husband has the management of his wife's 
property until it is revoked by her. 
In Germany the so- called Administrative System rules 
principally i.e. the management end enjoyment of the 
wife's property falls to the husband, but the wife is 
entitled to sae for te,.nination of the administrative 
management on certain gro-inds, as, for instance,if the 
husband fails to render her or the children of the 
marriage reasonable support. 
The statutory system may by agreeent of the parties be 
re_laced by some other system. 
Undr Gerztan Law the statutory presumption also exists 
as between husband and his creditors that all movable 
things not serving exclusively for the wife's personal 
use or ornament, which are in the possession of one of 
the spouses, belong to the husband. 
In France the statutory marital system of community as 
regards movable property prevails; by this system the 
husband has the right of management, enjoyment and dis- 
posal. The wife, however, retains her ownership as 
re,F ards immovable property, the management of which falls 
to the husband. Since the Statute of February 18th,1938, 
the wife has the power to alienate her immcvable property 
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provided that the interests in the property remain 
available to the community of goods. Further the wife 
may claim damages to be paid by her hT :.sband for fraudulent 
management and may also obtain a judicial order of sepa- 
ration of the estates against him, when her dowry is in 
f 
danger, or when the husband's affairs are in such disorder 
that there is reason to fear that his property will not 
be sufficient ' to answer for the wife's rights or claims. 
Article 1530 - 153: cc. Article 1443 cc. 
Mention may finally be made in this connection of the legal 
institUtiOnof:L a judicial adviser; a spouse may make 
an application for appointing a judicial advisor when 
the other spouse by his squandering attitude endangers 
the financial situation of the family so that the family 
could become destitute. Article 51314.c...:'.:;', 
Apart from that marital property system of community of 
goods, there exists under ,Tench Law Aso the so- called 
dotal ( dowry ) system under which the dowry is inalienable 
during mar.yi. F;e and after dissolution of the marriage,the 
ownership of the wife revives. (Article 1540, 1561 oe). 
Fin_:lly, mi:ntion may be made of a third marital property 
system under which either spouse retains the ownership 
management, and enjoyment of its movable property. 
tinder Swiss Law the effect of marriage upon the propert 
Of the spouses is governed by the following principlessim 
so far as no other provision has been made 
(1). In the absence of a marriage contract the so -called 
administrative system of property prevails; by this the 
rife' property, except her separate estate, falls into 
P. 
the management of the husband; the wife remains the owner 
thereof; the courts may, in case where the husband fails 
to provide maintenance for her and a child of the marriage, 
make an order for separation of the estates, (such order 
may be made at the instance of either spouse on certain 
grounds) 
Ç2). The 
.property of husband and wife, with the exception of their 
Separate estates, belongs to both spouses in common ;the 
Article 183 Swiss Civil Court.) 
system of community of property, under which the 
husband has the management of the common property,whose 
profits are shared by both. 
(3). The system of separate estates under which either 
spouse retains the ownership, management and enjoyment of 
his or her property. 
The duty of support and the relative civil remedies 
other than divorce against infringement of this duty.. 
English Law. At common law the husband is liable to main- 
tain his wife, but as long as they are living together, 
the law provides no means of enforcing this duty. The 
magistrate could only make him liable to the parish for 
the sum allowable as pauper relief by the Poor Laws Act 
when his wife and children have become chargeable to the 
parish. The Court of Equity created at a later date the 
vvifeTs equity to a settlement, see Page.Q1., to be made 
out of her property; but equity could not alter the 
position of married women who had no property. 
The wife,if living apart from her husband by reason of 
his misconduct, may pledge his credit for necessaries 
as his agent of necessity; this is a legal authority that 
i -" 
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cannot be revoked by him by a general or particular 
nr. ohibition as long as she has a just cause for living 
apart; the third person may in such a case sue the 
husband for the necessaries furnished to the wife. 
Only as an incident for :ivorce or judicial separation 
a wife may sue hehusband for alimony and maintenance 
respectively. 
In Hymans v. Hymans ( 1929) 45 TLR. 444, it was held that 
the parties to a-marriage cannot validly make an agree- 
ment as to maintenance either ( 1) not to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the Court, or ( 2) to control the powers 
of the Court when its jurisdiction is invoked, and there- 
fore such a deed is not binding and may be altered by the 
Court after decree absolute in herfavour. The power of 
the Court.to modify maintenance orders which are regulated 
by Ss. 190 and 196 of the Judicature Act 1925 are now widened 
by Section 14 of the Administration of Justice 
( Miscellaneous Provisions ) Act, 1938). The wife caving: 
separate property may be made liable by the guardians of 
the parish for the sum of allowance paid to her husband and 
children which have become chargeable to the parish; this 
liability is imposed on the wife only if her husband is 
disabled from supporting himself or the children. Married 
Wolpenfs Property Act. ( 1882) .Section 20. 
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U.S.A. Law. The common law liability of the husband for 
necessaries furnished to the wife is laid down in 
a great 
number of statutes. 
When the husband neglects his duty of support ,some statutes 
give now relief without divorce and authorise the wife 
herself to take proceedings against her husband in order 
to enforce this duty. 
Finally some of the jurisdictions have adopted the 
Uniform Desertion and Non- Support Act which was approved 
by the National Conference of Commissionars of Uniform 
States Laws in 1910. By this Act non - support is made an 
indictable offence, but the court may release the husband 
on probation upon his promiseor undertaking to furnish 
proper support for his wife. 
Continental Systems of Law. 
Under German Law,( 1360),German Civil Code ) and 
Austrian Law ( 91 Austrian Civil Code) the husband is 
liable to maintain his wife according to his station in 
life, his property and his ability to earn; th wife is 
equally liable to support her husband if he is unable to 
maintain himself. 
According to Article 214 French Civil Code, the husband 
is liable to maintain his wife according to his means 
and position. The same liability obtains under Swiss Law. 
By Article 171 Swiss Civil Code the judge may, where the 
husband negllcts his duty of supporting his wife and 
children, direct the debtors of the s,:ouses, regardless 
of the subsisting matrimonial property system, to make 
all or part of their payments to the wife alone. 
See above as regards separation of the estates by judicial 
order in case of the husband's failure tu support his 
wife and children. u.85 
As under English law,the husband is,under the Continental 
law concernec , te head of the family, who has the right 
to decide in all matters concerning the common matrimonial 
life, and particularly the place of domicil. Paragraph 1353 
of the German Civil Code :, Art. 214 of the French Civil 
Code and Ar. 160 of t: :e Swiss Civil Code. For further 
discussion of the married woman's domicil, see p.C... 
The wife may sue and be sued and her full capacity is 
recognised by those laws, in France since the law of 
February 18, 1938, see the amended article.215. 
The wife may follow any profession, trade or business, 
and in case where the husband dissents, a judicial order 
may be made, Art. 168 of the Swiss Civil CoC':e. 
The wife has the duty and right of managing the house- 
hold; she may therefore, by reason of her general and 
implied authority, pledge her husband's credit with re- 
gard to necessaries for the common ].iie.para.1357 Ger- 
man Civil Code and Art. 163- 164 Swiss Civil Code. 
The husband may restrict or exclude this right of the 
wife; if the exclusion or restriction is shown to be a 
misuse of the rir-;ht of the husband, it may be cancelled 
on application of the wife. 
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P a r t II. 
C h az t e r VII. 
a. . D i v o r c e. I, a w in British Commonwealth. 
In general. 
There have been discussed above some of the remedies 
which are available by the laws of the various countries 
against violation of marital obligations. Another remedy 
granted in case of marital offences of a graver character 
is the judicial separation from bed and board; this re- 
edy is granted. in France and Switzerland on the same 
groundsas divorce; in England, it may equally be obtained 
(1) on the same grounds as divorce and apart from those 
lso (2) for disobeying a judicial order of restitution 
If conjugal rights and ( 3) on the ground of unnatural 
offences. 
The institution of judicial separation is unknown to 
German law. 
he most important of all remedies against marital offences 
s that of divorce. 
English Courts have maintained three theories on the 
nature of divorce: 
( 1) The penal (2)the contractual and (3) the status 
theory. 
(1). The renal theor : 
he canon law divorce a mensa et thoro, which, as above 
tated.r.Z.. was the main basis of the legislative 
divorce a vinculo matrimonii before the passing of the 
Act, 1857, was granted by the ecclesiastical courts on 
penal principles. Adultery, the sole ground of legislative 
divorce, has been treated as a crime, punishable by the 
Spiritual Courts and it was held by this theory that 
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In general. 
There have been discussed above some of the remedies 
which are available by the laws of the various countries 
against violation of marital obligations. Another remedi 
granted in case of marital offences of a graver character 
is the judicial separation from bed and board; this re- 
medy is granted. in France and Switzerland on the same 
ground as divorce; in England, it may equally be obtained 
(1) on the same grounds as divorce and apart from those 
also (2) for disobeying a judicial order of restitution 
of conjugal rights and ( 3) on the ground of unnatural 
!offences. 
The institution of judicial separation is unknown to 
'German law. 
The most important of all remedies against marital offences 
Ls that of divorce. 
English Courts have maintained three theories on the 
nature of divorce: 
( 1) The penal (2)the contractual and (3) the status 
theory. 
(1) . The penal theory: 
The canon law divorce a mensa et thoro, which, as above 
Stated. z,.;,.. was the main basis of the legislative 
divorce a vinculo matrimonii before the passing of the 
&ct, 1857, was granted by the ecclesiastical courts on 
penal principles. Adultery, the sole ground of legislative 
divorce, has been treated as a crime, punishable by the 
Spiritual Courts and it was held by this theory that 
adultery e1ia not dissolve the marriage ex pacto,but 
was a crime upon which the party injured might desert 
the offender and ask for divorce. 
By the Matrimonial Causes Act., 1857 the power of granting 
divorce a vinculo matrimonii was assigned to the Matri- 
monial Causes Court, created by that Act, and those 
penal principles continued to influence the proceedings 
of divorce. Expressions, such as " Crime of Adultery" 
Criminal Offence " found in the decisions flow from those 
principles. This penal theory had thus for some time a¡ 
bearing on divorce proceedings until it was rejected 171 
the Courts on the reasoning that proceedings of divorce 
are not criminal but civil. 
Brandford v. Brandford ( 1378) 4 PD 72.73, following 
the decision of the House of Lords in Mordaunt v. 
Moncriffe LR 2 H L Sc 374. 
Under this theory a foreign decree of divorce would not 
be entitled to recognition since it was of a penal charac- 
ter. 
For jurisdiction in divorce on the penal basis ( locus 
delicti conunissi) reference is made to the heading 
" Scottish Law jurisdiction " page.46. 
( 2) Contractual theory of divorce. 
3y this theory the grounds for divorce are considered as 
breaches of the marriage contract; hence principles re- 
Ilating to private contracts, have, at least in part,been 
followed in the administration of divorce law. 
-The contractual point of view is stressed in that well 
known decision on " recrimination" of Beeby v. Beeby 1 
Hag. Eccl. 790, in which the following was pointed out 
" The doctrine that-this ( plea of recrimination) 
if proved is a valid plea in bar has its foundation 
in reason and p,rOTr. idr; it would be hard if a man 
could complain of a breach of a contract which he 
has violated." 
From this theory it also followed that the dissolubility 
Of the marriage depended on the special terms of the 
Marriage contract which led to the conception of the 
!' English marriage ", that as celebrated in England was 
t that time ( before 1857) indissoluble by a foreign 
t 
Court ( and was held so in a few decisions after that 
Í 
date) see page.2. 
On the basis of this theory has also developed the 
doctrine of " the matrimonial domicil " see p..6$.. 
(3) Status theory. 
The marriage relation is established by contract,but 
1 
being once stablished tie power of the parties as to 
its content or duration is at an end; according to the 
status theory of marriage, outlined above,divorce is 
the act by which a state through a public authority 
dissolves or puts an end to the marriage status at the 
instance of a spouse on grounds which,subsequent to the 
Marriage, frustrate its fundamental purposes. The state 
e highly interested in marriage relations since marriage 
is that unit on which every community is based. It is the 
modern trend of legislation of the diverse states to allow 
divorce not exclusively on the misconduct of the defendant, 
as it-was the case up to now, but to grant it irrespective 
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-of any guilt on the part of the other spouse in case 
where the marital relationship has become practically 
impossible.of continuance ( by reason of insanity;, 
contagious diseases, long absence of the ethei -spouse ;even if 
not caused by his own fault ) . 
The well recognised purposes of marriage do not rest upon 
agreement of the parties to the marriage,but upon the 
general law, common or statutory which defines those 
marital rights, duties and obligations; different commu- 
1ities, of course, have different views and laws respecting 
marital obligations and different estimate of the causes 
which should justify divorce. 
Those rights and duties relate in the main as outlined 
above, page.'7.].. to consortium,mutual' conjugal fidelity 
and assistance, engendering and bringing up of offspring, 
to marital proprietary relations and to support 
( maintenance). 
Since these marital duties are by the status theory not 
based on the marriage contract but on the law, divorce 
is by this theory regarded neither as an action in tort 
nor as an action for breach of a contract but as an 
action sui generis. 
Divorce involves a change of status whereby the spouses 
egain the character of single ( unmarried) persolis and 
the right to remarry. A judicial separation, on the 
contrary, leaves the status of the parties unchanged as 
Gorell Barnes0 J. put it in Armitage v.Armitage,(1898) 
( P 178 at p. 196; 
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" According to those principles and rules cruelty 
and adultery were grounds for a sentence of divorce 
a mensa et thoro which did not dissolve the marriage, 
but merely suspended either for a time or without 
limitation of time sore of the obligations of the 
parties; the sentence commonly separated the par 
ties until they should be reconciled to each oth . 
The relation of marriage still subsisted, and th 
wife remained a feme covert." 
Finally, divorce a vinculo matrimonii differs from a 
decree of nullity of marriage in that by the latter 
the marriage is declared to be void ab initio on grounds, 
generally, precedent to the marriage; yet among the 
grounds for a petition of nullity of marriage there is 
by the MCA, 1937, also provided a ground subsequent to 
the marriage, namely, that of " wilful refusal of the 
respondent to consummate the marriage". For bases of 
jurisdiction in petitions of nullity of marriage, 
reference is made to p.242: 
A further difference consequential to that just stated 
is this that the legal status of the issue born of a 
marriage remains unaffected by a decree of divorce while 
in case of a decree of nullity of marriage the issue is 
deemed illegitimate; there ere,however,some exceptiont 
[to the latter rule: 
ka) Under Scottish law and wider some continental laws 
lehildren of a "putative "marriage are held legitimate, 
Pb) Under English law according to sec.? (2) of MCA 193' 
phildren of a marriage avoided on the grounds of insanity 
pr mental deficiency or of venereal disease (sect.? , 
(1): (b) (c) of MCA 1937 are deemed le F itima to notwith -1 
standing that the marriage is so avoided. 
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English law on divorce. is consolidated in Part VIII df the 
Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 as amended by MCA 1937. 
Waiting period of three years for divoro 
petition. 
By s.l of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937 no petit 
for divorce is admissible unless three years have 
passed since the date of the marriage, sate exception 
hardship suffered by the pétitioner or exceptional 
depravity on*the part of the respondent could be prove.. 
On considering the application for such leave to preset 
a petition before the cexpiration of three years from 
the date of the marriage, the judge must take into 
account the interests of any children of the marriage 
and must enquire into the question whether a reconcilia 
tion between the parties is probable. Where the 
at the hearing of the petition is satisfied that the 
petitioner obtained leave to present the petition by 
mi,epresentatìon or by concealment of the nature of the 
case, he may dismiss the petition or may, if he pro - 
pounces a decree nisi, ordain that no application to make 
the decree absolute shall be made before the expiration 
of the three yearsT period mentioned above. 
Groundsof. _DIvPrce 
Under English law divorce is mainly based upon the guilt 
of the other spouse. 
Grounds of divorce based on guilt are : 
(a) Adultery. 
Adultery is sexual intercourse between a husband or wife 
and one of the opposite sex while the marriage subsists. 
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Prior. to 1923 a wife could obtain a divorce on her hus- 
be, ,d!:s adultery only if it was incestuous, or bigamous, 
or by way of rape, or if she established an additional 
ground of either cruelty or. 'desertim for at least two 
years; by the Matrimonial Qauses Act of 1923 (.._ 
(13 & 14 Geo. V c 19) the rights of husband and wife we 
equalised in this respect. For the srecific evidence 
rules with regard to adultery seep 202. 
(b) Desertion for at least three years. 
The MCA of 1937 contains no definition of d. /section. 
¡In a passage of the decision of Jackson v. Jackson 
e 
( 1924) 1 19, 23 desertion is defined by Lord. Merrivale- ' 
tto he ( 1) where there is abandonment by one of the 
Douses of the other, and ( 2) where one of the spouses 
auses the other to live separate and apart. A similar 
Definition_ is given by Sir Francis Jeune 1. in Frowd VlBtOrd (1904) 
177, 179 : 'T Desertion means the cessation of 
ohabition broug1 about by the fault or act of one of 
he parties. TT 
ilnder the MCA, 1937, the petitioner has to establish a 
tate of things amounting originally to desertion and h.s 
o prove that that state of things has continued. throug - 
Out the three years immediately preceding the presentation 
f the petition. The triennal period of sec. 2 of the 
ICA, 1937, differs ir_ this respect from the statutory 
.eriods under the MCA, 1857, and the Judicature ( Conso- 
illation 
) Act,1925, respectively in that the period mnQt 
e completed until the presentation of the petition. 
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yin case ,vhere a conversion of a decree of judicial 
separation or of an order of separation into a divorce 
is sougght, according to sec. ó subsec. 3 a period of 
(desertion_ immediately preceding the institution of the 
proceedings just mentioned_ shall, if the parties have 
not resumed cohabitation and such decree or order has 
been continuously in force since the granting thereof, 
be deemed immediately preceding the presentatiOn_of the 
petition. 
Where therequirements set forth in sec. 6 subsec. 3 
i.c. are not complied with such decree of judicial 
separation or such order of separation terminates 
desertion; the same applies to a maintenance order by 
a Court of Summary Jurisdiction containing a non - 
cohabitation clause, 
( Harriman v. Harriman ( 1909) 1 123 ). 
separation agreement terminates also desertion until 
such agreement is repudiated by both spouses. 
Ratclife v. Ratclife ( 1938 ) 'N.PT. 203. 
or insanity :,as a be to divorce off,. desertion , ,re 
erence may he made to this heading on p. 109. 
In Jackson v. Jackson cited above Lord T,Ierrivale P, help 
that the mere refusal and' deliberate (Ostinence from se 
cual intercourse, while both parties continued to abide 
under one roof, was not desertion. But cf. Synge v. 
ynge ( 1900 ) P 180 and Smith v. Smith (1939) P 49, 
'3here, .however, the'spouses lived apart. 
(c) Cruelty. 
he new Act of 1937 contains no definition. of 
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"Legal" cruelty. The definition of this terra is to be 
found in the decisior. of Russell v, Russell (1897) AC 3 
ecording to this, legal cruelty is " conduct of such a 
character as to have caused danger to life, limb or 
ealth, bodily or mental, or such as to give rise to 
seasonable apprehension of such Bane -er." 
here these essentials can be established the courts 
rant divorce as the following decisions will clarify : 
n a recent case Horton v. Horton ( 1940)P.187. 
t has been pointed out that conduct rendering c:ommon_ -- 
life unbearable -: and causing injury to health is c)t 
t itself sufficient; there must be wilful and unjusti- 
fiable acts conducing to this result. In this case, 
hysical violence, injury to clothing and deliberate edorts 
o prevent sleep, has been held as constituting legal 
ruelty against the husband. 
+he decidott of this nuestion depends often upon the 
strength of the constitution of the person illtreated; 
thus the same acts may constitute legal cruelty in the 
ne case, but may not be deemed to be so in another case 
here the court is not satisfied of actual or potential 
njury to health. 
cts of cruelty to children by a husband may amount to 
legal cruelty to the wife ; this is termed " constructive" 
cruelty. 
A spouse who has infected another with a venereal disease 
has been found guilty of cruelty in Browning v.Br. owning 
(1911) P 161 and Foster v. Foster ( 1921) P 438. 
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Fina.11y,in Thompson v.Thompson (1901)85 LT 172 the mere 
fact of the husbandTs conviction of 2 crime that caused 
a breakdown in the health of his wife was deemed "legal" 
cruelty. 
(d). Rape, sodomy and bestiality as grounds of divorce 
by the wife : 
Of the two spouses the wife only may petition for divorce 
on the ground of her husbandTs rape,sodomy or bestiality. 
Grounds of dissolution of marriage by either spouse re- 
gardless of guilt are 
(a) Incurable unsor dness of mind 
The new provision s.2 (d) of the MCA,1937,grants to a 
spouse the right to a dissolution of his ( her) marriage, 
if he or she can satisfy the court that the other spouse 
;Is incurably of unsound mind and has been cont- r:uously 
under- care and treatment for a period of at least 5 years 
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; 
the definition of that care and treatment is given in 
-s.3 (a) of the MCA 1937 by reference to the statutory 
provisions concerning insane persons,such as Lunacy and 
Mental Treatment Acts 1890 to 1930,the Army Act, Air Force 
'Act, the Naval Disciplinary Aet,the Naval Enlistment Act 
1884 and Yarmouth Nval Hospital Act 1931 and lastly in 
s.3 ( b) by reference to the Mental Treatment Act 1930, 
with regard to voluntary insane patients. 
In Shipman v.Shipman ( 1938) P 147 it was held that the 
requirement of s. 3 (a) of the MCA. 1937, was not 
k,-_:... 
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satisfied merely by the fact that the reception order 
as to the respondent was in force during the whole 
statutory period, and it has been there pointed out that 
absence on trial for prolonged period was not the same 
thing as actual deter.tion under an order which was beinf 
enforced. 
(b) Presumption of death of a spouse. 
Where a party to a marriage alleges that reasonable 
grounds exist,: for supposing that the other party to th 
Marriage is dead, the former may petition for a decree 
of presumption of the death of the other party End for a 
decree of dissolution of that marriage. ( s. 8 subs. 1 
of MCA 1937) . 
In subs. 1 of s. S no time limitations are made; the 
court may therefore, when the petitione_° is able to 
prove that the other party to themarriage has disappeared 
having been in mortal danger, for instance, on board a 
lost vessel, the court may, if satisfied, make the decree 
asked for . Under s. 8 subs. 2 of the MCA,1937, the 
fact that for a period of seven years or upwards the 
other party ,g' the marriage has been continually absent 
from the petitioner and the petitioner has no reason 
to believe that the other party to the marriage has beex 
living within that time, is evidence, that he or. she 5_s 
dead until the contrary is proved. 
This presump tion de jure has already been recognised by 
s. 57 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, under 
which it constitutes s defence against bigamy, in a case, 
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'where aparty to a marriage, believing the other party 
to be dead under the circumstances described above, 
'contracted a second marriage. 
See R. v. Curgerwen ( 1865) LR 1 CCR; R 
R.v. Fa,ulkes ( 1903) 19 Times LR 250; 
Filene's Trust ( 1869) L R 5 CH 139; 
'Parktson v. Parkison ( 1939) P 
The parties who contracted a second marriage by reason 
of that legal doctrine of pr_ esur_ption of death were 
laced at t<he disadvantage in some respects, as for 
instance : Since that presumption is rebuttable, the 
second marriage must be declared void, if it is established 
that the first husband is alive ; where, on the other 
hand, after a decree absolute under s..8 of the 1TA, 
A_937, has been pronounced, a second marriage is contracted, 
such remains valid, even if it is afterwards 
shown that the first husband was alive at the date of the 
celebration of that second marriage. 
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Bars to divorce, 
(A). Absolute bars to divorce, based upon guilt, --are 
connivance, condonation and collusion; 
t a) Connivance means approving of ()raiding the marital 
óffenco of the r.esnondent spouse,. 
(b) Condonation is forgiveness of a matrimonial offence 
donstituting a ground of divorce, by continuing common 
.ife,, especially sextaal intercourse with the respondent 
Spouse. 
(e) By. collusion is meant a corrupt bargain -^:hich the 
parti es :agree fraudulently to obtain a divorce by 
11) pretenling the commission of a marital offence or 
suppression of material facts. 
Discretionary Bars and the Doctrine of Recrimination. 
(B). Discretionary bars by s. 178( 3) of the Judicature 
Consolidation ) Act, 1925, as amended by sec, 4 of 
MCA , 1937, . are as follows , 
a) adultery, unreasonable delay and cruelty are discreti- 
onary bars to all grounds of divorce. and 
b) desertion without reasonable excuse or wilful sepa- 
ration are discretionary bars to grounds of adultery 
land cruelty 
e) wilful neglect and conduct conducing are discretionary 
i 
bars to ,grounds of adultery, and incurable unsoundness 
of mind and desertion. 
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.Before discussing these bars in detail it is necessary 
to consider the canon law doctrine of recrimination . 
The ecclesiastical courts applied this doctrine to 
divorce a mensa et thoro. Under this doctrine a divorce 
a mensa et thoro was to be refused. whereboth spouses 
ere equally at fault, Only -identical. *patrimonial often- 
es could be recriminated. This car.on law rule was based 
tipon the Roman lav pig. 24.3. 1939, a1th «» ^h this. 
flatter rule aPplied only to cases where property ad just - 
ent between spouses rather than divorce was at iss'Le, 
ee the decision of Proctor v. Proctor, 
.Hag. Cons. 292, 297. 
in some of the judgments, ,he. fo lóWi rteAzo .-s_:fDr.n.tI2enapplicatiox 
of the doctrine of recrimination, are also given 
(1) the equitable maxim " he who comes into court must 
dome with clean hands " and 
t2) the principle of the law of contract " a man cannot 
complain Of a breach of a contract which he has violated," 
ee Forster v. Forster, 1 Hag. Cons. 146 and Beeby v.Beeby 
i 
1 Hag. gon4. 790. 
Under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, such recriminatory 
i 
diefences termed. " countercharges " were merely discretio- 
lary bars to a divorce a vinculo metrimonii viz. the 
power was conferred upon the court to decide in its 
discretion whether or not discretion is to be exercised 
in favour of the party praying for it. 
he narrow view of the ecclesiastical courts that the 
ecriminatory charge must be of the same character as the 
briginal charge was abandoned by use of the term 
1 
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countercharge" in the relative enactments ; for a 
n countercharge TT may be of a character different from 
that of t o original charge; furthermore, recrimination 
is no longer a peremptory bar as it was by the rules 
of the ecclesiastical co?lrts. 
¡Elie principles as to the exercise cf this discretion 
have developed gradually. In Anchini v. Anchini , 
Curtei s , 210 , discretion in favour of the plaintiff 
as exercised by. reason of extenuating circumstances. 
,gain, in the decisions of Haswell v. Haswell ( 1859) 
9, LJ, Mat 21 ; Yeatman v. Yeatman ( 1868).LR 1 P de D 
494 the principles of the so called. rectitude theory 
have been arplied; in the latter decision Lord Penzance 
;pointed out at p. 493 : 
TT It would be of evil examrle , if the Court should 
hold that mere frailty of temper, unless shewn 
in some marked and intolerable excesses, was 
reasonable ground to justify a man in throwing a 
young wife upon the world, without the protection 
of his home and society ; TT and at p. 493 : 
" The cause should be grave and weighty which , in 
the judgment of the court,should deprive a de- 
serted wife of her remedy for that desertion and 
her right to set it up as a bar to divorce for 
adultery at her husband's suit." 
The main rules governing the exercise of the disr,retion 
Of the court are laid down in the decisions as follows : 
according to the decision of Wilson v. i;ilson ( 1920) 
P. 20 the court is to take into consideration 
(1) the h:osition and interests of the children of the 
a Dplicant (2) the interest of the woman with whom he has 
misconducted himself so that she may be in a position 
to marry him, 
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(3) the fact that the withholding of a decree will not 
he likely to reconcile the spouses. 
(4) the interest of the husband himself that he may re -' 
marry and lead a respectable life ;. 
to these have been added by the decision of Apted v. 
Apted (1930) the following facts to be considered by 
the Court, 
(5) the interest of the community in maintaining the 
;sanctions of honest matrimony 
1(6) a decree is to be refused if it is likely to en- 
;courage immorality; 
(7) there must be a strong affirmative case in order to 
¡secure relief 
!(8) all the material facts must be disclosed to the 
court.( Apted v. Apted (1920) P. 246. 
iTnder the new Act, Sec. 4 it is the duty of the court 
to inquire, particularly whether there is any connivance 
or condonation on the part of the petitioner or any 
collusion between the parties and also to inquire into 
my countercharge made against the petitioner. .thewidened powers of discretion and of inquiring 
into all material facts for the exercise of this dis- 
cretion reference is made to the heading " Procedure "Pfg00. 
Whereas under s. 178 of the Judicature Act. 1925, the 
court was bound to grant a decree on evidence of adultexy, 
ún.less the court could find, on the evidence before it, 
that the petition had been presented or prosecuted by 
collusion with either of the parties, by sec, 4 of 




Connivance, condonation or collusion, the burden of 
disproof as to those facts rests now on the party 
against whom it is suggested. 
See Poulden v. Poulden ( 1938) 2. 63. 
3- 
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INSANITY as BAR to DIVORCE. 
Since most of the grounds for divorce are bas on the 
¡guilt of the offending spouse, often the question 
arises which kind of insanity or what degree of mental 
defect of the offer._ding spouse may constitute a good 
defence to the petition of divorce. 
Different tests tier insanity are applied to the different 
jurai matters: as crimes, contracts,wills ,.'detention 
in asylum; again, in matrim,,1 matters., the tests of 
insanity applied to petitions furdivorce differs from 
those to be applied to pe- iti ons for nullity of marriage. 
In criminal matters there are two kinds of tests of the 
offenderTs responsibility, namely 
(a) the " right and wrong" test and 
(b) that of TT ir'r-e istible or uncontrollable impulse TT 
The former test of responstibi.lity is unanimously applied 
by the Courts ;o criminal cases since M ;cNa ight.oñ.';s 
case (1843) 10 Cl. F. 200 : 
In 1843 MacNaughton was tried for the murder of a 
Mr. Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert Peel, whom he 
shot in mistske for the latter; the accused made a plea 
of insanity ( insane delusions) and after evidence had 
been led, the jury returned a verdict of insanity. After 
that verdict the judges laid down at the request of the 
souse of hords in their answer to the questions put be- 
fore them, the rules as to criminal responsibility; by 
;these rules the " right and wrong "test was recognised 
as the sole test of criminal responsibility; in their 
Ltnswer to the questions concerning the responsibility 
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they said, as follows : 
Tr We submit our opinion to be that the jury ought: 
to be told in all cases that every man is pre- 
sumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient 
degree of reason to be responsible for his 
crimes, until the contrary be proved to their , 
satisfaction; that to establish a defence on the' 
ground of insanity', it must be clearly proved 
that at the time of committing the act, the 
accused was labouring under such a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind as not to know 
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, 
or, if he did know it, that he did not know 
that he was doing what wasktmong. TT 
In accordance with that opinion of the judges following 
lacNaughton' s case, the English Courts appl4r the rule 
that knowledge of right and wrong as to the act charged 
s the sole test of criminal responsibility; they reject 
h doctrine of irresistible ( uncontrollable) impulse 
defence to crime, viz: - the doctrine by which there 
exists a type of mental unsoundness resulting in impulsions 
which are quite uncontrollable. 
i 
The applicability to civil cases of the rule laid down ib. 
chat opinion of the judges in 18!!.3 is not clearly 
established up to now. 
Insanity as a bar in its Applicability to adultery 
and cruelty : 
In Long v. Long and Johnson ( 1890) LJP. 27, a.we&k/ 
minded resrond.er_t wife pleaded she was not a consenting 
('party 
to the adultery and. the Court refused to grant a 
dec ee on the reasoning that she was incapable of under 
standing the nature of the sexual act of adultery. 
In Yarrow v. Yarrow ( 1892) p. 92 it was doubted by 
Sir Charles Parker Butt whether even theTTright and 
Wrong" test would be a good defence to a petition for 
G y 
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.divorce on the ground of adultery; but in Hambury v. 
Hamburg (1892) P 222 Sir Chartres Butt P. held that it wAs 
b.ecessary, in order of make insanity a good plea to 
a 
petition for divorce, that the plea should state that 
Sthe insanity was lasting and abiding and that there was. 
Rio hope of recovery or amelioration, end not that it 'TAMS 
a mere recc4urrence of intermittent insanity. The questions 
:put to the jury as regards that plea were : whether,when 
the respondent committed the acts of cruelty and adultery 
charged against him, he was capable of understanding thEtir 
nature and consequences, and whether he committed those 
6 
acts under mental aberration directly or indirectly caused 
:spy drink, The jury found that the respondent was capablé 
f understanding the nature and consequences of the acts,, 
committed. 
the "right and wrong" test rule appears to have been 
applied to forming the questions put before the jury in 
ghat case, 
the same test has been applied to the plea of insanity 
n tLe recent divorce case of Astle v.Astle (1939) P.465 
grounded on cruelty,where it has been pointed out that 
intention and malignity was an essential element in the 
matrimonial offence of cruelty and there could be no such 
{ 
ruelty if the accused sppuseTs state of mind was 
uch that he did not know the nature and gli.ty of the act. 
Ft is noteworthy that in Kellock v. Kellock (1939) 
All E.R.972 it has been held that such disease was no 
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'answer to cruelty where respondent had acted with a 
consciously wicked mind. 
Insanity as a bar to divorce on desertion. 
s:be Townsend v. Townsend 12 3 P & 11p. 129. 130 1 .t was 
held in that case, that it was essential for the 
constitution of desertion that there should be a 
voluntary abandonment of the other's society against 
her ( his) will; hence it was concluded that insanity 
interrupted the running of the statutory period of de- 
sertion, 
Further, in the decision Williams v. Williams (1939) P.615 
1365 A.C. , it was held that a spouse certified is 
incapable of desertion after certification', frith regara 
to the decision in Pratt v. Pratt ( 1939) AC 417 in which 
case it was laid down that " the deserting spouse must be 
shewn to have persisted in the intention tc desert 
throughout the period ", the court took the view that the 
respondent husband being mindless was unable to think 
any thought, to form any intent, or to take any reasoned 
action. 
In Bennett v. Bennett ( 193:9 )p,274. 
the court refused to grant a decree of divorce be-cause 
the husband did not discharge the burden of proof that 
his wife who continued to be insane had continued to 
exercise a reasoned judgment or had been able to form 
a rational intention as to cohabitation with her husband. 
Finally ir. Rushb_rrvok v. Rushbrook ( 1940) P 24 it was 
laid down that when a spouse charged with desertion is 
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4roved to be insane and accepted in lag by certification 
as such during the relevant period, there is an i r re- 
butable presumption that such spouse is incapable of an 
T 
intention to desert. 
Insanity on the chart of _etitioner as a bar to divorce. 
Insanity of the petitioner does not interrupt the running 
of the stati}to yperiod of desertion:- 
In the *sae converse to the previously mentioned, 
A 
namely, where the petitioner has been an inmate of a 
!mental hospital during cart of the statutory period 
the co-_:rt did not refuse relief asked for by the 
petitioner on the ground of the huband's desertion. 
-Sothenden v. Sothenden ( .1940) C.A. 73. 
Effect of inSanity of the respondent at the date of 
institution of the Petition for divorce ( effect of 
insanity superver_ienaj ) . 
Supervening insanity of the respondent does rot affect 
the right of the injured spouse to a divorce on the 
ground of the marital offence committed by the respon- 
dent when sane. 
See the Scottish case as-Nunuitv. Mordaunt IR HIS 2 Sc App. 374, 
in which case it 'es held that supervening insanity 
rould not be a ber to divorce for adultery while sane. 
Yet it may now affect the right to divorce in the case 
of a divorce for' desertion, 
a.nce according to S. 2 b) MCA 1937 the stete of 
lthi.rgs amo11rting to desertion must continue from the date at 
¡Mph it began, throughout the three years immediately 
Treceding the pr.esentdtbno the petition , in this 
respect it differs from the statutory periodsunder 
Matrimonial Oauses Act ,1857, and the Judicature 
(Consolidation) Act,1925, respectively in that the perioä. 
of desertion cannot be completed until the presentation 
of the petition. 
Thus, if the state of the respondentt insanity 
existed at the time of the institution of the petition 
the period of desertion cannot be said to have been 
immediately preceding the presentation of the suit 
With regard to the decisions cited P.t,p,1Q9. 
In conclusion of this subject it may be noted that in 
Most cases where the plea of insanity by the r.esnpndent 
would be successful, the remedy of sv. 2 ( d ) of the 
$TCA 1937 would be open to the petitioner, if the require- 
ments of s. 3 of that Act were satisfied. 
'Mental derangement through intoxication by drugs or 
alcohol, ever, though great mental aberration may have 
been caused, cannot be pleaded in divorce nroi¢eedings; 
on the contrary, it may co Stjtait:e itself a ground of 
¡divorce under the heading of cruelty . 
¡Conversior of judicial separation or of separation order 
Into a decree of divorce. 
.Under s. 5 of the M.C.A. 1937, a petition for judicial 
separation may now be presented either by the husband or 
the wife on the same grounds as have been stated above 
ith retard to a petition for divorce, or on the ground2 
of failure to comply with a decree for restitution of 
i 
leonj u-gal rights, or on any ground on which a decree for 
? lz4 s9,' 
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divorce a mensa at thoro might have been pronounced 
immediately before the commenceme.__t of the M.C.A.,187, 
Lamely unnatural offences. 
Tnder s.6 of the M.C.A., 1937, a spouse who has obtained 
decree of judicial separation or a separation order 
.Under the Summary Jurisdiction ( Separation and Mainter.ane) 
Ac+s11895 to 1925, may petition for divorce and the court 
may treat the decree of judicial separation or the order 
of serara.tion as sufficient proof of the grouind' on which 
it was granted, but the Court is not permitted to pro - 
:ounce a decree of divorce without receiving evidence 
from the petitioner. 
Effect of divorce, 
Name. Under English law a rerson is at liberty to adopt 
any name so long as he does not act thereby by way of 
deceit to the prejudice of a third rerson. Hence a women, 
after a decree of divorce has been pronounced, may con, 
tinue to use her married name or resume her maiden name 
Cowley v. Cowa.sy ( 1900 ) 305, Du Boulay v. Du Bouleÿ 
( 1969) LR 2 PC 430. 
Succession. Wher. the divorced spouse dies intestate,th 
other s pouse h,.s no right whatsoever of inheritance. 
But since there is no such 
4 
rule as to testamentary 
succession and therefor a will is not deemed to be revol4ed 
by operation of law in case of divorce with regard to 
El, will made before d.ivor°ce, it is for the spouse who has 
made such will to revoke it after divorce has been nro- 
nounced. 
-113- 
- Custody of and access to children of the marriage.,_ 
The jurisdiction of the Divorce Oourt as to custody of 
and access to children is regulated by s. 193 of the 
Judicature ( Consolidation ) Act, 1925, and M.C.Rule 55 
The Chancery Divin has a concurrent jurisdiction in 
these matters, but if once a divorce suit is pending,it 
efuses.to exercise its jurisdiction in such a case un- 
til the matter is referred to it by the Divorce Division 
In accordance with the provisions just cited. 
The Divorce Division, as a rule, g-re21ts after decree nisi 
the custody of the children of the marriage not over 
16 years of age to the successful wife, and directs by 
the relative final order that the children shall not be 
removed out of the jurisdiction of the Court, except by 
itsleave. 
I 
Martin v. Martin ( 1860) 29 L.J.P.106; 
kalinson. v. Malinson ( 1966) I.R. I P & D 221. 
Scottish La w on Divorce is rather assimilated to English 
law on divorce since the passing, of the Divorce (Scott 
4`) 
Act, 1938, ( 1 and 2 Geo. 6 c !). Apart from this statjzte 
a body of case law is still in force which has grown up 
while the former statutes on divorce were in operation, 
since the principle of the binding force of precedent 
also obtains in Scotland. This principle was finally laid 
down in Scotland. by the decision of Rose v.Drummond (1828) 
S 945. By that decision it was expressly stated that a 
precedent must be considered as fixing the law,until a 
different rule was laid clown by the House of Lords. 
 
Scottish Law as to Grounds of Divorce. 
(A) Grounds of Divorce based on the guilt of the 
other sppuse. 
(1) Adultery. since the Reformation ( 1560) the 
Scottish Courts have exercised jurisdiction to 
dissolve marriage on the ground of adultery of either 
party, 
(2) Desertion. Desertion was recognised as ground of 
divorce by the Act of 1573, now repealed by the Divorce. 
(Scotland) 1938,S. 7; an action of adherence was to be 
a preliminary to an action fJr Divorce; but since the 
t.. 
QQonjugal8ights ( Scotland) Amendé :.ent Act 1861) it 
has no longer been necessary to institute an action of 
adherence as a preliminary to suing for divorce, 
Auld v. Auld ( 1884) 23 Sc LR 26; Mackenzie v.Mackenzie 
-(1895) AC 384. 
The above cited Sec. 7 lays down t'nat Desertion subsists 
l: hen the defender has wilfully and without reasonable cause 
deserted the pursuer and ,,persisted in such ddesertion 
for a period of not less than three years. 
Since the Divorce ( Scotland) Act(1938),the question of 
adherence has been doubtful. By the decision of Macaskill 
v. Macaskill ( 1939) Sc 187 and Bell v. Bell ( 1940) 
So LT X41 it has been held to be essential to the party 
suing for divorce to use every reasonable endeavour to 
induce the other party to adhere and to be ready and 
willing to continue to discharge his ( her) all marital 
duties and that willingness to adhere must persist up 
to the date of raising the action for divorce for the 
statutory period of three years. 
(3). Cruelty. The Act defines cruelty as such as would 
justify according to the law and practice existing at 
the passing of the Act the granting of a decree of 
separation a mensa et thoro. 
Wilson v. Wilson ( 19 39) She 102. 
(4). Conviction of Sodomy or Bestiality. 
(B). Grounds of dissolution of marriage regardless of the 
guilt of the other spouse. 
(a) Incurable insanity. The provisions concerning this 
ground are thqame as those contained in the English 
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937; for the details it is 
referred to p e.. It may, hew ver, be noted that whereas 
the English Act deals with care and treatment of insane, 
persons according to the English statutory provisions only, 
the Divorce ( Scotland)Act of 1938 takes account of 
English as well as Scottish care and treatment. 
(b) Declaration of presumed death. See for the details 
as the provisions are nearly the same as those 
contained in the English Act. 
Scottish Law - Bars to divorce. 
(a) The Doctrine of recrimination is not recognised 
under Scottish law in consistorial cases. 
Adultery of the petitioner is, as we shall show below, 
1 
I O.nc_ absolute bar to a divorce on desertion only. Under 
1 
Scottish law there does not exist a discretionary bat to 
a divorce; there are not such powers of discretion in this 
_respect conferred upon the Courts as they are under 
English law. The defender may only bring a cross -action 
on the adultery of the pursuer and if it is established 
that both souses are guilty, each is granted a decree 
of dissolution of marriage. 
The Divorce ( Scotland) Act, 1938, did not alter this 
position. Lord 'dark expressed in Bell v. Bell O.H.(1939) 
SN 71 the opinion that no discretion was enforced,but 
that, if the ground of divorce was established, the 
Court must grant a decree. 
This point was also stressed in 'gooier v.Wooler ( 1940) 
Sc. LT Page 66, at p. 68 per Lord Robertson, "Under 
Scottish law is no question of exercising a discretion." 
"Adultery is either bar or is not ". 
This decision was based o@ the decision in Auld v.Auld 
(1884) 12 R 36 and Hunter v. Hunter ( 1900)2 F. 771. 
(b) Absolute Bars. 
(1) Adultery of the pursuer committed after commencement 
of the desertion constitutes an absolute bar to divorce. 
ee Wooler v. Woofer, Hunter v. Hunter,Auld v.Auld and 
cott v. Scott ( 1908) Sc 1124, and Gilfillan v. 
Gilfillan ( 1931) Sc LT 454. 
2) . Condonation and Connivance ( lenocinium) are also 
absolute bars to L. divorce on adultery. 
(3) . Finally, wilful neglect and misconduct are bars 
to an action for divorce on the ground of incurable in- 
sanity. 
,,f 
4y Sec. 1 of Divorce ( Scotland ) Act, 1938, it is pro - 
4ided that the Court shall not be bound to grant a decree 
1 
4 divorce if it its opinion the pursuer has during the 
marriage been guilty of such wilful neglect or misconduct 
s has conduced to the insanity of the defender. It is note - 
orthy that by a recent decision it has been held that 
adultery is no bar to a divorce for insanity; in that de- 
oision, Brown v. Bros ( 1940) 36. 474 Lord Keyes pointed 
(put " I do not think that by analogy this recognised prac- 
tice of the Courts in actions of divorce for desertion 
( viz: that adultery is an absolute bar to divorce for 
desertion) can be extended to actions for divorce for in- 
1 
sanity. The reasons in the one case were based on the 
statute which introduced divorce for desertion. In the 
present case and under the Act of 1938 any similar reason 
f or refusing decree of divorce, where defender is found 
to be incurable insane, appears to me to be absent." 
Effect of Divorce. 
(1) At common law as laid down by the decision of 
Harvey v. Far ular ( 1872) OH (H1) 26, the guilty party 
to a divorce loses all claim to his or her legal rights 
on the death of the other spouse and the innocent spouse 
ay exact his ( her) legal rights as if the otter spouse 
ere dead. 4 
Where broth parties are declared to be guilty of divorce4' 
imither can take any benefit through the dissolution of 
the marriage. Frase,rv. Walker ( 1872) 10 M 83. 
it 
e ,. 
(2). As to custody of children. By the Conjugal Rights 
(Scotland.) Act 1861) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 86) T1e power was 
1pnfetred;uIto . t Cgurt to make in actions of divorce 
such orders as to custody, maintainance and e,ucati.on of 
'pupil children of the marriage as it thinks fit with 
regard to their welfare. 
(3)Remarria. e. Each spouse is at liberty to remarry 
after divorce a third person with one exception: by the 
Act ( 1600) d. 20 a marriage contracted by a souse 
divorced for adultery with his ( her) accoml;lice is 
deemed to be null, if the nLme of the latter is mentioned 
in the decree of divorce. See Beattie v. Beattie (1866) 
5 M 181. 
Northern Ireland. Law on divorce. 
In Northern Ireland where only a legislative divorce 
it i act of ie Parliament of Northern Ireland was obtainable 
up to now, the power to grant divorce from bond of matri- 
mony has been conferred upon the High Court by the recently 
/-1 
Iassed tatrimonial gauses ( Northern Ix'eland ) Act ,1931, 
( 2 and 3 Geo. VI ch. 13 ). This Act is on similar lines 1 
as the English MCA. 1937 with some modifications :The 
three years' interval interposed between marriage and 
bringing an action of its dissolution is omitted and it 
is only laid down that the court should not pronounce a 
decree of divorce o_ the ground of cruelty alone until the 
expiration of the three yearslperiod, unless the court 
is satisfied as to exceptional hardship of the petitioner 
or depravity of the respondent. 
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In an action for divorce on presumed death of the other 
spouse a decree of dissolution of marriage alone it tò 
be pronounced without decree declarative of presumed 
death as rr.ovided by the English enactment. It may further 
be noted that, whereas the English Act deals with care 
and treatment of insane persons according to the English 
statutory provisions only, the Matrimonial Causes 
(Northern Ireland ) Act 1939 takes account of English 
as well as Scottish care and treatment. Section 8 
of -the Act of 1939 imposes also restrictions on the 
remarrying divorcee with regard to certain degrees 
of relationship. 
The Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ir. eland)Act 1939 
differs, on the other hand, from the Divorce Scotland. 
Act 1938.in that it confexsdiscretionary powers upon 
the High Court similar to those of the English Divorce 
Division and again in thatstction 26 provides for a 
relief of a deserted wife in the same way as section 13 
of the English MCA Act. The Divorce (Scotland)Act 1938 
contains neither of these provisions. 
Self governing dominions. 
Common law rs- in general it the various parts of the 
British Empire; yet there exist some sixty legislatures 
in the British Commonwealth; hence a great variety of 
statutes relating to matrimonial causes and divorce can 
be found there and it is clear that an outline only of 
the most striking features can be given in respect of 
divorce legislation and that details however interesting 
they may be must necessarily be omitted. 
The most significant features of the statutory proviSDns 
5 a-40-e-c,41..<1 
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relating to grounds of divorce are : In : 
( a) Australia: (1) Long terms of imprisonment are 
admitted as ground of divorce almost universally through- 
out Australia. 
(2),In Western- Australia sec. 7 of the Act of 1919 Nr.33 
enacts that divorce may be obtained on the ground of 
ante- nuptial incontinence of either spouse; in this case 
divorce procedure islised as a substitute for annulment, 
i 
in order to avoid disadvantages which annulment of 
marriage ab initio carries with it,e.g.bastardization ofits issue. 
(3). In Victoria by the matrimonial causes and divorce lot - 
of 1936 fr. 4210 the ground of divorce of " habitual 
drunkenness" has been extended to include " ta]dng or 
using to excess any sedative narcotic or stimulating 
drug or preparations. " 
(b) Canada. Divorce a vinculo matrimonii may be granted 
only by the Divorce courts of Alberta, British Coltunbiai, 
Manitoba, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario. In th 
other provinces such divorce may be obtained by a private 
Bill in the Senate.only. 
(c) Absolute divorce is unknown to the law of the Irish 
Free State. 
( d)The Law of Newfoundland recognises no divorce, excep 
by private Bill. 
( e ) New Zealand: By the Divorce and Matrimonial Cause 
et of 1928 separation by mutual consent for three year 
'.s among others admitted. as ground of divorce. 
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(e). British colonies. 
r Insofardoimnon Law prevails in the British colonies the 
courts exercise jurisdiction in divorce including recogni- 
tion of foreign judgments in accordance with the same 
principles as those followed in England. 
(1). Msle of Man: 
The courtsof the Isle of Nan do not exercise jurisdiction 
in divorce a vinculo matrimonii; divorce aan only be 
a{ 
obtained by special Act by Tynwald. 
'(2). New Guinea: 
It is noteworthy that under the Divorce and Matrimonial: 
?Causes Ordinance 1934 relating to this colony contains 
among others the following ground of divorce: A wife may 
!petition for divorce in the case of a husband's failure 
sduxing the previous three years to pay to her maintenance 
'ordered to be paid by any court or agreedto be paid. under 
',any deed of separation. 
Furthermore, a petitioner whether husband or wife 
may claim damages from an alleged adulterer pro- 
s 
vided the adultery is not condoned and was 
co emitted within the previous two 
ì 
years. An 
alleged,, adulterer need not be made a party to the 
;petition and served, unless damages or costs 
;against the adulterer are claimed. 
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XT. S.A. Law on divorce, 
Grounds of divorce. 
In all States of U.S.A., except South Carolina,divorce 
absolute is recognised. There exists a great variation 
in the statutes as to the grounds of divorce; common 
to all statutes recognising divorce absolute is adultery 
as ground of divorce; it is the only one recognised by 
the law of the State of New York. 
The statutes vary as to the grounds of divorce; there 
are 39 grounds of divorce altogether stated by the 
different statutes, the number of these grolonds adopted 
by each of them also differs greatly. Among these grounds 
are, apart from those on which divorce absolute is granted 
under English law, to be found for instance: Conviction 
for crime, non- support, impotence, intoxication; yet 
incompatibility of temper as such is not named in any 
statute as ground of divorce, but thy: same result is 
reached in some statutes by basing divorce under the 
respective provisions on the existence of a voluntary 
separation continued for a fixed period.Some statutes 
admit divorce on grounds which must exist at the time 
o - ofcel.ebratiori .bf marriage; in these cases divorce 
procedure is used instead of that for annulment of 
marriage; in that way some of the disadvantages are 
avoided which an annulment of marriage carries with it, 
Finally, it is important to note, that under the 
Michigan statute the Court has the power to grant an 
absolute divorce although merely a judicial separation 
is asked for. 
-Grounds of divorce regardles of guilt. 
(1) Under the different statutes the only ground of 
divorce which contains no element of guilt is insanity. 
In some statutes a general clause exists and there under 
such a general clause insanity may also be considered 
a ground of divorce. The statutory period during which 
insanity must have existed in order to constitute a 
ground of divorce varies from two to twenty years. 
(2). In case of presumed death, a second marriage is, 
as a rule, voidable; under some statutes the returning 
spouse of the first marriage may elect which of the two 
marriages should be dissolved. The Arkansas statute 
only provides that such second marriage (after the 
other spouse has been absent for five years') " shall be 
as valid as if such husband or wife were dead." 
Bars to divorce. 
(1). Not all statutes on divorce deal with the defences 
to divorce; at any rate, collusion, condonation, 
connivance are there held. bars to divorce by the Courts 
on the same linesas by the English decisions. 
(2) Recrimination. 
There are many types of the application of the doctrine 
of recrimination in the statutes of the different states. 
The rule whereunder a respondent may in a suit for 
divorce based on any ground recriminate by showing that 
the plaintiff is guilty of any marital offence is 
generally recognised where no statutory provision concer- 
ning recrimination exists, and this rule is also embodied 
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in some statutes; in Hawaii recrimination on any cause 
is limited to divorce for adultery. By another group 
of statutes recrimination is limited to adultery what- 
ever the ground may be on which the suit for divorce 
is founded. The old Canon law theory that the wrong to! 
be recriminated must be of the same nature is also 
adopted by some statutes, and limited by others to divorce 
for adultery. 
Lastly there is a type of recrimination by which the 
respondent may in any divorce suit recriminate by showing 
that the plaintiff is guilty of a cause of equal wrong. 
Thus the statutes exhaust with regard to the docine 
of recrimination nearly all the possible combinations 
of events. 
Recrimination, if permitted at all, is an absolute bar 
to divorce, except for Kansas, Minnesota and Oklahoma, 
where it is left to the discretion of the Court to 
grant or to refuse a decree of divorce in such cases. 
A matter of recrimination on which a respondent could 
rely must be pleaded and proved by him, it is not to 
be taken into consideration by the Court ex officio. 
See Bishop, Marri -ge and Divorce para. 408. 
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C hap t e r VIII. 
Continental systems of law on divorce. 
French Law: Grounds of divorce. 
Absolute ( peremptory) grounds of divorce are : 
(1)).Adultery. ( Art. 229, 230, C.C.) 
(2). Condemnation to a degrading punishment (Art,232). 
When these grounds are Droved the court is bound to 
grant divorce, 
Relative ( facultative )grounds of divorce (Art.231)are: 
(1) Threats or conduct dangerous to life or health of the 
other spouse ( exces), 
(2) Extreme cruelty ( sevice) . 
(3) Any serious breach of marital duty (injuretgravel). 
e l 
The later ground finds a very wide interpretation,by the 
courts so as to include drunkeness,insulting words, 
quarrelsome nature,desertion,accusing the other spouse 
of infidelity withou justification,etc. 
Interpreting Act 231 C.C. the courts have discretionary 
powers to grant or refuse divorce as the particular cir- 
cumstances of the case may be. 
The following decisions are illustrative of the liberal 
interpretation given to this Article by the courts: 
Rouen April 29,1910,D 1912, 5.2.5 .1911,2.3'7.(Refusal of 
religious celebration of the marriage was considered such 
breach of conjugal duty as to justify divorce). 
Dijon,July 30,1868, D /68.2.247,(Desertion was held injure 
grave).Abusive control /the wifeTs relations or of her 
correspondence ( Paris,July 13,1898,D.99.1.358, 
Regu. Aug.6,1907,D.1907,1512) as well as a charge of apn- 
fugal infidelity without justification were held suffi- 
cient to justify a divorce.(Caen,Febr.11,1880,D 81.2.183). 
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-Drunk n.essor abuse of morphia may be considered "injure 
graver' to the other spouse. 
Alger, June 11, 1892 , D. 92. gpO, and also refusal of 
consumation of mFrriage. 
Requ.April 6, 1908. D. 1908.1. 240. 
Since the French law on divorce is founded solely on 
the fault basis of either spouse, insanity is no ground 
of divorce thereunder. 
Dijon,Nov.29,1923.D.l924.2,46; 
Poitiers,March 25,1890,D 90,2.340. 
Lyon, Nov. 20. 1903,D.1904,2.130.S.1904,2.295. 
Bars to divorce. 
Art. 244 C.C. mentions only death of one spouse 
reconciliation of the spouses as special defences to an 
action of divorce, yet the following facts are considered 
bars to divorce under French Law: 
(1) Condonation. 
Erreux Dec. 2, 1924 , Gazette Palais Feb. 5, 1925. 
It may, however, be observed that continuance of life in 
common is not of itself deemed to be necessarily condo- 
nation of the marital offence. 
Cass. Dec. 11. 1893, D. 1894, 1. 341. 
(2). Recrimination. 
There have been decisions recognising that principle of 
canon law, called recrimination. ( Compensatio criminum), 
that is to say that adultery of the petitioner ( equality 
of guilt) bars divorce.on the ground of adultery. 
This canonical doctrine was introduced into the French 
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jurisprudence on the reasoning that there was an 
analogous case in the French Penal Code supporting 
this view, namely,Art. 336 of the French Penal Code, 
by which a husband could not charge his wife with adultery 
when guilty of keeping a concubine in the common dwelling. 
The vast majority of French writers object to the theory 
that mutual wrongs should compensate each other. 
Although the modern trend of French jurisprudence a % 
the doctrine of recrimination, almost the same result is 
reached by way ofthrxeother doctrines which have deve- 
loped there, viz. the theories of : 
(a) Provocation. Provocationof the acts complaintdoOf 
is a bar to divorce where it has proximately caused the 
marital offence relied upon as ground of divorce. 
Requ. 12.1. 1903, S. 1903, 1.279. 
(b). Extenuation. As definitions of the relative 
( facultative) grounds of divorce named above are not 
given by the Civil Code, the courts, in consideit.g all 
the circumstances of the particular case, often hold the 
wrongs of the petitioner as extenuating the marital 
offence complained of and thus as barring divorce. 
(c). The most recent theory is that of Carpentier: 
He points out,that in case where a divorce is Sought upon 
a peremptory 
( absolute) ground the court must grant the 
divorce, Irrespective of the existence of an equal wrong 
on the part of the petitioner. Where,on the other hani , 
the petition for divorce is grounded on one of the 
facultative 
( relative ) grounds, an absolute ground as 
-defence to such petition will operate to procure a 
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'divorce for the respondent. 
(3). Lapse of time as a bar to divorce. 
(a)Lapse of time is a bar only insofar as it constitutes 
prescription of the action.i.e. when 30 years have 
slapsed since the cause for divorce arose, according to 
art. 2262(2) relating to the ordinary prescription. 
Rennes,Dec. 28. 1825. 
(b) Where proceedings for divorce have been commenced 
and not duly prosecuted so that more than three years 
have elapsed since the last step in procedure the action 
may be dismissed according to art. 394 CC.P. 
(4). Finally,it is noteworthy that separation- agreements 
are invalid. according to art. 307 C.C. and that there- 
fore Stich agreements are no bar to a divorce on desertion. 
Effect of divorce. 
(1)Jame. By art. 299 C.C. as modified by the law of 
February 6,1893, the divorced spouses must resume their 
family names. 
(2).According to art. 300 C.C. the husband or wife who 
has obtained the divorce retains the advantages mode in 
his or her favour by the other,even if it has been agreed 
that they were reciprocal and if the reciprocity does not 
take place. 
(3). Maintenance. When divorce is decreed on the fault 
of one spouse,the latter is liable to accord to the 
innonce-Jspouse if unable to support himself ( herself), 
an allowance not exceeding in amount one -third of his 
(her) income.'(Art. 301,C.C.) 
(4). Damages. The guilty spouse may also beordered 
to pay special damages to the other by reason of his 
(her) tortious conduct, according to art. 1382 C.C. which 
runs as follows ; 
TT Every act whatever of an individual which causes 
injury to another obliges the one owing to whom 
it has oc;cr ed to make up for it." 
(5). Custody and maintenance of children. The care and 
custody of children of marriage belongs to .he innocent 
spouse, unless the Court upon motion of the family or of 
the public prosecutor directs it otherwise. Art.302.C.C. 
Regardless of who has the custody of the children,both 
divorced spouses are entitled to control their education 4I 
vTa 
,/and liable to contribute to their maintenance.(Art.303). 
Conversion of judicial separation into divorce. 
94, 
According to art. 306 C.C. a judicial separation may 
be granted on the same grounds as those justifying 
a divorce. ( séparation de corps,..) 
When a judicial separation has been in force for 
three years it may be at the instance of either party 
converted into a decree of divorce ; according to 
art. 310, C.C. 
Fonversion was changed from permissory to mandatory 
by the law of June 6, 1908. 
!8emarriage after judgment declarative of absence. 
,Remarriage by the remaining spouse may take place after 
judgment declarative of the other spouse's absence has 
been given by the court. ( art. 119, C.c..) 
C°, C, 
0_ 
When a person has been missing at not heard of for four 
years, interested parties may apply to the Court to 
have the absence proclaimed. The court will order an 
inquiry and after expiration of one year after ordering 
the investigation the court will give a judgment declaPin.g 
absence, 
Since the absent spouse, whose consort has married again 
has alone the power of disputing the validity of the 
second marriage, the continuance of the latter depends 
solely on whther or not the returning spouse takes 
proceedings foi its annulment.( art. 13944 C.c, ) 
Austrian Law on Divorce. 
Prior to 1938. 
(a).The marriage of persons being of Roman Catholic faith 
is indissoluble except by death of either, or on dissolution 
by judicial declaration of the presumed death of one of 
the spouses, para. 111 of the Austrian Civil Code,See... 
( b). Under Austrian law a divorce a vinculo matrimonii! 
may be granted to persons who confess neither Roman 
Catholic faith nor Jewish faith, under the following 
co4ditions: 
Lite far as absolute divorce is permitted it is based upon 
Lie guilt of either spouse; the innocent spouse only 
may petition for divorce on the following grounds: 
(1) Adultery, 
2) Conviction of a crime involving imprisonment of 
at least five years. 
Æ 
(3). Malicious desertion (4) attempts to kill the 
other spouse or to inflict grave injury on him or her, 
¡(5) repeated grave insults and maltreatments,(6) invin- 
cible aversion,on the part of eitner spouse or of both 
'spouses ( para. 115 of the Austrian Civil Code and 
the Law of April 9, 1870, .Tmp' : r >1-LaV oy 511 ) 
i 
I,ccord.ing to these rules both spouses have to submit 
the relative application-to the court and to prove clearly 4 4.0'6.6 
their invincible aversion by some facts, since mutual 
consent of the parties does not suffice. 
,Disease including insanity is not recognised as ground 
of divorce under Austrian law; but since invincible 
aversion on the part of either mouse is sufficient to 
justify divorce, the sound spouse alleging invincible 
aversion on his or her part: may submit the relative 
application for divorce to the court in agreement with 
the curator of the insane spouse. 
Bars to divorce. 
(1) Conduct conducing. Since an innocent spouse only 
may petition for divorce, it has been held by the court 
that conduct conducing to the divorce ground relied upon 
bars divorce. (Decision,Slg Nr 3722). 
(2)Continuation of cohabitation by the innocent spouse 
although he or she has become aware of the facts constitu- 
ting a ground fol. divorce, is considered a bar to divorce. 
( paras. 115 and 96 of the Austrian Civil Code) . 
(3) Ther.e..-111,i, the other hand, not recognised under 
Austrian Law compensation of divorce gr'bu dS, that is to 
say: where both spouses have committed marital offences 
constituting grounds of divorce, each of the spouses 
may petition for divorce, if his ( her) conduct was not 
conducing to the marital offence of the other spouse. 
Decisions of the Supreme Court : 
Slg VIII 2932, 3014, XI 4234. XIV 5451. 
In the decree of divorce it is to be declared whether 
or( not either of the spouses is guilty of a marital 
(ofienceP]1i which one is, even in the case of a divorce 
founded ipon the ground of invincible aversion. 
Decisions of the Supreme Court: '(S1g. Nr.14.13'7,Slg IV,1303). 
Where the respondent has brought a cross -petition and the 
marriage is dissolved on the grounid of the guilt of both 
spouses, both spouses are to be adjudged guilty. 
(c). A marriage contracted between persons of Jewish 
religion may be dissolved: 
(1). By mutual consent of the spouses; 
(2 )Òn the ground of adultery committc`, by th wife. 
No other ground of divorce is admitted to spouses of 
Jewish religion. 
The dissolution of the Jewish marriage is effected by 
{ delivery to the wife of the so- called Gett. It is 
á formal latter of divorce; this delivery is to be 
performed before the court, a rabbi being -_,resent. 
( paras. 133 to 135 of the Austrian Civil Code.) 
Dissolution of marriage by judicial declaration of pre- 
sumed death of either spouse. The adjudication of death 
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may be made , in general, 
( 1) if no information that the person who disappeared 
is alive, had been received for ten years 4.d if he would have com- 
pleted his thirtieth year, 
(2) One who has disappeared and would have completed his 
seventieth year, may be adjudged dead if no information 
of his being alive has been received for five years, 
( 3) when the person concerned has been in mortal danger , 
the adjudication of death may be made after three years 
from that event, ( para 24 of the Austrian Civil Code). 
In all these cases the remaining spouse may submit an 
application for a judicial declaration of the dissolution 
of the marriage. 
The relative procedure is regulated by the law of 
February 16, 1883, Imperial Iaw aZ.2O. 
After such judicial declaration of the dissolution of 
the marriage thigilF remarriage by the remaining spouse itr r 
permitted. 
Yet such dissolution of the marriage is conditional upon 
the fact that the person who has been judicially de- 
clared dead, was in reality dead at the time of celebration 
of the second marriage. 
Judicial separation. By Austrian Law the institution of aC 
judicial separation is also recognised and may be granted 
on the following grounds: 
(a). By mutual consent , ( b) adultery, (c) conviction 
of a crime, regardless of the lengh of the term of 
imprisonment, (d) malicious desertion,( )immoral conduct, 
(f) attempts to inflict grave injury to body and health 
of the other spouse, (g) grave assaults, (h) repeated and 
very grave insults, 
The grounds named in (b) and (h) may by way of analogy 
extended to other similar causes by the courts and in 
fact the following were added: 
(To (b):minor contraventions against conjugal fidelity 
(decisions of the Supreme Court,Slg.XI Nr.4394,XIV Nr.5627). 
(To (c):Although thefts between spouses never constitute 
a C?'ime in the Continental sense of the term (rather 
corresponding to the English term "felony ")but only mis- 
demeanour according to para.525 of the Austrian Penal Code, 
the courts regard such thefts as a ground for separation. 
(Decision of the Supreme Court Slg.Nr.10.109), 
R e m a r r i a g e 
by way of an administrative act of dispensation of the 
impediment of "bond of matrimony" (para 84 of the Austrian 
Civil Code). 
Under Austrian law the only remedy available for persons 
of Roman Catholic faith who tried to get rind of the bond 
of matrimony was the permission of remarriage granted by 
an administrative governmental act of dispensation, 
Since the Armistice of 1918 -2ara,83 of the Austrian Civil 
Code found a more liberal interpretation and it ° held 
1 4 




granted; some writers took the view that the impedimeñt 
of "bond of matrimony" was not included in this para.83,1.c, 
and dispensation of this impediment must not be granted. 
The powers of granting such dispensation 
are by para.84 of the 





ments; the provincial governors granted them since 
1918 following the liberal view in construing para.84 1.c. 
dispensation of the bond of matrimony to spouses 6f 
Roman Catholic faith and allowed their remarriage,but 
since the judicial investigation of the validity of 
marriage takes place ex officio at the instance of anyone 
who is showang some civil claim depending; there9t the 
courts accoñing 94:. of the Austrian Civil Code and to 
,4,a 
the Imperial Decree of Aug. 23 1819 JGS.Nr. 1595,declared 4.c.4. - (1 
such remarriages null and void on the reasoning that 
dispensation of the impediment to remarriage cannot be 
granted; it is doubtful whether the courts had the 
competency to investigate into the merits of the dis- 
pensation as this administrative act of dispensation 
was a final one. The defensoi of the bond of matrimony 
Who was officially appointed in proceedings concerning 
1 
the nullity of marriage, took in several instances pro- 
ceedings to the Constitutional Court against the nullity 
decrees prnounced by the courts in order to defend the 
"Dispensehe" on the reasoning that the Civil Court was 
not competent to review the dispensation. " 
The Oonstitutional Court followed this view in some of 
its decisions declaring that there is a conflict of 
competency betwyen the Civil Courts tndthe administrative 
bodies of the Provincial Governments, which alone were 
competent. Dec. of the Constitutional Court of 
Nov. 5, 1927, February 27,1928, Constitutional Court 
Sig 878, 951. In its later decisions, however,the 
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-Constitutional Court held that there is no conflict of 
competency existing, since the Civil.Court in pronouncing 
the " Dispensehe "null and void decided this issue prin- 
cipally, whereas the question of finality of the dis- 
pensation act of the provincial Government was merely 
I 
la secondary issue to it. 
Decision of the Constitutional Court of July 7,1930, 
Slg.1341 ( 1932). 
Thus the view of the Civil Co.irt was affirmed. 
This state of things complicated the legal position the 
more as a series of laws and by laws , as for instance 
concerning salaries of public officials, insurance,etc, 
recognised the validity of such remarriages entered int 
by way of dispensation. 
Since August 1. 1938 the statute of July 6 1938 Imperial DJ.w 
Gazette I. page 807 concerning family law is in force 
both in Germany and .n_ÀustxiaBy transitory provisions 
of this atatute the recognization of such remarriages 
( by dispensation) " Dispensehe" and the conversion 
of a judicial separation into an absolute divorce of 
marriages of Roman Catholic parties are provided for. 
German law on divorce. 
prior to 1938. 
Under the German Civil.Code of 1900 the grounds for 
divorce are to be classified into absolute ( peremptory) 
and relative ( facultative); if the former are proved 
the Court must grant divorce, whereas in the case of a 
relative ground it is left to the discretion of the Court 
to allow or refuse divorce. 
Absolute grounds are : 
(1) Adultery, bigamy and sodomy. ( Para. 1565 of the 
German Civil Code. 
(2) Attempts against the other spouse's life (para.1567 l.c.) 
(3) Wilful desertion ( para. 1568 l.c.) ; 
iThe following are regarded as acts of wilful desertion: 
(a) Intentional disobedience to an order of restitution 
of conjugal community, continued for more than a year 
against the will of the other spouse. 
(b) Intentional absence from the marital community 
against the will of the other spouse, continued for more 
than a year under circumstances which would justify ser- 
vice of notice by publication against him . 
The relative (.facultative) grounds of divorce are : 
(1) Where the other spouse by grave violation of the 
duties of marriage or by dishonourable or immoral con- 
duct has caused so grave a disorder of the matrimonial 
relation that the spouse cannot be presumed to continue 
the marriage: gross maltreatment is also regarded as 
such grave violation. 
(2) Where the other spouse has become mentally diseased. 
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If the disease has, during the marriage, continued at 
least three years and has reached such a degree that the 
intellectual community between the spouses has ceased, 
and that every prospect of restoration of such community 
is excluded. 
6he law of 1938; 
'Under the new law on divorce of July 6,1938,(Imperial 14.w 
Gazette I, p.807, in force since Aug. 1. 193841 the 
following +grounds of divorce are : 
(a) Absolute grounds: 
(1) Adultery ( para.4'7). 
(2) Where the other spouse without reasonable 
cause refuses persistently to have issue or to become 
pregnant or unjustifiably uses or causes to use contra- 
ceptives. 
(b) Relative grounds are 
(1) Where the other spouse owing to some other grave 
breach of marital duty or dishonourable or immoral con- 
duct on his ( her) part has disturbed the marital 
¡relation culpably to such an extent that the restoration 
of a conjugal community corresponding to the substance 
of marriage cannot be expected.( para. 49). The refusal 
restore the conjugal community may according to para.83 
the new law be deemed to be a grave breach of marital 
duty kbonstituting;;e expr-.9T di.voxc01 (:pa .à > 9 
k,ra.841-4ic,,mentioned above reads as follows: 
err Who by condonation or lapse of time has ceased 
to be entitled to divorce must not refuse to 
restore the conjugal community by reason of that 
fact only which has constituted that right to 
divorce." 
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(2) Where the relation of marriage owing to the conduct 
of the other spouse which resting upon mental disturbance 
such as hysteria cannot be regarded as a marital offence, 
is disturbed to such an extent that the restoration of 
conjugal community corresponding to the POR44q@n of 
marriage cannot be expected ( para. 50 l.c.) 
(3) Where the other spouse has become mentally diseased 
and the disease has reached such a degree that the 
intellectual community is severed and the restoration 
of such community cannot be expected. ( para.51 of the 
law, 1938). 
(4).Where the other spouse is afflicted with a contagious or 
lort1Oathiame disease and its cure or the removal of 
danger of contagion cannot be expected within measurable 
distance. ( para. 52 1.c.). 
(5) Where the other spouse after celebration of marriage 
as become prematurely sterile.( para. 53 1.c.) 
(6). Where the domestic community of the spouses has be (Pn 
discontinued for three years and owing to the grave 
incurable disorder of the matrimonial relation, the 
restoration of the conjugal community corresponding to 
he fthetatI4e of marriage cannot be expected, either 
pouse may petition for divorce. ( para.55.1.c.) 
As above in point (aQ(2) stated a new absolute ground of 
Ilivorce is introduced, those absolute grounds, on the 
other hand, which were contained in paras. :'_65 and 5166 
I 
pf the German Civil Code, namely bigamy,sodomy and 
attempts against the other spouse's life, as well as that 
_iItO- 
of wilful desertion ( para. 1567 of the German Civil Code), 
are not among the specified grounds of divorce in the 
ew law, but they are covered by the general clause of 
i,ara. 49 of the new law; this general clause differs from 
that of para. 1568 German Civil Codes 
in that it does not now depend upon whether the petitioner 
may fairly be expectedto continue the6 marriage,but whether 
the continuance of the marriage relation is in the publie 
interest. 
Furthermore, where as under the German Civil Code insanity 
Only was operative as ground of divorce irrespective of 
guilt,by the new law the following grounds of divorce are 
added which are not based upon guilt of the other spouse, 
namely : mental derangement, not reaching the degree of 
insanity ( para.50 l.c.) contagious or loathsome disease 
(para 52 l.c.) sterility ( para. 53 l.c.) and under the 
general clause; discontinuation of domestic community . 
(para. 55 l.c. ) 
In the new provision concerning insanity as ground of 
divorce ( para 51 l.c.) the time limit as to its being 
continued for three years during the marriage has been 
cancelled. 
On the whole, the nevi law cf div.örcei based on the anti - 
individualistic doctrine/ n deciding a divorce case 
the judge is bound to have regard only to the question 
whether or noV the continuance of the marital relation 
of the parties could be of some value to the community; 
the individualistic interests of the parties to the 
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.divorce proceedings are immaterial and are to be dis- 
regarded by him. 
The general clauses of paras. 54 and 55 1.c. are 
of such a large scope as to include any power of the 
judge necessary to arrive at this result. 
Bars to divorce. 
Prior to 1938. 
(1) Bars to the divorce grounds of adultery,bigamy and 
sodomy according to para. 1565: where the petitioner has 
assented to the adultery, or to the punishable action 
for has become guilty of participation. 
(2) In all cases, except the case of insanity, condonation 
of the marital offence is a bar to divorce.(para.1570). 
(3). Lapse of time. The petition for divorce in all cases, 
except the case where insanity is the ground of divorce 
relied upon, must be brought within six months from the 
time when the spouse obtains knowledge of the ground 
for divorce. 
The petition for divorce is barred if ten years have 
elapsed since the ground for divorce arose. 
The law of 1938. 
Under the new law of 1938 the following are bars to divorce: 
To adultery; ( 1) The right of the spouse for divorce 
s barred if he assents to the adultery or by his conduct 
ilfully makes it possible or fagilitates it. 
( 2) A further bar to divorce based on the ground of 
adultery is according to para 56 condonation and .conduct 
of the injured spouse showing that he (she) does not re- 
gard the marital offence as disturbing the marital relation. 
Bars to sterility: 
(1). Divorce is barred where the spouses have their own 
hereditarily fit offspring or a hereditarily fit child 
jointly adopted by them 
(2).The spouse being himself or herself sterile is not 
entitled to sue for divorce; the same applies to a 
spouse who would be disallowed to contract a new marriage 
for health reasons or whom the Board of Health would 
dissuade therefrom. 
Bars to the grounds of divorce on mental disturbance 
( para. 50 l.c.) on insanity para. 51 1.c. on contagious 
or loaths:amed.esase.(para 52) on sterility ( para.53 l.c.): 
Divorce must not be granted if it is not morally justi- 
fiable. This is,asra_ruìe, deemed to be subsistent where 
the dissolution of the marriage would be extremely 
prejudicial to the other spouse; this latter is to be 
concluded from the various attendant circumstances,such as 
from duration of the marriage,age of the spouses and from 
the cause that ooc.asioned the disease or the sterility , 
( para. 54 l.c.) . 
Bars to discontinuance of domestic community: 
Where the spouse who sues for divorce is alone or prin- 
cipally guilty of the disorder of the domestic community, 
the other spouse may object to divorce; the objection 
is to be disregarded if the continuance of the mars ;;e 
relation is morally unjustifiable with due regard to the 
iubst.allben of marriage kie the entire conduct of both of 
he spouses. ( para. 55 l.c.) 
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General clause; 
ar to all divorce ground based on the guilt of either 
spouse. 
The right to divorce on the guilt of the other spouse is 
barred by condonation or conduct of the injured spouse 
showing that he or she does not regard the marital offence 
as disturbing the marital relation. ( para. 56 l.c.) 
(a)Lapse of time as bar to divorce. 
The provisions concerning the lapse of time as bar to 
divorce are under the law of 1938 the same as under the Civil 
Dade with one exception, namely, the case of sterility. 
The suit for divorce based on the guilt of the other 
spouse must be brought within six months from the time 
when the spouse is aware of the ground for divorce. The 
limitation does not run as long as the domestic community 
of the spouses is discontinued. If the guilty spouse 
requires the other, either to restore the domestic commu- 
nity or to bring the petition, the limitation commences 
from the receipt of the request. The petition for divorce 
As inadmissible if ten years have elapsed since the ground 
'ifor divorce arose; yet petition for divorce is admissible 
¡in spite of such lapse of time if the ground for divoro 
relied upon is an adultery which is prohibited by para. 
of the law concerning protection of German blood and 
honour,Statute of Sept. 15,1935,Imperial Law Gaz.I.p.1146. 
1 
( The above mentioned para 2 of the law of Sept. 15,1935 
prohibits the illegitimate intercourse between Jews and 
citizens of German blood and those of kindlred race. 
(57,1.c.) 
(b) The right to divorce on the ground of sterility ceases 
unless the petition is brought within one year from the 
time when the spouse is aware of the sterility of the 
other or from the time when he obtains knowledge of the 
fact that the bar to divorce according to para, 53(11 1.c), 
namely, that his or her hereditarely fit child of the 
marriage or the jointly adopted child does not exist 
any more. 
Divorce is i. such °case excluded if the spouse petitioner 
has attained the thirtieth year of age and ten years 
have elapsed since the celebration of the marriage.(para.58,1c) 
Finally, it is provided by para. 59 l.c. 
(1) that a ground for divorce may even though the limitation 
provided in paras. 57,and 58 for its enforcement has 
expired, be asserted in the course of the suit,if the 
limitation has not expired at the time of the institution 
of the suit, and 
(2) that a breach of marital duty which can no longer 
support a suit for divorce, may be asserted in support 
of an action for divorce based upon another breach of 
marital duty. 
Dissolution of marriage by remarriage after judicial 
declaration of presumed death of the other spouse has 
been given. 
If after the spouse has been declared dead, the remains g 
spouse contracts a new marriage,this is not void even 
the spouse adjudged dead is still living, unless both 
spouses, at the time of marriage, knew that he or she has 
survived the declaration of presumed death. 
pon the consummation of the new marriage,the former 
marriage is dissolved by law even if the declaration of 
death is revoked. ( para 43,1.e.). 
4f the spouse who has been declared dead is still living 
the other spouse of the former :carriage may within one 
year of the timewhen he has become aware of the survival 
sue for dissolution of the new marriage unless he had 
at the time of the second marriage knowledge of his first 
spouseTs being alive. In the case of dissolution of the 
second marriage mentioned above, the spouse who has §uéd 
for dissolution may contract a new marriage,during the 
lifetime of the other spouse to the former marriage,with 
the latter only.( para. 44 l.c.) Under the German OiTIl 
oc èI either spouse to the zecond ratlirtageCLhadAt right 
Of contesting it. 
the statutory provisions concerning death declaration 
are as follows : 
(1)The declaration of death may be made when no information 
that the parson who disappeared is alive, has been re- 
ceived for ten years. The declaration is not to be made, 
before the end of the year, in which such person would 
have completed his thirty- first year. 
(2). One who has disappeared and who would have completed 
his seventieth year, may be declared dead if no information 
of his being alive has been received for five years. 
( para, 14 German Civil Code). 
By paras. 15 to 17 German Civil Code period2 are fixed of one 
t three years according to the kind of mortal danger to 
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Ohich the person who disappeared. has been exposed under 
¡circumstances other than mentioned above. 
Adjudication of guilt in the decree of divorce. 
As to divorce founded on the guilt of the respondent: 
If the marriage is dissolved on the guilt of the respon- 
dent this is to be declared in the decree of divorce,and 
one or both of them may be adjudged guilty in the decree. 
Where the defendant nas brought a cross petition and the 
marriage is dissolved on the ground of the guilt of both 
spouses both are to be adjudged guilty. If the guilt of 
one spouse is considerably graver than that of the other, 
it is also to be stated in the decree of divorce that 
the guil -rof the former is preponderant. 
{Even if no dross petition is brought, upon motion of the 
,despondent, the spouse petitioner is also to be adjudged 
guilt, if the dissolution of the marriage is decreed 
Zpon a marital offence of the respondent, and if the 
latter at the time of the institution of the suit or 
afterwards would have been entitled to sue for a divorce 
bti Ott- the fault of the petitioner. 
If the respondent at the time of the institution of the 
petition has lost the right to petition on the guilt of 
the petitioner,then the motion is yet tb be granted. if 
it were deemedto be equitable. ( para.60 l.c.) 
The same applies to the petition founded upon a,.grouad_ 
fitot.hdr than the guilt of the respondent according to 
para 61 l.c. of the law of 1938. 
Effect of divorce. 
Name: The divorced wife retains the family name of the 
husband. ( para 62, 1.c.) 
The divorced wife may resume her family name by a 
declaration made before the registrar; the declaration 
is to be made in publicly authenticated form. The divorced 
wife may also resume the name acquired by her through 
a marriage prior to the dissolved one if there is issue 
from that former marriage and unless she is alone 
adjudged guilty. ( para. 63 l.c.) 
If the divorced wife is adjudged alone or principally 
guilt,Y,the husband may forbid her to bear his name,by 
a declaration made before the registrat; the declaration 
is to be made in publicly authenticated form. The 
registrar is to communicate the declaration (6 the wife. 
With the loss of the name of the husband, the wife again 
receives her family name.( para 64,1.e.) 
The divorced wife may by reason of her misconduct subse- 
quent to the divorce be forbidden by the court of 
guardianship upon motion of the husband or if he be 
dead, of his near relative,to bear the married name. 
The husband who is adjudged alone or principally guilt 
shall accord to the divorced wife the maintenance 
befitting her station insofar as she cannot gain it from 
the income of her property or from the e7rnings of her 
labour, if in the condition in which the spouses have 
lived, earning by her was customary, The wife who is 
adjudged alone or principally guilty, shall accord to 
the husband the maintenance fitted to his station inso ar 
as he is unable to support himself.( para 66,1.c.). 
taint enanc e . 
Insofar as a spouse adjudged alone or principally 
;guilty were péri.11ing.his own maintenance suitable to 
his station with regard to his other obligations,he 
needs only to accord such maintenance to the other spouse 
as it is deemed equitable with regard to the wants as 
well as to the means and earnings of the spouses; if he 
has to accord maintenance to an unmarried minor or in 
consequence of his remarriage to the new spouse,the 
wants and economic conditions of those persons are also 
to be taken into consideration. The husband is,under the 
conditions just mentioned above, entirely free from the 
obligation of maintenance, if the wife can procure the 
maintenance from the principal of her property. (para 671e). 
When both of the spouses are adjudged guilty,but none 
guilty to a greater extent than the other, the spouse 
who cannot support himself may be granted an allowance 
of support, if and insofar as it is deemed equit ble 
with regard to the wants and the means as well as earnings 
of the other spouse, and of those persons upon whom he 
depends for support. ( para 68,1.e.) 
The same rule applies to the case where no adjudication 
of guilt has been made in the decree of divorce. 
The party entitled for -Zeits his right to maintenance if 
after the dissolution of the marriage he or she commits 
a grave offence against the obligee(the divorced spouse) 
or leads against the will of the latter a dishonourable 
or immoral life. ( para 74,1.c.). 
The claim for maintenance ceases by the remarriage of 
the party entitled. ( para. 75,1.c.) 
Succession. 
The divorced spouse has no right to inherit from the 
deceased spouse. The right of inheritance EJ to a 
testamentary gift is barred if the decedent at the time 
of his death has been entitled to sue for divorce on the 
guilt of the other spouse and had already instituted 
the respective suit for divorce.(para 2077 of German Civil 
Code). 
Care of cl_-:ildren. 
After the marriage has been dissolved the Court of 
Guardianship is to determine to which of the spouses 
the care of the person of a mutual child is to belong. 
Decisive is what according to the circumstances of the 
particular case is deemed to be best for the welfare of 
the child. 
Wher qlere are several mutual children the care of the 
persons of L11 children is to be conferred upon the same 
parent, unless a different settlement is for special 
reasons required in the interests of the child. 
The care of the person of a child is not to be conferred 
upon the spouse who is adjudged alone or principally guilty 
unless i,,; is for special reasons deemed useful to the 
Welfare of the child. If it is deemed necessary for the 
welfare of the child the .court of guardianship may confer 
the care of it upon a guardian. 
The court of guardianship may make a different order,at 
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--any time, if it is, required in the iriterests of the 
child. 
Before issue of the new order the divorced spouses are 
to be heard. 
The hearing may be omitted if it i 1 t :feasible. 
( Para. 81.1.c.) 
The spouse who has not the care of the person of the 
child, retains the right of personal intercourse with it. 
The court of guardianship may control the intercourse 
as to particulars. The court of guardianship may also 
exclude any intercourse for a certain period or permanently 
if it is for particular reasons deemed useful to the wel- 
fare of the child. 
As to the maintenance of childre ̂ of divorced spouses. 
If a divorced spouse has to provide maintenance to a 
mutual child, the other spouse is obliged to pay to him 
out of the income of his ( her ) property and from his 
or her earnings, an adequate contribution to the expenses 
of the maintenance, insofar as the same are not covered 
by the usufruct derived from the property. of thechild. 
This claim is not assignable. 
If the spouse who is liable to contribution has the care 
of the person of the child, he ( she) may retain the 
contribution for his ( her) own use towards the main- 
tenance of the child. 
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Swiss law on Divorce. 
Swiss law admits the following grounds of divorce: 
(a). Grounds of divorce based on guilt of either spouse. 
(1) Adultery, ( art. 137 of the Swiss Civil Code). 
(2) Attempted murder, grave assaults, or serious 
insults.(art. 138, l.c.) 
(3) If a spouse has committed a degrading crime or 
leads an immoral life, so that the other spouse cannot 
''be expected to continue domestic community.(art.l39,c.c.) 
It is noteworthy that the commission of a degrading 
crime is sufficient, the conviction thereof is not 
requisite. 
(4). Malicious desertion for at least two years. 
(art. 140, c.c.). 
(b) Gro -ands of divorce containing no guilt element. 
(1) Insanity of either spouse if it is so grave. 
that the sound spouse cannot be expected to continue 
domestic community and if the insanity is after a7 
of thrce years held by experts to be incurable. (art.141A). 
The statutory period begins at the date when the first 
appearance thereof was detected. 
(2) Where ao. greve a-:. disorder_- of the conjugal relation: 
...Hsubsists ,. that the spouses cannot be expected to con- 
tinue domestic community. (art.142) ...). 
It may be caused by an incurable disease, venereal disease 
or the like. ( Decision of the Federal Court 33,2,394). 
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Bars to divorce: 
(1) Assent or condonation to adultery 
Th e right of,the spouse to divorce is barred if he 
assents to, or condones the adultery complained of, 
kart. 137, 1.c.) 
(2) Condonation is a bar to the following grounds of 
.ivorce Attempts to murder, grave assaults and insults. 
(art. 138, 1.c.) 
(3). Conduct conducing. 
Where the grave disorder of the marital relation has been 
caused principally by the conduct of a spouse,his right 
to divorce is barred.( art. 142). 
(4). Lapse of time. 
The petition for divorce on one of the following ground 
such as adultery, attempts to murder, grave assaults and 
insults must be brought within six months from the time 
when the spouse is aware of facts constituting the grounds 
of divorce. 
The petition for divorce is inadmissible if five years 
have elapsed since the ground of divorce has arisen. 
A compensation of grounds of divorce is not recognisedj 
,in case where the petitioner is also guilty of a marital 
offence, the other spouse may institute a cross petitiot. 
Conversion of judicial separation into a divorce. 
udicial separation may be granted upon the same grounds 
those which justify divorce.(art. 143, l.c.) A judicial 
separation may be granted for a fixed or undetermined 
period; when the fixed period has expired or, if no period 
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has been fixed, when the judicial separation has been 
in force for three years, the judicial separation may be 
at the instance of either party converted into a decree 
of divorce, except the case where it is founded upon facts 
from which the party now petitioning for conversion 
appears to be exclusively guilty. ( art. 14'7 and 148 1.c.) 
According to these articles it was decided in 
Willnegger v. VJilinegger ( Sem. Jud. 1918,113) that 
while divorce, which is not preceded by judicial sepa- 
ration, cannot be obtained by the spouse who is prin- 
cipally guilty of causing the rupture ( art.142,II) 
it can be obtained by him, after a decree of judicial 
separation has been pronounced, provided that he was 
not the tlbre guilty, spouse;, 
But even in the latter case conversion into a decree 
of divorce is to be decreed if the other spouse re- 
fuses reunion. ( art. 147 and 148). 
Dissolution of marriage by reason of adjudication of 
the death of either spouse. 
When the death of a person is most probable because he 
has disappeared having been in a great peril of life 
or when such a person has been absent for a long time 
without being heard of, he may be declared dead on 
motion of those who derive rights from his death after 
at least a year has elapsed since that peril of life or 
after five years have elapsed since he has been heard 
of again. (art. 35, et seq.) Thy remaining spóuse may 
bring an action for dissolution of the marriage based 
on the order declarative of the psumed death of the 
other spouse. 
'Such a decree of dissolution of marriage is not a decree 
of divorce but a constitutive judicial declaration sui 
generis. 
Effect of divorce. 
Name. After the dissolution of the marriage the divorced 
woman is to take again the family name which die bore before 
the celebration of the marriage. If she was a widow at 
the date of the marriage she may be authorised by the 
divorce decree to resume her maiden name. ( art. 149 of 
the Swiss Civil Code ) Í 
I 
Damage and maintenance. If by divorce the property rights 
of the innocent spouse are prejudiced, the guilty spouse 
is to accord him or her an adequate compensation. 
If the circumstances which have caused the divorce in - 
volve a grave injury to the reputation of the innocent 
spouse, the court may award him or her damages.(a_rt.151,1.c.) 
If the innocent spouse is, by reason of the divorce,in 
great need, the other spouse,though he ( she) be not the it'e. `'` 
i 
guilty party, may be made liable to contribute to his (her)' '"- 
maintenance an amount suitabl e to his (her) means .( art .152,1.c)5 
If according to the decree or a convention an allowance 
is payable as damages or maintenance,the obligation ceases 4+ßr 
CM.t.IYI' 
w 
by remarriage of the party entitled. 
Custody and maintenance of children. The court decides' 
its discretion as to the exercise of parental control 
over children and their relation between parents and 
children, after having heard the parents and,if necessary, 
the Guardianship board. 
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The divorced spouse from whom the children are withdrawn 
is liable to contribute according to his .(her) means to 
the expenses of their maintenance and education; he or 
she retains the right of personal intercourse with the 
children according to the circumstances. The court has 
very wide discretionary powers; it may confide the children 
Even to the guilty parent where the interests of the 
children demand it. See the decisions I. Baillod v. 
Baillod ( Sem.Jud. 1913,754) Amex v. Amex ( R.0.32.2.439). 
Succession. A divorced spouse has no right whatever to 
inherit? on the death of the other .(art.154, l.c.) 
Comparison of the various grounds of divorce. 
(1). First of all, it is noteworthy that, owing to the 
highly ethical character attributed to the conjugal union, 
a breach of marital duties as regards pecuniary interests 
per se does not constitute a ground of divorce under any 
of the laws concerned, although proprietary matters are 
often the principal cause of disrupture of marital community\ 
ome of the remedies which are granted by the various 
courts against such breaches are discussed above. The 
marital duty of tUpport. is not merely a pecuniary one, 
as above stated, but it flows from the conjugal legal duty 
of society and assistance and is, to be classed as of 
a mixed character; it has been called " a purely pegs-m.441 
allowance "for the maintenance of the spouse "which and 
is not assignable. 
(2). The grounds of divorce are statutory ones with 
one exception, namely: in Scotland divorce on adultery 
is based on common law; the Scottish courts have ..:granted 
divorce a vinculo matrimonii since the Refornation.(1560). 
(3). As above explained, the grounds of divorce are 
to be classified first,on the question of guilt into 
grounds based upon the guilt of the Q'thher. spoúse. and:' bh©:se 
containing no element of guilt ; and second, on the 
question of the discretionary power of the court into 
absolute ( peremptory ) grounds and relative ( facultative) 
grounds of divorce. 
Whereas formerly the laws on divorce were founded on the 
fault basis only, as is still the case in France,the most 
striking feature of th modern trend of the various legis- 
latures is this that in cases where it is deemed to be 
in public interest, some grounds of divorce are admitted_ 
which are not based on the guilt of the respondent. In- 
sanity and declaration of presumed death are such grounds 
of dissolution of marriage, recognised by English,Germa 
and Swiss law. 
($33ince French law on divorce is founded solely on the 
fault basis of either spouse, insanity is no ground of 
divorce thereunder. 
Dijon, Nov.. 29, 1923, D 1924,2,46; 
Poitiers,March 25, 1890, D 90,2,340. 
Lyon,Nov. 20, 1903, D 1904.2.130, S. 1904,2.295. 
Grounds of divorce containing no fault element are unknown 
to French law. 
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1 
By German and Swiss law a further ground of divorce o 
the character just mentioned , is recognised, namely rupture 
of conjugal relations of such gravity that the spouses 
cannot be expected to live in common. 
Finally,German law provides for three more grounds of- 
such kind,namely: misconduct of the spouse caused by 
his or her mental disorder,not reaching the degree of; 
insanity,further contagious or loathsome disease,and 
sterility. 
The tests imposed by the laws of these countries of 
ascertaining insanity, as well as the rules concerning. 
declaration of presumed death, differ greatly from each 
other. 
ï 
(1) . Insanity: As test of insanity amounting to a ground 
of divorce under English law is required the detention 
of the spouse of unsound mind in a mental institution 
for at least five years immediately preceding the pre- 
- 
sentation of the petition for divorce,wile neither in 
Germany nor in Switzerland any such detention is re- 
, 
quired. 
By German law no period for the continuance of the un- 
soundness of mind is fixed at all,whereas by Swiss lawl 
insanity amounts to =. ground of divorce,if after a lapse 
of three years it is held by experts to be incurable. 
Finally, it is to be observed that under German law 
mental derangement of a lesser degree than insanity is 
also recognised as ground of divorce. See p, 140, 
. ri /17 r44,,1 
044 
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(2eclaration of presumption of death. 
By English law sect.8 subs,1 of MCA 1938 no lapse of a 
deficita period of absence is required and. where, e.g. a 
spouse has been exposed to mortal danger,the court may 
make a decree of presumption of death and of dissolution 
of the marriage if it is satisfied that reasonable grounds 
exist to presume that the spouse who disappeared under 
such circumstances is dead; by subs.2 of sec.8 1.c. the 
fact that for a period of seven years or upwards a spouse 
has been continually absent from the other who has no 
reason to believe that his or her consort has been living 
within that time is deemed evidence that the spouse who 
has disappeared is dead until the contrary is proved. 
Under French law disappearance of a spouse is not recognised 
as a ground of dissolution of marriage. see p. C 
By German law the dissolution of the marriage incase of 
absence is effected only by way of remarriage after 
judicial death declaration; for the time limitations 
reqùired for such declarations under German and Swiss 
law reference is made to page 144 and page 15=' 
respectively. 
,(b) The grounds for divorce may also be classified into 
absolute ( peremptory) and relative ( facultati.ve)grounds 
of divorce. If the fact constituting an absolute ground 
of divorce is established,the .curt is bound to pronounce 
a elecree of divorce. Relative grounds of divorce,on the 
ice:xe,uz 47 et.i' 
other hand, are such as even when the facts are established, 
it is left to the discretion of the Court to grant a 
divorce or not. Under English Law à dultery,incurable 
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Insanity and desertion, on the part of either spouse, 
and rape, sodomy and bestiality, on the part of the 
husband,are absolute grounds of divorce while the others 
are relative.( facultative). 
French Law provides two absolute grounds : -,Adultery and 
convictión_i;fli _ cting a degrading corporal punishment, 
and three relative ( facultative) ones: 
Threats or conduct dangerous to life or health of the 
other spouse, $xtreme cruelty, ana ex.y.i.aeziow _ breach of 
marital duty. 
Under German Law thera are two absolute groúndo of 
divorce, namely adultery and persistent refusal to have 
issue, or use of contraceptives, while all others are 
relative grounds. But the absolute character of these 
grounds of divorce is substantially lessened by the 
statutory provision of para.56 of the German Law of 
1938 by which it is in the discretion of the Court to 
determine whether the attitude of the injured spouse has 
been entirely indifferent towards the marital offence complained 
of. If so, then the court may refuse to grant divorce on 
those grounds. 
It is noteworthy that by sec.? (1) (a) of the English 
Matrimonial Causes Act , 1937, Wilful refusal of marital 
intercourse by the respondent to consummate the marriage 
is a ground for a decree of nullity of marriage. 
The provisions concerning relative ( facultative)grounds 
of divorce led to new grounds not expressly provided by 
law. Relative g,rousids permit the court to follow the 
modification caused by the evolution.of the ideas and 
-concepts. Thus legal cruelty under English law has been 
defined by the courts as comprising the followi.g 
grounds Df divorce, expressly named as such by other laws: 
enrea_ disease; see Foster v.Foster (1921) (CA) p.438 , 
ntoxication, Powe v. Powe ( 1865) 4 S and T 489; 
Criminal Conviction: Thompson v.Thompson (1901) 
85 LT 172 and 
Bosworthin v Botworthink ( 1901) 86 LT 12. 
German law has omitted two absolute (per_emptory) ground 
of divorce named by the German Civil Code in paras.1565 
and 1566; ¡ actions punishable ace)r.d.ing to paras. 171 
i,nd 175 of the German Penal Code or if the spouse has 
.esigns on the life of the other, and it is left to the 
iiscretion of the court to treat such cases under the 
1 
*ide scope of the " relative ground" of par.49 of the 
law of 1938. 
The French relative divorce ground. of art. 231C.C.namely, 
threats or conduct dangerous to the life or health of 
the other spouse, extreme cruelty, and serious 
breach of marital duty finds a very liberal interpretation 
by the courts, so as to include : 
3M 
Desertion, drur.3=ené,s-g,insulting words, and non -support 
(in connection with art. 212 C.C.); Refusal of sexual 
i;utercourse does not constitute a cause of divorce by 
article 231 unless it is not warranted.See decision 
Montpellier, Nov. 27, 1897, La Loi June 11,1898; a husband. 
has been granted a decree of divorce because cf "absence 
of encouraging disposition of his young wife " See 
decision Toulouse January 30,1896, La Loi,March 21,1896. 
Again,the Swiss courts interpret the relative ground 
of divorce provided by art. 142 of the Swiss Civil 
Code, ( grave rupture of the common life ) in giving it 
a very wide scope so as to AmclUie veneral disease, 
refusal of sexual intercourse, and. - non- sllport. 
Comparison of the various bars to divorce. 
Discretionary bars to divorce, as recognised by English 
law, see p.1.0.24 are unknown under Scottish Law, and under 
the Continental SystenrPof law. The laws concerned do not 
recognise compensatio criminis; the respondent may bring 
a cross action of divorce based upon the respective 
grounds. While delay constitutes, by English law,a 
discretionary bar, it is under German as well as under 
Swiss law provided that the action on certain grounds 
of divorce must be.presented within a given period from 
the date when the fact constituting a cause for divorce 
has occurred, so that lapse of that time is an absolute 
bar to divorce. 
The absolute bars of condonation and connivance are 
recognised in all the systems of law concerned. Divorce 
by mutual consent is not recognised by any of those laws 
and the coùrtt refuse to grant divorce where the partis 
seek to avoid that restriction by collusion. Under English 
law the provisions as to preventing collusion are so 
stringent that a divorce can hardly be obtained by way 
of collusive action of the spouses. Yet by the Continental 
systems of law parties to a marriage may,with regard to 
the liberal interpretation given to the conception of 
some of the grounds of divorce, sometimes be able to pro- 
_cure a divorce by collusive action. 
Thus when both parties desire tivorce,_ they simulate 
facts which furnish the legal ground of divorce,con_cealing 
the true ground of mutual consent. The result has usually 
been arrived at in Germany and Switzerland by an action 
for divorce on the ground of desertion. . 
Again, in France art. 231 C.C. ( serious breach of marital 
duty) has often been used for reaching the same result. 
As above stated it has been held sufficient to justify 
divorce where one spouse, without just cause has charged 
the other with adultery. ( Art. 231, C.C.); hence this 
article 231 has often been employed in such case by 
spouses acting in agreement. 
s7-7r iiOn the rest,the provisions concerning discretionary 
bars under German law, are of a much larger scope than 
those under English law; by para. 54 as well as para.55 
the judge is to take into consideration whether the 
granting of divorce is morally justifiable i.e. whether 
it is in the public interest. 
Comparison with regards to insanity as a bar to divorce. 
Owing to the fact that under the new German law of 1938 
every mental affection of the spouse, even if itzaoes not 
reach the degree of insanity, may be a ground for',divorce 
insanity cannot be pleaded as a bar to divorce;for,if, 
the respondent pleads insanity, the petitioner can insist 
that insanity be made a ground for divorce. In Swit¿erland 
insanity can be pleaded insofar as the petition for divorce 
As based upon a ground which consists of an element of guilt. 
-As to English law, see p.6,46. 
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C hap t e r IX. 
Conflict rules as to choice of law: 
'Anio- American systems of law: 
¡Since domicil is the sole test of jurisdiction in divorce, 
English law alone applies to such proceedings.By this law 
Llone it is to be determined whether the facts al 
_ ,;_eg a 
justify the divorce sought,i_rrespective of the place where 
the marriage was entered into,or of the place where the 
cause of divorce occurred,and irrespective of nationality 
of the spouses. Eater v.Bater(1906) 1.269 (English case), 
nrd !,'silson v.Wilson 10,Ind.436 (1858), 
Rose v.Rose 132,Minn.340; 156 NW 664 (1916) (American case 
Thus the parties to a marrie.ge may by change of their 
;domicil procure a divorce which they would have been 
unable to obtain in their previous domicil either becate 
the law of the latter does not recognise divorce at all 
or does not admit the ground of divorce relied on. 
Further,a husband may by changing his domicil subject 
his wife to the jurisdiction of the courts of á foreign 
country andbring her under a system of positive law that 
is less favourable to her. 
For the methods of removing such hardship reference is 
made to p.239. 
Wention may here be made only of the fEict that some states 
of USA have attempted at preventing such "migratory" 
divorces by applying the following methods: 
(a)By embodying sect.22 of the Uniform Marriage Act, 
for details on this subject reference is made to p.255, 
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-and.(h) by requiring some definite period of residence 
with -in the state for granting a divorce. Some statute',s 
require also a definite ?.period of residence within the 
county ( district) to give the particular court juris- 
diction. 
Continental systems of law. Hague Convention II on 
divorce. 
There are two Hague Conventiois of 1902; Convention I.' 
treats of marriage and Convention II of divorce and 
seT)aration. 
Since France, Germany and Switzerland have been signatories 
to Convention II up to 1914, 1934,and 1929,respectively 
and Italy still adheres to this Convention, it seems 
necessary to state the significant features of that 
Convention II. 
The rules laid down in that Convention are still bindin; 
upon the courts of the states which have renounced it 
in respect of those judgments of divorce which have been 
endered. by their courts before the reno ,ç. e i of the t -a0.rs0.0e1.*4c.a^." 
ponvention. 
further, the courts of those states talc& sometimes account 
f these rules and the Italian courts apply them or similar 
rules even to parties which are not members of Treaty f 
i ACV 
powers to that Convention. The Convention II contatns 
conflict rules (a) as to jurisdiction , (b) as to choice 
of law and (c) as to recognition of foreign judgments of 
divorce: 
(a) The jurisdiction as to divorce is regulated in 
art. 5. 
According to this article,suits for divorce may be brough 
( 1) in the courts which are competent by the national 
law of the spouses; the national jurisdiction is reser ed 
in so far as the national courts exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction in divorce. 
(2) Where the national courts do not exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction, petitions for divorce may also be brought 
in the courts of the domicileof the spouses. If by their 
national law the spouses have not the same domicil,the 
courts of the respondent's domicile are competent. 
(3) In case where the domicil has been abandoned or 
changed after the happening of the cause of divorce,the 
petition for divorce may be brought in the court of the 
last common domicil of the spouses. 
Finally, the foreign courts remain competent as regards 
the dissolution of a marriage in respect of which 
¡petition for divorce cannot be brought in the competent 
national court; this rule applies to marriages which 
according to art. 3 ( 1), art. 5( 2) and art. 6( 2) of the 
Hague Convention I of 1902 on marriage, are deemed to be 
invalid by the national law and for this reason cannot 
be dissolved by the national courts. The last mentioned 
'provisions of the Hague Convention I as to marriage 
concern countries the law of which requires a religifus ce- 
lebration ian4 which may refuse to recognise as valid 
marriages contracted by their nationals abroad without 
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observing that requirement. In the event of the spouses 
not having the same nationality the law last common to 
them is according to art. 8 of the Convention II deemed 
to be their national law for the applic,ntion of the rules 
stated above. 
(b). According to art. 1 and 2 of Convention II it is 
required that both the national lcw and the lex fori must 
recognise the institution of divorce, and that also the 
grounds of divorce must subsist according to both systems 
of law; it suffices, however, that divorce is admissible 
on different grounds in each of them and it is simply 
demanded that one ground shall subsist by the national 
law and another by the lex Pori. There are two exceptions 
to these rules of arts. 1 and 2, namely : 
(a) According to art. 3 the national law alone shall be 
observed if the lex Pori directs or permits that course. 
This exception was made at the request of Italy where 
at that time some courts granted divorces to foreigners 
although the institution of divorce is not recognised 
under Italian law. But the judicial opinion in Italy is 
now to the contrary, since the decision of the Court of 
Cassation of Trino of November 1900, Monitore 1900,981. 
See page. L8; . 
b) Further, according to art. 4 the national law of 
the spouses cannot be invoked to give the character 
of a cause of divorce to a fact that happened when the 
or one of them had another nationality. It is 
intended by this rule that a change of nationality may 
snot be made by one spouse to the prejudice of the other. 
Finally, according to art. 8, there is in the event of 
the spouseot having the same nationality,the law last 
common to them deemed to be their national law for the 
application of the rules stated above. 
Thus, if one of the spouses only changes nationality or 
if both change it, but each of them to another, a diffe- 
rent nationality, such a change of nationality is imma- 
terial as to the law to be applied to matters of divorce, 
since the former national law common to both remains 
applicable; yet in case where both change the nationality 
and acquire thereby the same nationality, the new national 
law common to -both is applicable toquestions of divorce 
subject to the limitation set forth in art.4 of the 
Convention II. Therein no provisions are to be found con - 
derñing cases of diversity.of..nationality of spouses on 
marriage.and_ . of double nationality or of no nationality 
of spouses, since the ccnsequences.of the modern tendency 
towards equality of the sexes as regards acquisition of 
separate nationality by a married woman were not known then. 
A married woman may now under the laws of the various 
states retain her original nationality on marriage or 
reacquire it when separated. The difficulties arising out 
of the application of the arts.4 and 8 in connection with 
art. 1 and 2 led to the renunciation of the Convention II 
by Switzerland in 1929, by Sweden in 1933, and by Germany 
in 1934 ; the courts of these countries were by those 
articles precludes from grantime divorces to their 
nationals when, for instance , 
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women who judicially separated from their husbands 
sought after regaining their original nationality to 
obtain a divorce or conversion of their judicial separ 
into divorce. The;'e is no provision in the Convention, 
but seems to be clear from general principles that a 
taon 
change of nationality after the institution of the petition 
for divorce is immaterial as to questions discussed above. 
For details on this subject reference is made to the-;next page 
(c) Asto recognition of decrees of divorce. 
By art. 7 a decree of divorce, if rendered by a court 
competent according to art. 6, is to be recognised 
everywhere within the purview of the Convention II. on 
condition that its clauses have been observed and that 
in case of a decree by default the service of the 
petition on the respondent has been effected in accordance 
with the particular provisions which the national law 
requires for the recognition of foreign judgments. 
Similarly the conditions of Arts. 1 and 2 of the Con- 
1 
vention must have been complied. with. A decree of divorce 
granted by administrative jurisdiction shall equally be 
recognised everywhere within the purview of the Convention II, 
if the national law of each of the parties recognises 
such divorce. By this rule the courts concerned are 
precluded from refusing recognition of divorce decrees 
in respect of their offending against public order,since, 
however, by arts. 1 and 2 of the Convention II, the 
national law as ml l',stlw lex fori are to be observed, that 
imitation is of less importance. It is noteworthy that 
the national law controls both the question as to 
the domicils of the spouses and that as to the due ser- 
vice of the petition on the respondent in case of a 
decree by default ( art. 7). 
The purpose of this prevision of art. 7 of the Con- 
vention II is to prevent a spouse from changing his 
domicil:Nrhereby the mode of due service might be altered 
to the prq udice of the other spouse. 
Finally, there is no provision as to whether the courts 
concerned are bound to refuse recognition to decrees 
of divorce which have been granted without the rules 
prescribed by the Convention II being observed. The 
right answer to this question appears to be that from 
the omission of any provision in this respect it may be 
concluded that it is left to the discretion of the courts 
concerned to grant or refuse recognition of such decrees 
of divorce. 
(d) The courts of Italy where the Convention II is still 
in fore`: have extended the application of its rules to 
all decrees of divorce that are granted to foreigners y 
foreign courts, even if they dó not belong to states 
which are signatories to the Convention II subject to me 
qualifications which will be discussed below. 
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French law 
Art, 3 of the French Civil Code declares French law 
to control status and capacity of French citizens,even 
though domiciled in a foreign country; hence even if the 
spouses live abroad and one of them is a French subject, 
proceedings for divorce may tel taken before French 
courts and French law alone is to be applied there to, 
äccoresing to art. 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code; 
for the details reference is made to p.26. 
As to foreigners nationality:is the criterion of the 
choice of law in matters of divorce in France, with two 
exceptions, 
(1) where the application of the foreign law would be 
repugnant,to the public policy of French law and 
(2) where the dogtrine of renvoi is applicable. 
As to ( 1); As under French law mutual consent is not 
recognised as ground for divorce, French coasts decline 
to apply a foreign national law admitting that cause 
for divorce since it is offending against public policy. 
The same applies as regards insanity as ground for 
divorce, as French law on divorce is solely founded on 
the fault basis of either spouse. 
Tr. Marseille February 21, 1902, Clunet 1904,p.188. 
Another case falling within the scope of the principle 
of public policy is the conversion of a foreign judicial 
order of separation into a divorce decree where the former 
is based upon mutual consent. 
The ground of divorce admitted by the foreign national 
law must be at least analogous to that of the French law 




it is often a difficult -kaA;ttermitectilletigtioii characterization 
to this matter. 
The French courts also refuse to entertain a suit for 
divorce, if the national law of the foreigner refers 
divorce to religious law. 
Paris, December 26, 1912, D.P.1914, 2- 47. 
Renvoi : Where the national law of a foreigner domiciled 
in France is based upon the principle of domicile,French 
Courts accept the reference back to its law in matters 
of divorce and applies French law alone, especially as 
to the question whether the marital offence complained 
of constitutes a ground of divorce. 
Seine February 11, 1913, Clunet 1913, 1233 in which case 
French internal law was applied to British subjects 
domiciled in France. 
Lyon, July 24,1898, Clunet 1899, pag. 569. 
;Faris, March 15, 1899, Clunet 1899, pag. 794. 
Where by the national law ne divorce is recognised 
French courts refuse to grant a decree of divorce. 
Colmar,A-nril 7, 1925, Clunet 1926, pag. 74 in which case 
spouses of Italian nationality were refused a decree of 
divorce since their natonal law prohibits.. divorce. 
'Change of nationality. 
Where butin spouses have changed to the same nationality 
the new national law controls the question whether or -on--, 
¡ghat grounds divorc9is admissible; 
'Ca.ss.Civ. Clunet 33,1093. 
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:Where the change of nationality itkDskeffe.ctea:fratialulehlkly 
in order to avoid a law prohibiting divorce altb.gether 
or for certain causes and this is proved,ihe French 
courts disregard such change of nationality and apply 
the old law. 
Narbonne, Dec. 21, 1898, Clunet 1899, p. 350. 
Furthermore, where diversity of nationality of the spouses. 
already has been existent on marriage, the capacity as 
to divorce is tested by the í 7ational law of each of the 
spouses concerned; this rule applies also to the case 
where one of the spouses is of French nationality. 
Yet where change of nationality has been effected after 
the marriage, various views have err-,,prevailin. 
first of all, it must be noted, that as long as France 
dhered to the Hague Convention of 1902 on divorce,the 
rench courts applied. the rules of this Gonvention al8Orugh 
o persons who did not belong to Statu which were sig- 
iatories to the Convention. 
For the details reference is made to p;167. 
Since France renounced the Hague Convention in 1914, 
the rules of the Convention were not applied any longer 
and some courts held that the national law of the husband 
is to be applied to such cases; thus the suit for divorce 
by a wife,formerly American, but restored to French 
citizenship by degree, was dismissed because under the 
law of the husband domiciled in New York the marital 
h 
Offence relied on, namely, drunkeness, was not admitted 
ti 
as a cause of divorce. Havre,Nov.17,1923,Clunet 1924,p.1000. 
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Other decisions take the view that the law of the State 
to which the petitioner belongs is to be applied, part4z- 
1.ar1y if it is French nationality to which the spouse 
petitioner reverted. 
Tr. Tunis, Dec. 8,1920, Clunet 1923, p. 110. 
Seine, January 19, 1926. Clunet 1926, p. 663. 
(Valentino case.) 
Since intermarriages between French and Italian subjects 
are frequent,repatriati ishappen equally often to occur. 
In the well known case Ferrari Civ. July 6, 1922, Clunet 
1922, 714 , a French woman who by.her marriage became 
Italien citizen, after having procured a separation 
;rom bed and board in Italy, was repatriated and obtained 
thereafter a divorce from the French courts. The plea 
iII 
Of fraud by the Italian husband was disregarded on the 
r` easoning that the courts are AQt_ Orm . tqä. to. re-- examine 
the validity of the administrative act of naturalisation. 
The decision was followed by Civ. May 7, 1928,D.H.1928,350. 
S 929.1.9; Civil Februar..5,1929,Gazette Pal. 1929,1,426. 
Thus, the practice inaugurated by the decision in the 
Ferrari -case is a constant one now although some writers 
as Pillet and Niboyet still take the opposite view and 
regard such a divorce decree as a violation of the right 
acquired by the other spouse on marriage that the latter 
should remain indissoluble. 
The facts constituting the ground of divorce may precede 
such change of nationality,provided that the legal con- 
sequences are still subsisting at the date of the 
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commencement of the suit. 
2nd arret Ferrari ,Civ. March 14, 1928, D.28,253. 
Clunet 1928, p.383. 
Limoges, Febr. 26, 1929; Nimes, April 13,1929,Clunet 1930,p.368. 
Austrian law: By Austrian law domicile is test of 
personal status of Austrian citizens and nationality that 
of foreigners. Sec. 4 of the Austrian Civil Code reads 
as follows : 
" Austrian citizens are bound by Austrian law as 
regards their legal, acts or transactions entered 
into by them abroad insofar as their capacity 
of acting is restricted by law, a n d these legal 
transactions shall have some legal effect within 
the territory of Austria. " 
This section has been interpreted by Burckhard to the 
effect that the Austrian law apples to legal transactions 
entered into by Austrian citizens abroad, in case only 
where such transactions are intended to have some legal 
effect within the territory of Austria; the Austrian 
Supreme Court followed that view in its decision 
Sig. X Nr. 3649. The rule laid down in that decision 
is to the following effect; 
The marriage of an Austrian citizen contracted abroad 
in spite of an Austrian statutory provision forbidding 
such marriages is deemed void within the territory of 
Austria only when at the date of the celebration of 
uch marriage the intent of the parties to the marriage 
as been to the effect that the marriage should carry 
With it some legal effect within the territory of Austria. 
I 
It is immaterial whether on contracting the marriage thé 
parties thereto have acted with the purpose of evading 
Austrian law or because of ignorance thereof. A marriage 
contracted abroadb'' .Austrian citizen domiciled in a 
foreign state, is deemed valid by Austrian courts in 
spite of the prohibitary próvisions of an Austrian 
statute if he or she,only a f t e r the marriage, makes 
up his ( her) mind to return to Austria and if the 
marriage is valid by the law of his or her foreign domicile. 
National law, on the other hand,is a test as regards thé 
capacity of foreigners. The relative sec. 34 of the 
Austrian Civil Code runs: 
" The capacity of foreigners as regards legal 
transactions is generally governed by the law 
of the place to which they with regard to their 
domicil! or in case of having to domicil, by 
virtue of their birth belong as subjects. " 
The meaning of this section is very obscurq.The modern 
view is this, that the expressions " domicile and birth" 
used in it are the titles to acquisition of citizenship 
usual at that time, bb that the main stress is to be 
laid up : n the expression " subject." 
Decision 8f the Supreme Court Slg. X Nr. 3984. 
Thus the personal status of foreigners is governed by 
their national law with some qualifications, as, for 
instance, with regard. to the principles of public policy 
and reciprocity. 
This interpretitdapf the section corresponds to the 
authoritative construction given to,it by the Imperial 
Council Order of Dec. 22, 1814, Collection of e .viiiDit 
Ciaion,4 i "r . 1118. 
Previously the courts and the writers took the opposite 
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view as regards the interpretation of the statutory 
provision para, 4 and 34 Of the Austrian Civil Code men- 
tioned above. 
Thes:e__raál s amply to questions of legal capacity of contracting marriage 
bu,t theÿ dó :riot appîyi; to matters of divorce. A few 
statutory provisions only wittt regard. to rules of conflict 
of laws are contained in the Austrian statutes,the main 
part of private international lativ has been built up 
by writers and decisions of the courts. 
;According to para:.. 100 ,of the jurisdiction rules and 
,81 (III) of the statute relating to executóry'pró- 
ceedin_gs, dissolution of marriage of Austrian citizens 
is controlled by Austrian law exclusively. As stated. above, 
marriage: entered _ into, :abroad by an :A tstrian citizen 
domiciled in a foreign country is valid in Austria under 
certain conditions; yet the law of the place of celebration 
of such marriage is entirely immaterial as regards the 
question of the dissolution of the marriage. 
Decision of the Supreme Court.of Dec. 7, 1909 0laser{Tng6r, 
Collection NF.N::p 1. Slg. 14.006, VI.Nr.2196,VIII.Nr.292 
kinaiiy, it may be observed that under Austrian law the 
judgment of divorce as well as that of annulment of 
parriage is expressly restricted as regards its operation 
i0 the territory of Austria; this peculiarity of the 
Austrian law is in contrast with the modern idea of 
private international law; this rule is one of the reasons 
supporting the interpretation of para. 4 of the Austrian 
Civil Code stated above. 
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As to the dissolution of marriages of foreigners. 
By an Imperial Council Order of the Oct. 23, 1801,Collection 
f the Civil Statutes, Er. 542, it was laid down that 
he law applicable to divorce of foreigners is the law 
f the place of O:tlebr.ti.QXL =Of: marriages..__ 
t is doubtful whether this statutory provision was 
repealed by the introduction of the Austrian Civil Code 
in 1811. 
Lastly, by the decision of the Supreme Court of Dec.28,1910 
Glaser Unger, NF. 5280, it was held to be still in force. 
íiet the better view on this subject is that taken by c 
series of decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court holding 
that the Austrian courts are required to ";ply Austrian 
law elö eto dissolution .ofmarriage:, 
Decisions of the Supreme Court of October 21,1886, 
Glaser Unger NF. 1870, Dec. 28, 1910,Glaser Unger 
NF 5n80, April 29, 1902, SZ III , Nr. 48, which latter 
waEi,concerned with the dissolution of the marriage of 
v 
citizens of the United States domiciled in Austria. 
Austrian law alone is to be applied to dissolution 
of marriage irrespective of whether or not the decree 
of divorce would be recognised by the national law of 
the spouses. 
Decision of June 11, 1907, Glaser -Unger NF 3806. 
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.German law. The choice of law ule as to matters of 
divorce is laid down by a ticle 17 of the Introductory 
Act to the German Civil Code; the wording of this article 
is as :r'ollows: 
" As to the dissolution of marriage,the laws of 
that state are a-iplicable to which the husband 
belongs at the time of the commencement of the 
suit. A fact which occuied whilst the husband 
belon -ed to another state can be asse._ ted as 
ground for divorce only, if the fact is also 
under the laws of this country a ground of di- 
vorce. If at the time of the commencement of 
this suit the German citizenship of the husband 
has been lost, but i -' the wife is German,the . 
German laws shall apply. Divorce on the ground 
of a foreign law can be decreed in this country 
only if the divorce should be admissible as well 
under the foreign law as under German law." 
the Tording of this article is here given as modified 
by para. 29 of the decree concerning the matrimonial 
causes law of July 6, of 1938. 
According to this art. German Courts may pronounce a 
decree of dissolution of the marriage of foreign spouses 
only, if it is admissible both by the national law of the 
husband 'and Cae ran_. law. l . 
Under the national law of the husband is meant his 
hai municipal law including its rules of conflict of laws; 
the renvoi ( remission) by that national law to German law 
is deemed to be only a reference back to German i@iternal 
law exclusive of conflict rules. 
ImpAr a3; Court.3RG.136 , 363e 7E ',237. 
For details reference is made to the heading " renvoi" 
see p 
It is often difficult to decide whether or not the 
grounds of divorce conform in both laws. The German Courts 
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-took a rather liberal view in this respect and hold it 
sufficient that the group ds of divorce should be of similar 
character only. 
At any rate, in the case of combination of the principles 
of national law and that of the forum as laid down by 
the relative provision of art. 17 that law that is of 
the most stringe:at character will always prevail over 
the more liberal one as regards grounds of divorce. 
The question often arose whether, if the foreign law 
recognises an institution of manent  p re judicial sepa- 
ration, 
:. 
unknown to German law, such separation might 
be granted by German Courts; the German Imperial Court 
refused to grant a decree of permanent separation on 
the reasoning that German law does not recogn e that 
institution; see decision . Imperial Court 5,.3 »:5. 
The fact that formed a cause for divorce must by pars 
of art. 17 German Civil Code not have lost its character 
of affoi: ding a divorce ground by certain intervening 
events, as condonation or lapse of time, but must still 
be operative at the date of change of nationality,so as 
to operate as groundofAAVDtge4. 
Para. 3 of art. 17 is applicable only if the husband 
has acquired foreign citizenship; for if he has lost 
his German citizenshipv;rwithout acquiring another i.e. 
if he remains stateless, art. 29 which applies to 
stateless persons, is applicable,viz.German law applies. 
Art.29 German Civil Code runs as follows: 
00- 
" The rights of a stateless person are to be de- 
termined so far as the laws of the state to 
which a person belongs are declared as controlling 
according to the laws of the State where he has 
his habitual residence and if not his habitual 
residence, where he has his abode or had such 
at the time in question. " 
Para. 3 of Art. 17 applies therefore only in the case 
where the husband acquires another citizenship while 
the wife retains her German citizenship; even if,under 
the new national law of her husband, the marriage were 
indissoluble, itmould not bar the German wife's suit for 
divorce; on the other hand, German law applies in such 
case although it be less favourable to her than the 
new national law of her husband. 
Attention may be drawn on this occasion to another pro- 
vision as regards davordecbyea;atat essspa less 
son, namely, para. 32 of the statute of April 14.1938 
German Civil Code, I page 380: 
" If the state according to whose law the 
rights of a stateless person are to be 
determined declares the marriage to be in- 
dissoluble in principle, and a suit brought 
by him has been dismissed for that reason, 
the state ry provisions on the conclusiveness 
of the dismissal of the suit do not bar his 
fresh suit for divorce." 
German law also applies in case of the renvoi,regulated 
by art. 27, that is to say, in case where the national 
law of a foreign citizen refers the matter back to Ger- 
man law, either because it is the domiciliary law or for 
ome other reason. See page.N 
Another exception to para 1 and 2 of art.17 is the case 
falling within art. 30,viz. where the national law of the 
spouses concerned is deemed to be against good morals or 
or against the purpose of a German law. 
A further exception is art. 17 1.c. is made by art.l 
of the statute on the application of German law to 
matters of divorce of Jan. 24. 1936 Zmpex a1..L W GazetIe I 
page 48 under which German law is applicable to the 
suit for divorce by a wife upon condition that the wife 
only, but not her husband be of German citizenship and 
the national law of her husband declares the marriage 
to be indissoluble in principle. 
As above stated, under Berman rules of conflict of laws 
( art. 17 para. 1) the husband''national law controls 
matters of divorce; therefore, those conflicts which 
spring from the diversity of the nationalities 
of the spouses do not arise, except in the case of a suit 
for divorce by a German wife whose husband has become 
stateless. 
Change of nationality after the institution of the suit 
for divorce is immaterial as to the jurisdiction assumed 
by the German Court in the matter ; but,as regards the 
substantive law to be applied to the case, the date of 
the _Last hearing in the divorce suit is decisive. 
The new law at that date,if the nationality of the hus- 
band has been changed after the commencement of the pro- 
oeedings for divorce,ik to be applied with some qualifi- 
cations discussed above on p.179 The divorce grounds 
must be admissible at that date by both the national law 
and that of the forum. 
Finally it may be observed that the provisions of art.17 
(1 and 3) are applicable as to the effects of divorce, 
r 
viz. thenational law of the husband at the time of the 
institution of the divorce proceedings continues to 
control those matters, ( Imperial Court 38,198 and the 
resolution of the assembled Civil senates of the Imperial 
Court , Imperial Court 41, 191; but these rules apply 
to general marital proprietary duties only; the special 
dut.e arising from marital regimes are controlled by 
their own conflict rules. 
Conflict rules as to matters of declaration of presumed 
death: 
The rules as to choice of law in matters of declaration 
of presumed death are stated in art. 9 of the Introductory 
et to the German Civil Code. 
(a) As to German_ citizens : 
German citizen who has disappeared may be adjudged 
dbad by German courts according to German laws, if he 
was a German citizen at the time of his disappearance, 
(b) as to foreigners: 
A foreigner who has disappeared may by German courts 
e adjudged dead under German law with effect as to 
hose legal relations which are governed by German laws 
s well as with thediTect as to property situate in 
ermany. 
Finally, / foreigner husband who has disappared and 
had his last domicile before disappearance in Germany 
may be adjudged dead upon application of his wife under 
German law without the qualifications as to the effect 
mentioned above under (b) , if the wife who has remained 
in, or returned to, Germany, had been a German citizen 
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.until the respective marriage. 
The above mentioned jurisdiction of German courts is 
not exclusive, so that German courts would recognise 
an adjudication of presumed death of a German citizen 
rendered by foreiF;n courts but anb.Aect .toAhe samérieStrtetions 
as apply to adjudications which are rendered in Germany 
over foreigners. They recognise also adjudications of 
presumed death of foreigners rendered by the .. national 
courts of the latter. 
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,swiss law: 
Swiss law alone is applicable to dissolution of marriage 
of Swiss citizens domiciled in Switzerland; in case of 
their being domiciled abroad, Swiss Courts possess an 
optional jurisdiction in divorce according to art.61,7 g. 
of the Final Title to the Swiss Civil Code. Swiss citizens 
may in the latter case sue for divorce in Switzerland or 
before the court of their foreign domicil°. In the former 
case Swiss law aloxie is applicable to the divorce. 
As regards foreigners domiciled in Switzerland,by Swiss 
law the question whether a divorce is admissible is governed 
by both national law and lex fori, while the question 
`upon what grounds and under what circumstances divorce 
is obtainable, is controlled by the lex fori, according 
to art. 61, 7 h of the Final Title to the Civil Code. 
In case of change of nationality Striss law rules that 
the new national law controls divorce with the exceptio 
hat a fact which has occured at a time when the spousei 
ave been under another national law, can be claimed as 
ground of divorce only, if that fact were the cause 
1f divorce, also at the time of change of nationality. 
art. 61, 7 h II. of the Final Title to the C.C.) 
This rule, however, does not apply to a change of 
nationality to a Swiss one; in such case the Swiss courts 
grant a divorce when there is a cause of divorce by 
Swiss law; the courts do not investigate the motif of 
the change of nationality; even if tt has, be t effected 
f7for 
the sole purpose to procure a divorce thereby,it is 
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disregarded. 
ederal Court's decision 40, 1, 427. 
n case of diversity of nationalities of the douses 
the national law of the petitioner applies to divorce; 
{thus if the petitioner is of Swiss nationality, Swiss 
law is to be applied to the divorce case without any 
regard to the national law of the respondent. 
Decision- of the Federal Court , June 13,1907,33,I,355 
in which case the court granted a divorce to a natu- 
ralised Swiss, former Austrian citizen, against his 
wife, being an Austrian citizen of Roman Catholic faith. 
4t 
Decion of the Federal Court,May 3, 1932, 58, II,93 in 
which case a judgment of divorce was granted to a 
repatriated Swiss wife whose husband retained his Italian 
citizenship, although that judgment could be not recognised 
by the national law of the husband. Till 1929 the date 
of the renunciation of the Hague Convention 1902 by 
Switzerland, the Swiss court were required to apply the 
k'elative art. of this convention. Thus Swiss Coutts.- 
bound by arty &8 of that Convention dismisses a petition 
for divorce which wa brought by a Swiss- 'woman who married 
lx). Italian citizen in Switzerland and having been deserted 
by her husband procured a judicial separation and regained. 
her Swiss citizenship. The reason for the dismissal was 
that() under her former national ( Italian) law 
divorce was not admissible. 
Decision of the Tribunal of Geneva of Jan. 27,1922, 
Clunet 1922, pag. 456. 
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Italian law. 
In Italy national ty is the test of choice of law as 
regards status. 
Although by Italian law divorce from the bond of matrimony 
is not ecogri .se4, Italian courts have for some time 
granted divorce to foreigners who were entitled thereto 
by their national law. 
App. Ancona, March 22, 1884, Monit. d.tr.1884, 367, 
Tr. Genova June 7, 7. 1894, Monit.d.tr.1894,784. 
r. Milano, Jun 2, 1897, Monit. d.tr.1897, 514. 
Since the decision of Cass. Turin, Nov. 21,1900 
onit. 1900, 981, the courts take the apposite view and 
efuse to grant foreigners divorce a vinculo matrimonii. 
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Part III. 
P r o c e d u r e. 
C h a p t e r X. 
1Substance and procedure; 
Procedural matters are the rules of the machinery destined 
by law to protect the civil rights of the parties by 
the tribunals, 
Procedure as distinguished from substantive matters 
( the civil rights of the parties) are under the conflict 
rules governed by the law of the forum. This rule ob- 
tains in all systems of law. 
The line between these two categories of matters is in 
some respects differently drawn by different systems. 
It is often difficult to classify the rules, for instance 
whether a certain rule of a foreign law is to be consi- 
dered by English law as procedural or as substantive;if 
procedural, this part of the foreign law cannot be 
applied to the case in dispute before the court, since 
procedural matters are exclusively governed by English 
law; for instance both the Statist of Limitation and the 
jrule concerning measures of damages are regarded by 
English law as procedural while continental systems of 
law consider-them substantive for the choice of law pur- 
poses. That divergency between the English law and the 
Continental systems flows from the former hostile attitude 
9f English Coarts towards the recognition of foretn law 
hich led to enlarging the concept of procedure and 
narrowing that of substance under English law. 
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This problem does not affect divorce proceedings in 
Anglo-American law systems,since domicil is the sole 
test,both of jurisdiction and choice of law as regards 
matters of divorce and therefore the lex domicilii i.e. - 
the lex fori is to be applied to procedural matters as 
well as to substantive ones. 
Yet we have to discuss the problem particularly insa&r 
as it affects ancillary matters of divorce adjudicated on 
a foreign decree of divorce,which are sought to be en- 
forced in England; in such proceedings may for instance 
the cuestion arise as to whether an award of maintenance 
is enforceable with regard to the ]i glish 
Statute of Limitation or with regard to foreign limitation 
-of actions. 
By the decisions of Huber v. Steiner (1835) H.L.? Bing, 
N.C.208 and Donn v.Lippman ( 1837) 5 Cl.and Fin,l,N.1 Sc.A, 
it has been laid down, that for the purpose of the classi- 
fication of rules of limitation of actions there is to 
be applied the test whether the rule extinguishes the 
right or merely bars the remedy; in the former case the 
rule of limitation is deemed to be substantive, in the 
.latter to be procedural.Thus if that action, in the 
case supposed above,is barred by the English Statute 
of Limitation the right is not enforceable in England; 
if the English Statute of Limitation does not apply tri 
the case,then the foreign rules as to limitation are to 
be ulassigied by the rules of the foreign law,and havii 
in that way found, that the rules of limitation of the 
foreign law are merely a bar to the a. do ,then are 
by English law regar .edd as procedura as cannot n applied, 
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if,on the other hand,by the foreign law the rile is 
considered to be exstinguishing the right, it is then c].assi- 
cied byiethé, English rule of classification as substan- 
tive and operative in England. 
Where the period of limitation differs in that it is 
shorter than the English period, the English Statute of 
I,iraitation applies. 
rries v. Quinni ( 1869) Z.R. Q.B. 653. 
here is an exception to the general rule that 
rules. of Limitation ireprocedural4in the case where 
the statute creating the right contains also the relative 
_ule as to limitation. 
The Continental Courts have often after examining into 
the nature of the rules declared rules contained in the 
Civil Codes to be of prbcedural nature and.,on the other 
hand, regarded rules stated in the Codes of Civil Proc 
dare as being of substantive character. 
Under German law rules concerning limitation of actions 
are regarded as of substantive nature and are therefore 
to be applied irrespective of the characterization applied 
to them by the foreign law. 
Decision of the Imperial Court , RG. 145, 121. 
Some continental writers take the view that the theory 
f the so- called"RechtschutzanspruchT1, see 1)9. 
may afford the criterion for the delimitation of proceduure 
and substantive law respectively. The general definition 
that procedure is the system of norme which regulate the 
general and special suppositions for every judgment as 
opposed to those norms which determine the ever. changing 
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content of the judgment does not afford any solution of 
this question. Since under the laws of some systems 
declaratory actions can be maintained where an actionable 
ight does not exist or, at least, does not yet exist, 
nd thus a remedy is given independently of the existence 
f a right, where an interest in such a judicial declartion 
I.s 
shown ( R ec L ssc_utgint e ec e ) the system of procedure 
ecomes dissociated from the possession of a right;this 
"RechtsschUt_tinteresse " can now afford the criterion 
for the delimitation of substance and procedure. 
At anIn rate, the lines between these two branches of 
law ( procedure and substance) are differently drawn in 
the different systems of law; hence there cannot be 
found an absolute logical basis for the solution of 
questions of delimitation. 
Masons of utility and convenience will greatly influence 
the decision on such questions, as Cook put it tiu3 his 
essay ( 1933), 42 Yale Law J.333, 344: 
" How far can the court of the forum go in applying 
the rule taken from the foreign system of law 
without unduly hindering9írnconveniencing itself ? ". 
2.Nature of the suit for. divorce. 
In general. 
The nature of an action is to be classed by the cause 
underlying its prayer ; it may. be a demand 
(1) for some act or omission oxi the part of the defend -wt 
( action in personam) or 
(2) for declaration of existence tr non -existence of 
a right ( action declaratory ) or 
(3) for change of an exisiting status or relation. 
.A judgment in an action in personam does not per se 
accomplish th.-. object of the suit; it must be -.nforced 
by way of execution. For further details on this subjec 
reference is made to the heading of enforcement of 
decrees concerning ancillary matters to,divorce,pn p.0 
judgment in an action concerning status operates 
mmediately and absolutely upon the status of the 
etitioner; no execution is necessary in order of enforce 
his judgment. 
$I. Declaratory judgment. 
(a) English law. 
ery often the necessity arises to procure declaratory 
udgment, ascertaining a right or legal relation.Its 
dvantage lies, as Borchard puts it," in enabling a plain - 
iff assailed by doubt and uncertainty arising from adverse 
laims or clouds, to avoid the resulting peril and in- 
ecurity by obtaining an authoritative adjudication of 
id rights, before risking disaster by acting on his o 
assumption or guess or incurring prejudice by not actin 
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< because of fear of consequences J(Borchard.,Declaratory 
Judgment,1934,310). 
Insofarr an -other remedy, for instance, coercive relief 
h.- 
is available, the latter is to be preferred to a mere 
declaratory judgment. 
Although a divorce decree declares the marriage to be 
dissolved, it is not a declaratory judgment; for a 
decree of divorce creates a status or a change of status 
by restoring the spouses to the state of unmarried 
persons whereas a declaratory judgment merely ascertains 
already existing rights or exi-st.iug legal relations. 
Again. an action of jactitstion of marriage is by English 
law an action in tort and though it has indirect 
declaratory effect as to the existence of the marriage, 
the judgment in such action is by the definition of the 
notion given above not a declaratory judgment. The 
declaratory judgment, previously authorised as a general 
procedural device in chancery cases, see the Chancery 
Procedure Act, 1852 ( 15 and 16 Victoria c.86) was 
extended to all actions and proceedings by the S.C.Rules 
1883 which conferred upon the Court the power to make 
"binding declarations of right whether any consequential 
relief is or could be claimed or not.( RSCO XXV r.5). 
The jurisdiction of the court under this rule is only 
limited by its own discretion, but the Divorce Division 
cannot give a declaratory judgment nor is this rule 
applicable to divorce proceedings. see decision of 
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De Gasquet James v. Duke of Mecklenburg- Schwerin (1914) 
P 53, except in the circumstances specified by the 
Legitimacy Act. 1926 and s. 188 of the Jud. Act. 1925. 
The Court may in this way also indirectly decide the 
question as to the validity of a decree of divorce being 
a preliminary question to the validity of a marriage,as 
for instance, in Armitage v. Attorney General ( 1906) P 35 
and in Turner v. Thompson ( 1888). 
Further examples of declaratory judgments rendered with 
regard to such specific issues are the decisions of 
Hope v. Hope ( 1854) 7 D, M&C and Guaranty Trusts v. Hamay 
(1915) 2 KB 536; in these cases the English courts made. 
declarations of the English law on points that have 
arisen for decision ts.A further ill.stration 
oX_an indirectly:_. declaratory judgment is Clark v.Clark(1921)TLR 815 
It was an action for restitution of conjugal rights,where 
since the wife did not appear to the hearing the respon- 
pdent husband was allowed to adduce evidence as to his 
ti. 
omicil and. to the law of his domicil with regard to 
of the French decree of divorce and to have these 
facts embodied in the order dismissing his wifets 
petition for restitution of conjugal rights. If the device 
Qf declaratory judgment regarding the validity of foreign 
il 
ecrees of divorce, as mentioned in the preceding case, 
were generally available to the parties before contracting 
a second marriage, they would often re-:rain from con- 
tracting bigamous marriages; such a use of declaratory 
judgment in matters of divorce is the more important as 
ithe danger often subsists of being charged with the 
felony of bigamy and as the illegitimacy of children 
of such marriages 'carries still with it haavy dis- 
advantages. 
The framers of the Matrimonial Causes Act.,1937, availed 
themselves of that modern device of declaratory judgment 
by introducing the decree of presumption of death of a 
spouse who has disappeared, which decree, however, is 
obtainable only in connection with a decree of divorce 
and inseparable therefrom. 
For details on this subject may be referred to p.cni 
Under Scottish law the declarator of marriage is such a 
declaratory judgment. 
U.S.A. law.on declaratory Judgment. 
In_ USA. the Uniform declaratory Judgment Act.,prepared 
by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform 
t aces Laws, has been adopted in a great number of juris- 
ciictions; thereby a declaratory power of general application 
has been established. 
In Bauman v. Bauman, 250 NY 382,165 N.E.819( 1929) 
the Court of the State of New York gave a declaratory 
judgment pronouncing a M .xican decree of divorce and a 
subsequent marriage void, but declined injunction relief. 
Yet the courts refuse declaratory relief where other fo 
of relief are 'vailable. 
Thus the same Court refused a declaratory judgment riled 
for by a plaintiff who had grounds for divorce. 
German and Austrian law. 
By para.228 of the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure and 
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'para. 256 of the German Code of Civil Procedure a party 
may bring an action for declaration of the existence or 
inexistence of a right or legal relation or of the 
authenticity or non- authenticity of a document, if he 
( she) can show his legal interest in having these questions 
determined as soon as possible. The courts may also by 
aras. 236,259 and 393 of the Austrian CCP and by 
paras. 280 and 506 of the German CCP render an inter - 
locutory declaratöry judgment, on motion of either party 
to proceedings, determining the existence of some contro- 
erted right upon which the ultimate decision depends. 
hen the requirements of para. 256 of German CCP. ,cited 
above, are subsistent, an action declaratory of a 
foreign judgment's being in operation , is admissible, 
Decision of the Imperial Court RG 109,385. 
Finally, according to para.638 of the German COP. as re., ci asj 
t/ 3 amended by the Decree of July 27, 1938, Imperial Gazette, ` 
I.p.923 a declaratory judgment relating to status is 
declared. to be binding upon all the woild. 
U. Judgment in rem. 
nglish law. A petition for divorce is a petition for 
a change of an existiflg status of marriage; it is 
tt ted in the decisions as an action in rem or quasi in 
rem and the decree of divorce being a decree oft a questign 
of that status is deemed to be a judgment in rem i.e.firal 
and conclusive against all the world. 
Lord Esher, then Brett LJ. said in Niboyet v.Niboyet , 
(1878) 4 PD 1: 
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+- TT A judgment or decree determining what is the status 
of an individual is a judgment or decree in rem.It 
is therefore, if binding at all, not only a binding 
judgment as between the parties to the suit,but is to 
be recognised as binding in all suits and by all par - 
ties.Such a judgment where the jurisdiction of the 
court,which made it, is recognised,is treated as 
binding and final, not only by all courts of the 
country, but by the courts of all countries." 
In Salvesen otherwise Lorang v. Administrator of Austrian 
roperty, ( 1927) AC 641,per Viscount Dunedin : 
TT A metaphysical idea, which is what the status is,is 
not strictly a res, but it, to borrow the phrase, 
savours of a res, and has all along been treated as 
such. Now the learned judges makedistinction.They 
say that in an action of divorce you have to do with 
as res. to wit, the status of marriage, but that in 
action of nullity there is no status of marriage to 
be dealt with, and therefore no res. Now it seems to 
me that celibacy is just as much a status as marriage." 
As will be shown below in chapter.XZI.l.. the provisions 
relating to recognition of forei. :.. J.údgmentq _,6.ß.:d.3vUes,: a.re 
with regard to their nature, defined above, less stringent 
-han those for other judgments. 
German law. By German law any action concerning st -tus 
is deemed binding against whole the world; this is ex- 
pressly stated by the enactment para.638 CCP as amended 
by Decree of July 27, 1938, cited above 13.1Q,;.. 
This view was also taken by the Imperial Court in its 
decisions RG. 59,20 and 80.323. 
French law, by which marriage is regarded as civil contract, 
an action for divorce is deemed an action in personam. 
Some of ti-F' recent decisions,hoWe:vrefused the theory 
ofthe contractual character of marriage in some respects 
and held that divorce is a status to be recognised every- 
where. 
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Thus in the well - known case of Ferrari ( Lyon,Dec.17,1925, 
J. Cllinet 1926, 384) the contractual theory,by which the 
marriage wpuld have been indissoluble, was not followed; 
It was held that " the agreement of the spouses at the 
time of the marriage does not control the latter's future 
characteristics, such as may result from changes in 
legislation or personal status." This decision was 
followed by the decisions of div. May 7, 1928 DH 1928,350, 
S 1929, 1.9. 
Giv. February 5, 1929, Gaz. Pal. 1929, I. 426. 
( cited by Planiol et Ripert, vol.14, p. 38). 
As regards the question whether a declaration of exe- 
quatur is necessary for the recognition of foreign 
judgments, the French courts have for long distinguished 
between judgments relating to status and judgments in 
tpersonam; thus foreign decrees of divorce are recognised, 
independently of any exequatur being obtained, save in 
case where an enforcement founded on such decree is sought. 
pit. Febr. 28. 1860, S 60,1,210.Seine,April 12,1923,ClUnet 1924,107, 
concerning judgment of divorce 0, and 
ileq.Mardh 3.1930, S. 1930 . I. 377. 
C h a p t e r XI. 
1. Principles of Divorce Proceedings in general. 
evil procedure in general may be controlled either by 
the principle of accusation or by the principle of judicial 
.nvestigation or by a combination of these principles. 
The principle of accusation is also called the principle 
of party presentation; a component of the latter is the 
principle of " dispositive election." The principle 
Of " dispositive election" is this - the parties are at 
liberty as to whether and for which of their substantive 
law rights they will bring án action of whether and which 
of their substantive law defences they will plead against 
an action. In order to achieve the intended judgment the 
parties when choosing the second alternatives may also 
be allowed by law to be free in assembling the cause ma- 
terial for this end, the judge is bound to consider the 
causematerial only submitted to his examination by them. 
The principle of judicial investigation, on the other 
hard, also called the principle of officiality, is the 
opposite of the above described principle of party pre- 
sentation. 
By the principle of judicial investigation the parties 
are denied the right exclusively to determine what kind 
of caused material is to be put before the judge for exa- 
mination; by this principle it is the duty of the judge 
to get the full cause material and to ascertain the 
absolute truth as far as humanly possible. 
The judge may, therefore, by this principle consider 
facts and call witnesses on his own motion and disregard 
cause material laid before him by the parties even if 
-hey are agreed upon it, when he thinks fit to do so. 
The various civil procedures rest upon the one or the 
other of these principles of party presentation and 
judicial invetigation or are based upon some sort of a 
combination of them. The rules regulating procedure in 
Divorce differ in many 11, respect from those applied to 
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-ordinary civil procedure. This divergency is due partly 
to the historical development of jurisdiction in matri- 
monial matters which was till 1857 exercised by the 
Ecclesiastical Courts partly to the great interest that 
the state has in the status of marriage and its incidents. 
English law. 
The rules as to divorce proceedings were greatly in- 
fluenced by the practice of the Ecclesiastical courts and 
the Canon Law respectively that they administered.From 
the latter law is derived the inquisitorial system which 
has maintained itself in divorce proceedings, whereas pro- 
cedure in the other branches of law is mainly ruled by a 
sort of combination of this principle and the so- called 
" accusatorial" one. 
The main features of the inquisitorial system are: 
l) The Court is required to investigate ex officio 
he material facts even when they are admitted by the 
> arties. This duty of the court that has ever since 
leen exercised by the court is nowwidened by section 4 
of the Act, 1937. Even in undefendedca,_eE this duty of 
investigation obtains. This duty of investigation relates 
first of all ,to the question of jurisdiction of the Court. 
Some earlier decisions have been to the contrary; thus 
in the case Zyklinski v. Zyklinski,1862,2 Sw. and Tr 420, 
lit was held that the appearance of the husband without 
protest gave jurisdiction to an English Divorce Court, 
and in the case of Caliwell v. Caliwell (1863) 
Sw and Tr 259, the Court exercised jurisidiction, 
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Although the husband was not domiciled. in England,this 
on the reasoning that tlle wife did not object to juris- 
diction, but this rule of founding jurisdiction upon 
implied consent of the parties is not binding any more 
since cue decision in Le Mesurier v. Mesurier and 
Bater v. Bater. This modern view is also laid down in 
Armitage v. Attorney Gen.( 1906),'. 135. 
In the case of H.v.H. ( 1928) B,. 206 and Horn v.Horn 
L92), 142 LT. 93, it was held that even where the respgn- 
L-4. /dent wed? cztopped from setting up the plea of lack of ji ris- 
diction by reason of the new domicil of the plaintiff,it 
was the duty of the Court to try the issue of domicil. 
This rule has been extended by the decision in Herd v. 
Herd ( 1936) /., 205, to undefended catise ;in a petition 
or divorce where the husband who had deserted his wife 
ánd had acquired a new domicil abroad failed to appear 
$.n his wife's petition and contest jurisdiction it was 
Decided that it was the part of the Court to raise the 
question of f.omicil and jurisdiction respectively and 
aving found that a new domicil has been established 
broad by the respondent the court dismissed the petition 
or want of jurisdiction. 
he same rule obtains now in Scotland; see decision 
Brown v. Brown ( 1928 ) S . C .542 . 
(2). In performing its duty of investigation,the Court 
is assisted by the King's Proctor acco ding to sections 
181 and 182 of the Judicature (Consolidation) Act,1925. 
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'Formerly, the King's Proctor which office has been 
created by the King's Proctor Act, ( 1860), could only 
intervene after decree nisi on suspicion of collusion; 
see decision of Hudson v. Hudson ( 1875), 1 PD 65; but 
his function has been widened by the decision in Slogeth 
v. Slogeth ( 1928),.. and the Matrimonial causes 
rule ( 1937); the King's Proctor has now the right to 
intervene also before decree nisi and to argue any 
important question and, of course, lastly, to intervene 
as at after decree nisi. 
(3). For the same reason, viz: of public interest in 
lthe divorce status rests Matrimonial causes rule 38; 
it provides that any person other than the King's proctor 
who, desires to show cause against making absolute a 
decree nisi is allowed to do so by entering an appearance 
n the cause when the decree nisi has been pronounced, 
And by filing an affidavit within four days, setting 
forth the facts upon which he relies. Thus the woman 
famed as an alleged adulteress may also after decree nisi 
has been pronounced intervene in accord.nce.with this 
rule, unless she has intervened before in the suit,see 
decision W.v.W. ( 1936) . 38. This intervention of 
the TT third party" serves the end: of assisting the Court 
in its duty of investigation into material facts. 
The principle of judicial investigation rules in the field 
fof allegations as well as in that of evidence. 
This principle operates as to allegations by way of 
amendments by which parties may be added to a suit or. 
-202- 
,-struck out, or by amendments for the pfirpose of deter - 
mining the question raised by or depending upon the pro - 
ce ings. See RSC , order XVI, rule 110, and 
order XVIII, rule 12. 
By the latter rule the judge may amend any defect or 
error in any proceedings. In the filed of evidence there 
prevails the principle of Party presentation. It is he 
task of the party to the petition to produce proof of 
their allegations. Although party presentation is the 
dominant principle in the fieldi of roof, yet the prin- 
ciple of judicial investigation operates here too, either 
(a) in the affirmative or (b) in the negative direction: 
(a) In exceptional cases the judge will can a !itness 
of his own motion or, 
(b) refuse evidence to a great extent either because he 
deems it inadmissible with regard to the so- called " best 
evidence rule It i.e. the rule forbidding substitutionary 
evidence where direct evidence is available, or because 
he thinks it irrelevant i.e. not logically probative.The 
relevancy of proof is to be determined by the rules of 
pleading and of sustantive law. The refusal of evidence 
may also take place for some other legal reason, for 
instance, because the judge is boun4. by precedent; it 
seems important to mention in this connectmn the non - 
access rule in Russell v. Russell ( 1924) AC, 687. By this 
rule evidence of non- access cannot be given by either 
spouse tending to bastardise or legitimise a child 
conceived and born during wedlock ; the decisions 
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of h-íart v. Mart ( 1926) P 24 and Stafford v.Kidd (1937) 
IKB 395 by which the view was taken that this rule did 
not apply to cases where the spouses were living apart 
under a deed of separation, have been overruled by the 
decision of Ettenfield v. Ettenfield ( 1940) CA. 96 in 
which the following rules are laid down : 
( 1) The rules that evidence cannot be given by any 
spouse tending to bastardise or legitimise the child 
onceived and born during wedlock is absolute, and 
pplies not only when the parties are living together 
ut when they are separated either by decree of a court 
f competent jurisdiction or by their own volition. 
(2) Where the only evidence of adultery in support of 
a husband's petition is the birth of a child to the wife, 
the husband need prove no more than the date of the 
decree or order of separation and the date of the birth 
of the child. If it must have been conceived after the 
date of the decree or order there is a presumptio juris 
that tt is a bastard. She must rebut this presumption 
if she can, but she must do it by evidence other than 
bier own. 
(3) The presumption is that a child is legitimate; if 
the husband leads evidence to rebut that presumption, 
the husband must prove that fact by any means open to 
him other than his own evidence; the wife can call, but 
cannot herself give evidence of the child's legitimacy. 
Another important rule as to evidence in divorce pro- 
ceedings is laid down by Section 198 of the Supreme 
Court Judicature ( Consolidalibn) Act, 1925, as follows : 
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" No witness in proceedings involving questions of 
adultery shall be liable to be asked or be bound 
to answer any question tending to show that he 
or she has been guilty of adultery, unless he 
or she has already given evidence in the same 
proceedings and given proof of alleged adultery." 
hereas the rules discussed above relate particularly to 
questions of adultery only, there has under English law 
developed a theory of estoppels ti ibtwith regard to a 
particular sort of case, By these estoppels a party is 
precluded from denying the existence of some state or 
fact which he or she has formerly asserted by deed,by 
conduct, or by record; even if the assertion is entirely 
untrue, he or she is " estopped" from denying or from 
leading evidence to the contrary. It is treated as 
conclusive legal evidence against him( her). 
F6r all the reasons given above the judge may, as stat¢& 
by Matrimonial 6,Aauses Rule 25, refuse to admit eviden e 
tendered in accordance with any order made under that 
rule, if in the interests of just, &w he should think f t 
to do so. 
(4) Discovery snd interrogatories are also founded on 
the inquisitorial principle. 
A party, even before trial, maycompel his ( her) 
opponent by the equitable assistance of discovery and 
interrogatories to disdose evidential resources that 
are within his ( her)knowledge(Matr. Cause wale23). 
This legal device is unknown to continental laws. 
(5k further substantial principle of civil procedure in 
general is that of giving both parties to the proceedings 
the opportunity to be heard. The so- called principle 
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of Bilaterality. How fan violation of this principle 
constitutes a ground for non- recognition of foreign 
decrees, see p.280. 
(6) here is lastly, among the fundamental %inciples of 
odern civil proceure.to be mentioned, that of publicity. 
he main lines of this principle are laid down in the 
ecision of Scott v. Scott ( 1913) AC 417 where excepti ns 
o it were specified. Vaughá Williams, Lord Justice, s id 
at p. 260. 
TT I do feel that the hearing of trials in public 
is so precious a characteristic of English Law 
that it is important that the power to hear 
cases in camera, even by consent, should be li- 
mited by express specific limitation." 
As the unfettered reporting of divorce cases was in- 
jurious to public morality some statutory limitations 
n1 this respect have been introduced. 
For the relative limitations as to press reports concer- 
ning divorce proceedings reference is here made to the 
egulation of Reports Act ( 1926) ( 16 and 17 Geo.5,C.61) 
And for the general limitations as to the principle of 
ì 
publicity to Section 189 A of the Supreme Court of Judi- 
cature Amendment Act. ( 1935). 
While under English law witnesses are to be examined 
n open court, in France sìaoh evidence is taken on 
=mission and written evidence prevails at the hearing 
efore the court. 
ccorCing to paras. 30 and 73 of the Germa,? Decree of 
July 27, 1938 Federaligazette 1.923 the public is 
xmluded from the court in proceedings for divorce. 
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The continental systems take a middle cours between the 
rrinciple of party presentation and judicial investigation, 
called also princirle of offici aity. The former , as 
above stated, expresses the idea that the statute assigns 
to the party the function of assembling the cause ma- 
#erial and limits the judge to the reception of such 
material. While the princirle of party presentation 
- 
rreva.ils in proceedings concerning ordinary cases, the 
principle of judic.l investigation is pre- ponderant 
'in proceedings for divorce. The judge is by this principle 
required ex officio to search for the absolute truth;he 
is not bound by the presentation of the parties even 
if they have agreed upon them, and may consider facts 
which the parties have not put before him. By paras.37 
and 77 of the German Decree of July 27,1938, Imperial I,w 
Gazette I p.923 the court may of its own motion call 
'witnesses and consider facts which the parties have not 
put before it, yet it can do so in spite of the protest 
Of a party seeking divorce only in so far as it relates 
to facts serving the continuance of marriage. The public 
prosecutor, who according to para. 31 of this Decree 
has to assist the court in its duties as regards 
ascertaining of absolute truth possesses the same powers 
as those conferred upon the court by paras.37 and 77. 
The judicial discretionary power of the French courts is 
rather unfettered since the procedural statutes Igy down 
general principles only in this respect. The court may 
on its own motion order an inquiry into facts as it thin.fts 
fit.(art.234 CCP), 
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4n Switzerland where the cantons may make their own rules 
as to civil procedure there it is laid down by sec.113 
of the Constitution Act that a judge is not to accept 
roof of any essential fact on which the claim for divorce 
is based, without being himself personally convinced that 
the fact took place as asserted,and further that the par- 
ties to such proceedings are not to give sworn evidence 
f any such essential fact. 
art. 158 of the Swiss Civil Code is to the same effect). 
econciliation. 
With regard to the interest which the State takes in the 
1 
continuance of conjugal community particular provisions 
1 
respecting reconciliation are embodied in the relative 
statutes. 
English law. Under English law attempts at reconciliation 
are only prescribed in the exceptional case where a spouse 
makes an application by originating summons for leave 
to present a petition for divorce before three years have 
passed since the date of the marriage; by Matr.Cause 
Hil e 'P( Mtiis ordained that in such a case attempts at 
reconciliation of the spouses are to be made before leave 
to file the petition is granted. 
Again the very enactment of sec.l of the MG.Act,1937 
respecting the three years' waiting period as well as 
that of the MCA, 1860, relating to décree nisi_ a; , 
principally at of oraing an opportunity of reconciliation. 
Under French law the party seeking divorce is required 
to make an application to the President of the Court 
givil for leave to file such suit for divorce ; 
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,at the hearing on such application the judge is to make 
genuine attempts at reconciliation and to grant leave for 
filing the petition only if the attempts at reconciliation 
failed and he is convinced that reconciliation is im- 
probable. ( CCP 877). Similar provisions contain 
paras. 608 to 610 of the German Code of Civil Procedure as 
amended by para 32 of the Decree of July 27, 1938. 
Imperial Gazette I, p. 623. 
Where reconciliation seems probable, the petition for 
divorce is to be dismissed under Swiss law; on the other 
hand the petitioner has only to prove that he had made 
genuine attempts at reconciliation and they have failed. 
( art. 146 CC). 
Decision of v. R.O. 
2. Special rules relating to procedure in divorce 
under the various systems of law. 
As to the capacity to bring and defend a suit for divorçe. 
English law: A minor or a person of unsou4d mind may by 
is next friend commence an action for divorce and may 
in case of being respondent defend it by a guardian 
ppointed for thatpurpose. ?.:C Rule 64. 
ustrian law; By para.5 of the Decree of 1819 and para.4 
f the Decree of the Minister of Justice of Dec.9, 1897 
oncerning procedure in matters of divorce and nullity 
f marriage a minor spouse may commence an action for 
ivorce and defend it. 
ecision of the Austrian Supreme Court SIg.VIII.3125. 
ccorcing to para. 3 of the Austrian Code of Civil Proced. 
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foreigner who under his national law is incapable of 
bringing an action or defending it, may be regarded as 
having such capacity before Austrian Courts if he ( she 
is deemed to be capable in this respect by the relative 
rovisions of the Austrian law. 
German law: According to para.33 of the Decree of July 7, 
938, a spouse, even if he ( she) be of limited capacit 
to effect a legal transaction, is capabl. of suing or 
eing sued for divorce. 
France: A minor is emancipated by marriage and the grea er 
weight of judicial decisions regarda minor spouse as 
capable of suing and being Lued for divorce. 
Faris, March 22, 1894, D 94.2472: 
ngers, January 4, 1899, D. 99.2.160. 
feeble- minded person and a spendthrift may sue or be 
sued for divorce jointly with his judicial adviser. 
¡axis, March 25, 1890, D 90.2.257. 
wiss law: Art. 14 of the Swiss CC provides that marriage 
onstitutes majority. 
Death of the party to proceedings. 
English law: On the death of a petitioner at any time 
before the decree absolute is made the suit abates. 
Stanhope v. Stanhope ( 1886) 11 PD 103 CA. 
Brocas v. Brocas ( 1861) 30 U. PM and A 172. 
On the death of a respondent the cause also abates unless 
in a husband's petition damages are claimed. 
M. v.M. and A ( 1910) 26, LTR 305. 
There is no abatement or the death of a co- respondet. 
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.German law. According to para. 628 Code o$ Civil 
procedure in a case where oiT of the parties to the 
proceedings dies before the judgment has become final 
the suit for divorce abates and the cause may rroeeed 
only -.ith regard to the costs to be awarded. Yet the 
filing of the suit has legal effect with regard to 
succession under rill; for para. 20'77 CC reads as 
follows: 
TT A testamentary disposition whereby a testator has 
made a testamentary gift to his spouse is inoperative, 
if the marriage is void, or if it has been dissolved 
before the death of the testator. The marriage is 
to be deemed dissolved, if the testator was entitled, 
at the time of his death, to petition for divorce 
by reason of the fault of the other spouse, and 
had filed a petition for divorce or judicial separ1tion," 
Fr-nee: The rule that a suit for divorce abates in caste 
o:X death of a party to the proceedings applied till 
1919 also to the case where a party died after the judgment 
had become final yet before its transcription. This rut 
was abolished by the law of June 16, 1919 under which t e 
operation of the divorce judgment is no longer conditional 
upon its being transcribed upon the registers of civil. 
status. 
Trib. Seine, March 23, 1925, La Loi Oct. 2, 1925. 
Englísb, law; In this connedtion mention may be made of 
some of the peculiarities of English law on procedure in 
katters of divorce: 
(a) Co- respondent. By English law the husband petitioner 
is required to make the adulterer co- respondent,excert 
when he is dispensed with naming anyone as a co- respondent 
by the judge. This rule does not apply to the adulteresse 
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who must be named only in the wifeTs petition, if her 
name is known. These rules are unknown to continental 
laws on procedure; there the suit for damages against 
adulterer or adulteress _:. may be heard only in ordinary 
proceedings, 
(b) A further feature of English divorce procedure 
unknown to Continental laws is that divorce causes , 
especially petitions in which also damages against the 
co- respondent are claimed, are often tried by a judge 
ith a common or special jury. MC Rule 29. Since,hawever, 
petition for divorce is not a common law action and 
no statutory rule existe,ne l fintitlifg ä a-r- y _o 'a_ jury 
rial in divorce proceedings, there is no right to a j y 
nd the court has full. discretion in this matter. 
twin v. Rugg, Gunn ( 1931) 1. 147. 
it may be observed, however, that by the Courts (Emergency 
Powers ) Act 1939 the elimination of juries, save by 
special order, has been ordained for the duration of the 
present war. 
(c) Affidavits. The petitioner is required to furnish among 
with the petition an affidavit in support and verifying 
the facts of which he ( she) has personal cognisance 
and stating whether the petitiarniis prosecuted in collusion 
with the respondent or any of the co- respondents.MC Rule 6. 
The respondent by MC Rule 23 is required if the answer 
contains counter- charges to file with the answer an 
affidavit verifying the answer especially also as to 
existence of collusion, connivance, and condonation. 
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--The device of such sworn affidavits is also unknown to 
continental laws. 
In this connection mention may also be made of the device 
of the Discretion Statement. ( MC Rule 28). Every party 
to a matrimonial cause praying that the Court may exercise 
its discretion in his favour to grant a decree nisi not - 
Isithstanding that party's adultery, is required to lodge 
statement, called the Discretionary Statement in the 
Divorce Registry Such statement is Open to the inspection 
f the King's Proctor but, except by the discret on of 
he ftadge, it must not be inspected by anyone else. 
he lodging of a discretionary Statement is a pre - 
equisite for the exercise of the courts discretion in 
otitsfor the exercise of the court's discretion in such 
cases. 
( d) Cross- petition; .A respondent who makes counter- 
charges may ask in his f her ) answer for such relief 
as he ( she) were entitled on filing a petition. But 
when the original petition is not a petition for divorce, 
but an action for judicial separation .restitution of 
conjugal rights or of nullity a cross -petition based 
on the counter- charges must be filed in order to get 
the relief ( divorce) the reason being that the last 
ffientioned petitions are not purely statutory ones,but 
still partly founded on 6eclestastical rules,: . 
According to art. 239 of the French CC a counter -claim 
for divorce may be made in an answer to a suit for 
divorce, but not in an answer to a suit for separation. 
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According to para. 615 of the German Cdclelof..0 ;vi .j'I?ro.ce 
cross- bill for divorce may be amalgamated with a suit 
for divorce as well as with a suit for nullity of 
marriage or for restitution of conjugal rights. 
Judgments: 
Englishlaw: Wherethe petitioner does not prosecute the 
petition in the manner prescribed by law the respondent 
or any other party who has filed an answer such as the 
dnre 
'co- respondent or the named person intervening, may apply 
for dismissal of the petition. Where the respondent is 
seeking relief by his answer he may also proceed on his 
answer. 
Volkers v. Volkers ( 1935) P 33. 
It must be noticed that tA1WVPin which the court is asked 
to exercise its discretion, see p.1QZ. or in which in- 
sanity is the ground relied' on for relief, are treated 
as defended caageq,even when the respondent does not 
enter an appearance or not file any answer or in which 
all the answers filed have been struck out. 
How far the court even in undefended causes is bound ex 
officio to inquire into material facts, has been dealt 
with above. 
By English law the final decree of divorce is preceeded 
by a preliminary decree, called decree nisi. Prior to 
1860 the decree of divorce became final after is has 
been pronounced. Iy Matr. Causes Act. 1860 elinstita- 
{ 
Lion of a decree nisi was introduced, which could be 
made absolute after three months unless the King's Proc4or 
Io 
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r any third person intervened and showed cause why it 
should be rescinded; the period. was extended by I:C.Actl:66 
to six months. 
Both parties may now apply for the decree to be made 
absolute; for according to sec. 9 of the MCA 1937 Atre 
no such application has been made by the party who ob- 
tained the decree nisi, then, at any time,after e: iration 
of,the three months from the ê.arlest.'Aate. on:whiéh_th2.t 
party could have made such an application, the party 
against whom the decree nisi has been granted, may apply 
to the court to make the decree absolute; The party may 
also in case of unreasonable delay ask for retission of 
the decree nisi. 
Rutter v. Rutter ( 1921) F. 421. 
Hunter v. Hunter ( 1934) . P.92. 
In a single case in which both parties air ecrthe ceou't ±b 
exercise its discretion in their favour, a decree of 
divorce was granted to both parties. 
Abbis v. Abbis & Low, July 27,Times. 
French Law: Accorc'.ing to 394.CCP. where the petitioner 
does not prosecute the petition over three years the A/ 
petition may be dismissed on motion of the respondent. 
There is no restriction u,non taking a default judgment 
in divorce proceedings; the same rules apply in this 
respect as in ordinary proceedings. 
Divorce may be pronounced against both parties to the 
proceedings. 
Seine, Nov. 16, 1897, La Loi Dec. 31, 1897. 
-215- 
erman law: Neither judgments on admissions nor judgments 
n default are admitted in proceedings for divorce under 
erman law. para. 617 and 618 CCP. 
dmissions of facts which are relied on in order to obtain 
a divorce are c :wally inadmissible. Ire. case of default 
the hearing of the cause takes place in the same way as 
if the respondent had denied the petitioner's allegations, 
the court is bound to inquire into all material facts. 
W. 16.259. A judgment of divorce may be pronounced 
against both parties to the proceedings. The court may 
compel a party, even when defaulting to appear before the 
court in order to be examined as witness and in case of 
fladisobedience 
the same compulsory measures may be taken 
against him ( her), as are provided in case of disobedience 
of a witness to an order of the court, except imprison - 
ent. ( para. 619 CCP. as amended by the decree of 
July 27, 1938) . 
nder Austrian law such defaulting party may also be 
ompelled by imprisonment to appear as witness. 
para. 12 of the Ministerial Decree of Dec.9, 1897, 
Imperial Gazette 283). 
These rules do not apply to a case in which service by 
ublication has been ordered. 
ccording to para. 614 ( a) CCP as, introduced by 
para. 34 of the Decree of July 27, 1938 Imperial 
Gazatte 923, the suit for divorce may be Abandoned until 
the judgment becomes final; in case of abandonment of 
the suit a judgment is deemed rescinded. 
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Appeal. 
Fnglidh law : An appeal from decree nisi or absolute 
to the Court of Appeal is to be filed within six weeks of 
the decree, subject to the right of the trial judge 
or the 6ourt of Appeal to extend the time. 
Judicature Act. 1925, sec. 27, RSC 58, rule 15. 
But such an appeal from a decree absolute does not lie 
in favour of any party, who having had time and 
opportunity to appeal, has not appealed from that decree. 
Judicature Act. 1925, sec. 30 ( 1) ( c). 
A motion for new trial i.e. in a case tried by a jury 
must be made in she first instance to the Court of 
Appeal ( Judicature Act. 125, sec. 30 ( 1). 
A motion for rehearing of a case heard by a judge alone 
where no error of the court at the hearing is alleged, 
must be glade in the first instance to a Divisional 
Court of tie Divorce Division. Matr. Caus.Rule 36(1). 
French Law; Appeal may be entered within two months 
from the date when the judgment has been served on the 
losing party. 
After the Court of Appeal has adjudicated, a judgment 
can be referred to the Supreme Court ( Cour de Cassation) 
on specified grounds, as error in law or lack of juris- 
diction ( called review). The means of opposition 
is allowed ainst judgment by default, according to 
art. 247,and 158 CCI. 
A judgment in default for non - appearance is accord -4g 
to art. 156 CCP deemed not rendered unless it is executed 
within six months of its service upon the dt.Aulting party 
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who may in such case bring a fresh action. 
Seine, February 1, 1894, Gazette de Tribunaux,Febr.9,1894. 
It is inadmissible to relbase the right to appeal, 
according to art. 294, CC. 
Cass. March 25, 1879, D. 1879, 1 270. 
Hew Trial. Art. 480 CCP. allows a judgment to be 
annulled by the court which pronounced it on speci- 
fied grounds, such as fraud, forgery; the facts to 
be grounds for such proceeding ( requete civile) must 
not be such as could have been raised by appeal or review. 
German law: An appeal against a judgment may be made 
witlin one month after its official issue, to the 
court of second instance and thence to the Imperial 
Couyt. 
By the Decree of June 14, 1932TmTeri v Gazette 1, p.285 
the judgment can be referred to the Imperial Court by 
way of a review ( called " Revision" ) only by leave 
of the court of appeal. ( Oberindesgericht).The court 
of appeal may grant a leave to review if it departs 
from a decision of the Imperial court or if a question 
on a point of law of fundamental importance is expected 
to be clarified in this way. By German law it is allowed 
to wave the expiration of the time to appeal; in such 
case the judgment becomes final at the date when such 
declaration of waiver has been served upon the opposing 
party, It is also to be mentioned that under German 
law there exists ( 1) an opposition called declaration 
of opposure ( "Eiñspruchu) which is allowed against a 
judgment in default.e2) an'application for procedural 
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reinstatement and (3) a complaint of error allowed 
against certain judicial orders. 
Extraordinary recourses serving for attack upon 
judgments in the court of rendition are: 
(1) The complaint of nullity for specified grounds 
such as when the court has not been ordina.rjly 
constituted, or want of attorney ( para. 579 CCP) 
and ( 2) the application for reopening of proceedings 
on a limited set of grounds, such as where a judgment 
of a criminal or administrative court which has been 
the basis for the judicial decision, has been Quashed 
and replaced by a final judgment, or fresh evidence 
under- certain conditions. 
The statutory period of five years, beginning from 
the date when the judgment has become Xi,na1 , _§ 
allowed for these extraordinary recourses, except the 
case of want of authority. 
According to para. 614 ( a) CCP as, intraduced by 
para. 34 of the Decree of July 27, I9T''Imerial Gazette 7923. 
the suit for,divorce may be abandoned, until the judgment 
becomes final; in case of abandonment of the suit a 




P art Imo_,,, 
1 Y C h ap t e r XI I. 
$ Theories as to the of Recognition and 
#1 t Foreign Judgments. 
fa English law: 
Thee are various theories regarding the foundation 
Enforcement of 
of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 
A( 1). Non- merger theory. Under English domestic law, 
by the theory of the quasi- contract of litis- contestation 
( or contract of record) the cause of action is deemed 
to have merged into the judgment so that the petitioner 
after recovering it is precluded from suing again, the 
same respondent on that original cause. 
See Duchess Kingston's case 11 Sm.h.C.11th Ed.p.731 44x 44x P 
King v. Hoare ( 1844) M & W 494, 504. ' 
This rule does, however, not apl3ÿto fo-re.i:gn --, tpJ 
judgments and thus the petitioner by reason of the so- 
called non- merger theory may sue on the original cause 
of action as well as on the judgment obtained abroad; the 
petitioner will choose the first alternative when he 
failed to establidh his claim in the whole or in part. 
Smith v. Nicolls 8 LU CP 92, Hall v. Odber 11,East 118 , 
Bank pf Australasia v. Harding ( 1850) 9 CB 661, 
Bank of Australasia v. Nias ( 1851) 16 QB 717. 
In both cases mentioned above ( action on the original 
cause of action or action on the foreign judgment) the 
foreign judgment produced before the Court was previously 
deemed to be merely " prima facie evidence " and the 
merits could be put in issue again and re- tried. 
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Houlditch v. Donegal) 2 Cl and F 470, 
Ricardo v. Garcias 12 Cl. and F 368, 
Walker v. Witter 1, Dougl 1; 
Sinclair v. Fraser 1 Douglas 5, 
ItwkS M4 until the decision of Godard. v.Gray LR QB 139,see 
also point (3) that the rule was laid down that a foregn 
judgment is as conclusive as a domestic one and,therefore, 
not reviewable or impeachable except on s-necial grounds 
as,for instance,for want of jurisdiction,for fraud or 
for infringement of the principle of public policy or of 
.natural justice,see p. 278. 
According; to t he Bh c:J.ish case Pemberton v.Hughes ( 1899) 
1 Ch.781,790 (AC) no challenge to res judicata is possible 
even where irregularities of procedure have occurred,if, 
the court is a competent court acting within its juris- 
diction and no substantial injustice according to English 
ideaaha.s been done; as long as the judgment is not re- 
versed by that foreign court which pronounced it,it is 
regarded as valid: by English Courts. The view that a 
foreign judgment was merely "prima facie evidenceTTwas the 
main basis of the non -merger theory;although this view was 
abandoned and replaced by the well settled rules on recognition 
of foreign judgment (see (3 )post, the non -merger theory as 
regards foreign judgments still prevails under English law, 
Barber v.Lamb 8 CB (NS) 95, Yet this theory is less important 
now,since in case(only)when a party who has obtained a judgment 
rendered abroad in his favpur, choses to sue again in an 
English court on the original cause, this: ,theory prevent the 
defendant from pleading res judicata and thus 
results in allowing him to become 
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uxxlztiggIMNIX liable for the costs of the new proceedings, 
unless that foreign judgment has been satisfied prior to 
those proceedings. 
(2) Theory of comity: It has been held that the princirle 
of comity was the foundation of recognition and enforce- 
ment of foreign judgments and that each country may re- 
gulate the terms of that comity; thus it was also held 
permissible to examine into the merits of. the forei 
judgment. 
This theory was expounded in Castrinue v. Iinrie 
LR 4 HL 414. 
In U.S.A. this theory still rules the recognition of 
tuceme tsi?ronounced by courts of foreign countries. 
See judgment of the Supreme Court of U.S.A. in Hulton v. 
Guyot ( 1895) 199 U.S. 113, at 163 ÿer Gray J. : 
" No law has any effect of its own force, beyond the 
limits of the sovereignity from which its authority 
is derived. The extent to which the law of one 
nation, 3.s put in force within its territory,whether 
by executive order, by legislative act,or by judi- 
cial decree, shall be allowed to operate within 
the dominion of another nation, depends upon what 
our greatest jurists have been content to call 
'the comity of nations '. .... 
rr Comity in the legal sense is neither a matter of 
absolute obligction,on the one hand, nor of more 
courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is 
the recognition which one nation having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience and to 
the rights of its own citizens, or the persons who 
are under the protection of its own . 
Fordetailed discussion,esrecially with regard to judgmmits 
rendered by a court of a state of the Union reference 
is made to p. $,254 post. 
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( 6) Theory of legal obligation,called also the theory of vested right 
The theory of comity was because of its vague character 
abandoned and replaced by the more fitting theory of 
legal obligation. It has repeatedly been laid dorn in 
the decisions that a-rrthe basis of enforcement of foreign 
judgments where a competent Court has adjudicated a cer- 
tain sum to be due, is a legal obligation arising from 
this judgment,te pay that sum and that legal obligation 
may be enforced by an English Court when called upon to 
do so. 
See Russell v. Smyth 9 M and W 810, 
Williams v. Jones 14, IJE 414, 
Goaard v. uray LR 6 QB139, 
Schibsby v. rc stenholz LR 6 QB 155, 
Harris v. Taylor ( 1915) 2 IB 580. 
Asstated above, the rules governing the incidents of 
marriage including divorce are different in the different 
countries; this flows from the character of marriage as 
an institution in which the state takes a great interest. 
By the view based on the status theory the answer to the 
;question whether a marriage may be dissolved at all or 
under what circiunstar.ces or conditions it may be dissolved, 
'varies according to the domicil of the spouses for the time 
being; this applies also in case of change of domicil. 
the existence of the status, that is to say, the marriage 
itself or the change of the status effectuated by a decree 
of divorce, on the other hand,constitute v e s t e d 
j rights. of the individuals concerned which as a:.rule remain unaffected 
by change of domicil . 
-223- 
.Foreign judgments pleaded in defence. (exceptio rei 
judictae). 
(B) A foreign judgment may also be pleaded in defence 
(ither because it is a decree of dismissal or it has al- 
ready been put into execution and satisfied. 
The Courts always held that there is a distinction bet - 
ween being; called upon to enforce a foreign judgment and 
.sustaining it in defence; in the latter case they 
declared it to be non- examinable upon the merits except 
for specified defects. Thus foreign and domestic judgments 
are on the same footing in regard to the plea of res 
judicata. 
See Ricardo v. Garcias 12 Cl and F. 368 , 
Schibsby v. V estenholz LR 6 QB 155, 
Barber v. Iamb 29, 14 CF 234. 
The reason for this distinction given in Philips v.Htrnter 
h.. 
. 
.2 I 402 by Eyre C.J. is that in the case of applying 
for enforcing a foreign judgment t.'is thereby voluntarily 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the English Courts and 
treated not as obligatory to the full extent as domestic 
judgments; at any rate, the judgment must be properly 
pleaded by way of estoppel. A similar distinction betwelen 
action and plea is to be found. in the common law rules 
concerning estoppels; estoppel is a rule whereby a party 
is precluded from denying the existence of some state of 
facts which he or she has formerly asserted ( 1) by deeid, 
or ( 'P) by conduct, or ( 3) by way of the quasi contradt 
of litis contestation; the latter is called 't estoppel 
by record" and the finding of the Court on certain facts 
.. 
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that have been in issue must be accepted as truth by the 
parties to the judgment. There is L. Common Law. 
that a defence only, but not an action, can be founded on 
estoppels by deed or conduct; Low v. Bouverie ( 1891) 
Ch 82 at 105 per Bowen L.J. " Estoppel is only a rule of 
evidence. You cannot found an action upon estoppel. 
Estoppel is only important as being one step in the 
progress towards relief on the hypothesis that the defen- 
dant is estopped from denying the truth of something which 
he has said." 
Exceptional Treatment of Divorce Decrees. 
0 (1). From the rules based on the theories discussed 
lande_ points A ( 1) and ( 2) the Courts admitted,even 
before the theory of legal obligation had developed, 
certain exceptions, namely, judgments in cases of peculiar 
jurisdiction, such as concerning questions of status; 
such judgments were deemed to be not reviewable upon the 
merits, subject, of course, to some specified pleas. 
The reason given for the exceptional treatment is the 
expediency of having such questions settled once and for 
all in the Courts which the parties were at first 
amenable. See Harve .v.Farnie ( 1882) (CA) 6PD 35 (Hh)8AC 43. 
Barter v. Bater ( 1906) P 209. 
'Pemberton v. Hughes ( 1899) 1 CH 788. 
(2) That exceptional treatment of judgments concerning 
status ( decrees of divorce) is also to be found in the 
Scottish decisions Southgate v. Montgomerie (1837) 
15 S 507, 519 and Boe v.Anderson (1857) 20 D 11 where 
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he Court held that there is a sound principle in the 
distinction between being called upon to enforce a foreign 
judgment, and sustaining it in defence as exceptio rei 
judicatae and that in the former case the judgment is 
examinable but not in the latter; Lord Medwyr_ after re- 
viewing the authorities on this principle continued then 
at page 519; 
ti Certain exceptions are admitted, but still, 
I think, they do not trench upon the general 
rule... judgment in cases of peculiar jurisdiction, 
such as questions of status, the reason,being to 
be found in the admitted expediency of having &u h 
questions settled once and for ever in the courts 
to which the parties were at first amenable and 
also in the obedience which in former times was 
given to the ecclesiastical courts throughout 
Christendom in matters within their jurisdiction". 
Conclusiveness of Judgment as to iliariScii:Ctj;bn3 t1;._ 
(A) . (1) . English law : The rule as to cbnclusiIrenes ;. 
relative to the merits of a case applies to the, findings 
as to jurisdictional facts only when the latter ha ebeen 
an issue before the Court. 
See De Mora v. Concha ( 1885) 28, Ch. 268, 276. 
In this case the question of domicil has been a non- 
essential issue and the Court of Appeal declined to accept 
the suggested propodition that a judgment in rem decides 
conclusively against all the world, not merely the titles, 
rights, or disposition of property which it necessarily 
determines, but also the questions of fact upon which such 
adjudication proceeded; but held that in the case of pro- 
bate the adjudication as to domicil could only conclade 
the parties to the suit and their privies, and even this 
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.only because there has been an express though unusual 
finding as to domicil which has probably been given at 
the special request of the parties. 
In re Trufort, Trafford v. Blanc ( 1887) 36 ChD 600 
where the finding of a Swiss Court as to jurisdiction 
were contested by plaintiff, the Court after reviewing 
the authorities as to conclusiveness of foreign jùdgments 
especially Castrique v. Imrie LR 4 ß-3Z 414 and 
Godard v. Gray LR 6 QB 139 relied upon De CossL Brissac 
v. Bathbone 6 H and N 301 as to the question whether the 
conclusiveness of a foreign judgment was affected by dis- 
covery of fresh evidence; Stirling J at p.617 said 
ii consequently this is a decision that a fore'n 
judgment binds, nothwithstanding the discovery of 
fresh evidence and although the whole of the facts 
were not before the foreign tribunal at the time 
it delivered its decision... 
Every system of jurisprudence provides a mode by 
which a judgment may be reviewed and a cause re- 
heard on the discovery of fresh evidence; and to 
the regular mode so provided recourse ought to be 
had, as in fact has been unsuccessfully done by 
the defendant in the present caseTT. 
The same view has been taken as regards the conclusiveness 
of findings on jurisdictional facts in Bater. v.Bater (1906) 
P 209 per 
IT It is submitted that this subsequent inquiry as 
to whether the foreign. courts Own rule of juris- 
diction has been complied with, is contrary to 
the fundamental principle on which the law of 
foreign judgments is based. The English Courts 
never go into the question whether the foreign 
court has correctly interpreted. n 
It may be observed that the question of domicil involved 
in that ease is at least a mixed question of law and 
fact and the conclusion cited above is material to the 
subject here discussed. 
of 
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By the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction 
Act 1926 ( 16 and 17 Geo 5 c. 40) it was provided that 
the decrees of Divorce are to be recognised by the 
¡English High Court or the Scottish Court of Session and 
their registration is to be allowed if: 
( 1) The Indian_ Court had jurisdiction according to 
the Act of 1926, as stated on p.241 
(2) the Court administered the principles followed from 
time to time by the High Court in England, 
(3) the decree:of divorce has been granted on a ground 
recognised by English law. 
By this Act is also provided that the findings of the 
Indian Court as to " domicil " La binding on all the 
Courts of the three countries concerned, i.e. England, 
Scotland and India. 
This is the only statutory provision concerning recognition 
of findings as to jurisdictional facts. 
U.S.A. law : 
The requirements for recognition of foreign judgments 
are laid dot'm in 429 - 430 Of theRèstatomott of. 
of laws according to the usual practice of the Courts 
of U.S.A. 
For a further discqssion on this subjedt it may be re- 
ferred to p.;5?- 
In accordance with the decision in Thomson v.Wightraan 
(18 Wall 457 U.S. 1873), the restatement adopted the 
view that even though there is jurisdiction in the in- 
ternational sense, yet where an inttastate limitation 
of the jurisdiction of the court has been violated, 
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a judgment may be collaterally attached in another 
state as not being within the cdImpetency of the court. 
In earlier decisions it has been held that questions aS 
to jurisdiction were re- examinable on the reasoning that 
a court could not confer upon itself the requisite power 
to decide a case by a mere finding that it had the 
jurisdiction. The doctrin of res judicata applied only 
to non- jurisdictional issues of law in cases where the 
court had jurisdiction over the parties. 
In later decisions with r gard to the full faith and 
credit clause and with regard to the due process clau4, 
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, it was 
held that foreign judgments were to be recognised not 
because of the doctrine of comity but with regard to those 
constitutional provisions just mentioned which demand 
the recognition of judgments by a sister state; in these 
later decisions the courts tool: the; view'. tto théeeff.ect 
that records reciting jurisdiction must be given full 
faith and credit ; other decisions, however, are still 
to the contrary on the theory that in case where 
there is involved an ex parte finding the record was not 
conclusive. Some courts took the view that if litigated 
the other spouse was even by lack of jurisdiction 
estopped in any private matter from thereafter disputing 
the validity of the decree of divorce but not in a 
matter involving the question of status.. 
Gibbs v. Gibbs 26 Utah 382, 73 P 641 ( 1903). But this 
doctrine was abandoned in the case of Gould v.Gould 
235 NY 14, 138 NE 490 ( 1923). 
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,Finally, in Davis v. Davis 59 Supreme Court 3 (Nov.7,1938) 
it was held that since upon special ,.ppearance the issue 
of " domicil" of the petitioner has been ligitated,tha 
decree, based.on the finding of domicil, is entitled to 
full faith and credit. 
. rhis td'eA'Tof conclusiveness as to jurisdictional ; 
facts was brought to its logical conclusion in the case, 
of Stall v. Gottlieb ( 305 US 165,1938) in which it was 
laid down that litigation resolved a jurisdictional x.z. 4,- 
question conclusively, on the reasoning that a party is .F f 
entitled to but one trial and that at that proceeding he or 
she should have the burden of presenting his entire case. 
German law: 
By the decision of the Imperial Court RG 75.147 it was 
laid down that the findings of the foreign court as to 
the facts constituting jurisdiction were not reviewable 
even in case of a judgment in default. 
Finality and Conclusiveness of judgment. 
In general. 
( a) The claim against the state to have oneTs private 
right protected by the courts in case where it is threatened, 
disturbed, or not satisfied, has been termed. by the 
German writer Wach " Rechtschutzanspruch'T as distinct from 
thatprivate right itself. The most important requirement 
of recognition and enforcement of judgments is their 
finality and conclusiveness. There is to be distinguished 
between conclusiveness of judgment ( German term 
" materielle Rechtskraft ") and procedural finality 
( German term " Formelle Rechtskraft "); the former is a 
notion of substantive law, the latter one of procedure. 
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By conclusiveness is meant that the findings of the 
court as to the " Rechtsschutzanspruch" involved are 
not controvertible, binding and authoritative; all these 
characteristics are attached to a conclusive judgment 
even if the judgment is wrong by error in law or in fact. 
The adjudication upon_ a matter by a final judgment 
engenders a legal title not by re.son of its being lawful 
but only by virtue of the authoritative power inherent 
in that judgment and attached to it by law. On the 
foundation of that principle there is a great divergence 
of opinions among the writers on this subject; the judgment 
has been said to be binding because 
(1) it is lawful ( Savigny, Unger) 
(2) it is.analogous to law ( BZìlow) 
( 3) it saves the courts from the trouble of re- opening 
disputes already adjudicated upon ( J.Chr.Schwartz, 
Hellwig), 
l4) it conforms tto the duty of the state of preserving 
peace and order ( Paulus , Bind er) , 
(5) it is in the interest of the state in the legal 
security that there should be an end of litigation 
and the private legal relations should once and 
for all be secured. 
( Bernatzik, Klein, Loeffler,Pollak). 
See 
See para. 322 of the German Code of Civil Procedure 
conceriiii "Materielle Rechtskraft " . The courts on 
their own motion are bound. to enquire as to whether 
there has already been rendered a final judgment on the 
same subject- matter between the same parties and to 
refuse to adjudicate upon that matter a,gain. 
Under English law the fundamental doctrine of res judic to 
( conclusiveness of judgment ),applicable to all courts 
that there must be an end of litigation,was expounded 
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in the decision. of Re May (1885) 28, Ch D. 516 C.A. 
(b) Procedural finality of Judgment. ("Formelle Rechtskraft)" 
The pre- supposition of the substantive conclusiveness 
of judgment is its procedural finality. Whereas the 
substantive finality of judgment means its being non - 
con pert. and binding, by procedural finality of 
judgment is meant this that it is unalterable by the 
Court which pronounced it and incontestable by ordinary 
procedural means ( appeal, recourse, revision (review) 
declaration of opposure in default cases i.e. opening 
a default and application for procedural reinstatement. 
In certain exceptional specified cases of hardship and 
miscarriage of judgment the law allows the procedural 
finality of a judgment to be set aside by extraordinary 
procedural measures, such as : 
( 1) an application for re- opening of proceedings, 
( retrial or rehearing) 
( 2) an action of nullity. 
When the judgment is immune from attack to ordinary legal 
a 
measures either because an appel therefrm has been dis- 
h 
missed or because the period to appeal has expired it 
becomes final and may be put into execution; that it is 
still assailable by the extraordinary procedural recourses 
does not prevent the judgment from being final; as long 
as it is not reversed, it remains final. This is the 
rule under German law according to para. 705 Code of .arc 4.4.- .$..s..( 
Civil Procedure ( " Formelle Rechtskraft )", 
Under English law by finality is meant that the decree 
is unalterable in the court which pronounced it and it 
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does not matter that it is assailable by appeal to a 
higher court or by extraordinary recourses. 
See Nouvion v. Freeman 37 Ch D. 244,255. 
Under French law finality is to be distinguished from 
irrevocability of a .judgment; by the latter notion it is 
menat that the ordinary recourses as well as the extra - 
ordinary ones are exhausted in respect of the-.judgment 
On the whole, the view of French law on IT finality" 
of a judgment conforms. to that of German law viz. a 
judL,uent becomes final where it is no longer subject to 
opposition or appeal, 
The Limits of Conclusiveness of judgment. 
(1) The principle of conclusiveness of judgment explained 
above i.e. its binding power upon the parties and the 
court ap-plies to the enacting part only of the judgment 
( French term: " dispositiveT' , German term:" Urteilsformel"), 
viz. the material point which it decides, but neither to 
its presuppositions nor to subsequent facts constituting 
a new cause of aTTRechtsschut? s.pilUcl}TT;this term has been 
explained on page,-9,29 thus in case of a decree of dis- 
missal, where a new fact constituting a ground for divorce 
occurs after that decree a fresh petition for divorce may 
be founded thereon. Finney v.Finney (1868) 1 P & D 483. 
See paras. 322, and 616 of the German Code of Civil Provedure. c.// 
Under the different systems of law different rules subsist 
concerning the question how far alterations as to 
income of the obligee subsequent to a maintenance order 
affect such order. 
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For the English rules on this subject reference may be 
made to the heading. "Finality of maintenance orders" 
Iß,292 
By para.323 of the German Code of Civil Procedure it is 
enacted that such alterations may affect future payments 
only and that the court is not competent to vary its 
judgment in respect of the instalments .elilready accrued 
due. 
Such provisions as to variation of maintenance orders 
are, at any rate, exceptions to the rifles flowing from 
the definition of " conclusiveness " of judgments given 
above since such factual alterations are not of such a 
character as to constitute a cause of action. 
Finally, in order that issues, such as 11)res1 -PP. ositior ,_,to 
a judgment, may become conclusive , they must be made 
the object of a declaratory interlocutory judgment, 
mentioned above on p.1:4 
C h a p t e r XIII. 
Recognition of decrees of divorce. General observations, 
(1) . The recognition of judments is under all systems of 
law concerned differently treated from enforcement of 
judgments since the latter involves proceedings leading 
to :.t.o material execution on property or to constraint 
of persons, and therefore more stringent requirements 
have to be complied with. Judgments may, on the other 
hand, have full effect, independently of the question 
whether or not they are put into execution. The trans- 
cription of a deo;ree of divorce upon the registers of 
Civil Status, or the use of such decree as a plea to an 
action are cases in which recognition only as distinct 
from enforcement is required. 
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By French jurisprudence this character of a judgment 
is called U l' autoritê de la chose jugêe TT by which 
is meant that the judgment is conclusive as res jiidicata, 
but has no executory force ; a judgment may, in fact, 
be final and conclusive but not enforceable at all, 
as for instance, a declaratory judgment which declares 
only a civil right to be existent or inexistent; the same 
applies to a judgment in rem viz: a decree of divorce 
which operates immediately amdabsolutely upon the status. 
Prom the fo.coing observations it is clear that finality 
and conclusiveness,on the one hand,and enforcSab l y, 
on the other hand, are not inseparable characteristics 
of judgments. 
(2). One of the reqúirements of recognition is the 
subsistence of the foreign court's jurisdiction in the 
international sense of the term, as distinct from juris- 
diction in the territorial ( domestic) sense of the term. 
Hence first of all it is to be ascertained whether the 
foreign court had jurisdiction to pronounce the decree 
in question according to the conflict rules of the lex 
fori. 
It is, as a ril e, immaterial whether the foreign court 
had territorial ( domestic) jurisdiction; i.e. whether the plArticular 
CoUrbNas authorised by the municipal law of the country to 
which it belongs rat :.one materiae personae and loci 
to pronounce the degree in question. Momestic competence "). 
International jurisdiction of the foreign court is a 
requirement of recognition of a foreign decree of divorce 
under the laws concerned except Italian law,by which both 
the international and the territorial ( domestic)juris- 
diction of the foreign court are required. 
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glish law: 
First of all, it must be noticed that the Courts of 
kny British dominion, colony, posse Sion, protectorate 
Or mandated State, as well as those of Scotland,Northern 
Ireland, the Channels Islands and the Il.e of Man must 
be treated as foreign courts for the purpose of the 
Divorce jurisdiction and of recognition of decrees of 
divorce. Yelverton v. Yelverton ( 1859) 1 S and T.574. 
The sole test of jurisdiction in matters of divorce is 
the domicil of the husband at the date of institution 
of the suit for divorce, subject to some qualifications 
.which will be consideredlater. The courts of the country 
where the husband is domiciled at.the institution of 
the suit for divorce have jurisdiction to pronounce a 
decree of divorce; this rule was definitely laid down 
in the case of Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier (1895) A.C.517. 
pee also the decisions Bater v. Buter 1906 P 269, 
superintendent Registrar of marriages for Hammersmith 
ex p. Mir Anwaraddin 1917, 1 KB 634, Keyes v.K.1921 P 204, 
Lord Advocate v.Jaffrey 1921, 1 AC 146, AG for 
Alberta v. Cook ( 1926) AC 444, 
H. v.H. ( 1928) P 206 and Herd v. Herd (1936) 2.205. 
ireviously the courts based jurisdiction in divorce on 
ifferent grounds such as on: 
(1). Place of the celebration of the marriage: 
In Lolley's case ( 1812) Ru & Ry 237 the judges held 
that no sentence or act of any foreign country or state 
could dissolve an English marriage ( i.e. a marriage 
contracted ttid èélebratéd in England )a vinculo 
matrimonii for a ground on which it was not liable to 
be dissolved a vinculo matrimonii in England. n 
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,Lolley contracted. his first marriage ink gland where 
he was domiciled;. after he took up a transient residence 
in Scotland: the wife obtained a decree of divorce from 
the Scottish Court on the ground of his adultery.Lolley 
remarried in England and was found guilty of bigamy. The 
resolution of the judges in I,bUey's case was based on 
the contractual theory of marriage under which only the 
lex loci contractus ( the law of the celebration og the 
marriage ) controlled the marriage status. It is to be 
observed that at that time, before Ihe:, passing' QÍ the 
CA. 1857 the marriage was under English law indissoluble, 
xcept by a private act of Parliament, and even this wa; 
or a wife available only on the ground of her husbands 
dultery w i t h aggravating circumstances. 
he rule laid down in IolleyTs case was followed by some 
ecisions, even after 1857, in Dolphins v. Robins 
1859) 7 ILL. 390 Wilson's Trusts ( 1865) LR 1 Eq.247, 
Shaw v. Att. Gen. (1870) LR 2 P & M 161 but finally 
overruled by Harvey v. Farnie (1882) (CA) 6PD 35,HL,8C A 43. 
A Scotsman, Farnie, who was domiciled in Scotland, 
married an EnElishwoman in England; and they afterwards 
resided in Scotland where he was divorced at the suit 
of his wife for his adultery. She ma. _vied the petitioner 
in England who subsequently brought a petition for 
annulment of the marriage. Although reliance was placed 
by the petitioner on the resolution in LolleyTs case,it 
was held that the Scottish sentence dissolving the first 
marriage was to be deemed valid in England and by all 
other countries in the world, since it.has been rendered 
by the competent court of the domicil of the parties. 
See also Briggsv. Brigs ( 1890), 5 PD 163, 
Bater v. Bater ( 190G) P 209. 
Thence it is well settled that a divorce pronounced:ybyhthe 
competent court of the domicil of the parties for what 
ever ground is valid everywhere irrespective as well of 
the matrimonial domicil as of the place of the celebration 
of the marriages subject to the requirements for 
recognition as to foreign decrees of divorce discussed 
unter the heading on p.2`ß .. 
( 2) Allegiance: Deck -Deck (1860) 2 OwE Tr90; the 
husband. after having abandoned his English domicil and al- 
hdughdomiciled in America was declared to be bound by 
allegiance by the rules governing English divorce law; 
This decision was followed by Bond v. Bond (1860) 
Sw 80 Tr 93 . 
(3).Residence : In Brodie v. Brodie ( 1861) 2 Sw & Tr 259 
both of the spouses were domiciled in Australia, the 
husband, resident in England ; the courts followed the 
C.' 17 
decisions of ' the Ecclesiastical courts under which 
residence within the TT diocese TT was the ground for 
jurisdiction. The reference to the Matrimonial Clauses Act 
of 1857, however, was unfounded since para. 27 was not I 
applicable; the decisions of the Eccl. Courts a etheto`ther hand,are 
nonbinding nor persuasive as regards d i v o r c e m a t te rs. 
(4) . TT Matrimonial domicil TT . The doctrine of 
domicil was applied in the cases of 
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Tellemach.. v. Tellemache ( 1859) 1 Sw & tr 557, 
Yelverton Yelverton ( 1859) 1 sw & ír. .574, 
Brodie v. Brodie ( 1861) 2 sw & tr.259, 
Manning v. Manning ( 1871) LR 2 p 7 D 223, 
Wilson v. Wilson ( 1872) LR 2 P &. D 435 
liiboyet v. Niboyet ( 1878) 4 PD 1. 
The definition of " m_'trimonizl domicil " to be found 
in those decisions is very vague; it was defined as 
a bona fide " residence which has not been resorted to 
for the mere purpose of getting a divorce which was not 
obtainable in the country of domicil " or as the place 
where it is the duty of the wife to rejoin her husband". 
This theory has developed principally in Scotland. 
(5). Locus delicti commissi : This was based on the penal 
theory of divorce.Thectheory by which the petition for 
ivorce might be brought in the court of the place ;There 
he marital offence has been committed was rejected in 
radford v. Bradford ( 1878) 4 PD. 72.73 
Dodd v. Dodd ( 1906) P. 189. 
( 6). Submission to the jurisdiction , express or implied. 
In Callwell v. Callwell ( 1860) 3 Sw & tr 259, the court 
exercised the jurisdiction in divorce although the 
husband was not domiciled in England because the wife 
(responiep,t) did not object to jurisdiction. 
(7) Place of. desertion: ( Jurisdiction ex necessitate). 
In Rudd v. Rudd 40 TIR 197 it was held that the deserted 
wife retained her domicil in the place of desertion as 
basis for her divorce petition and following dicta it 
the cases of:. 
+Niboyet v. Niboyet 4 PD 1, 14; 
!Armitage v. Armitage ( 1898) P 178,185, 
tater v. Bater ( 1906) P 209,215-216, 
Ogden v. Ogden ( 1908) P 46,82, 
the courts exercised in the cases 
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-Stathatos v. Stathatos 29 TLR 54 and 
De Montaigu v. De Montaigu LR ( 1913) P 154 
jurisdiction on the basis of the deserted wifers separate 
domicil in England, although her husband had acquired a 
domicil in a foreign country where he procured an 
annulment of the marriage. 
hese cases were definitely overruled by the decisions 
á° 
'n Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier ( 18) AO 517, 
H. v. H. ( 1928Q P 206, and 
Herd v. Herd( 1936) P 205. 
The following are exceptions to the rule of domicil as 
test of jurisdiction in matters of divorce; 
( 1). In order to remove the hardship arising from 
change of domicil.by the deserting husband,above dis- + 
cussed, sec. 13 of the MCA. 1937 provides that an English fití 0` 
court has jurisdiction i eeproceedings where a wife! .d 
has been deserted by her husband who was immediately 
J" ez? 
before such desertion domiciled in England or Wales 
'L4InAllijli 
notwithstanding that the husband has changed his domicil 
since the desertion; the same applies in the case of 
deportation of the husband. 
Some cases of hardship of a deserted wife will still .b 
lot removable despite sect. 13 of MCA. Thus where a 
foreigner having no domicil in Englandor Wales desertsi 
his wife of British 1 ationality which he married in 
England, and goes abroad, or 
where a husband changes his English domicil to a foreign 
and deserts his wife afterwards. 
At any rate, this sect. 13 of the MCA. means an advanced 
step towards assimilation to the rules governing a married 
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woman's separate domicil under the law of USA. 
It is doubtful whether English courts will recognise 
decrees of divorce rendered by foreign courts whose juris- 
diction is based on similar grounds as those regulated. 
in sect. 13 of the MCA.(1937). It is clear that in case 
where such a decree is recognised by the law of the 
spouses' domicil English courts will also recognise the 
decree according to the rules laid down in Armitage v. 
Attorney Gen.(1906) P. 135 discussed above on p.4A 
It may be that international reciprocity will lead 
English courts tò recognise such a decree even if it is, 
not recognised by the law of the husband's domicil, 
Although English courts 'tiometimes exercise jurisdiction on 
a. `round which they do not deem recognisable as regards 
foreign courts there is the case of Philipps v.Bato 
( 1913) 3 K B 25 which could support the proposition 
.mentioned above. 
Under SC rule XI actions in personam are served pit of 
jurisdiction upon absent foreigners and the respective 
judgment3 are enforced by English courts but when asked 
to enforce a judgment of a foreign court against an 
Englishman served in the same way, English courts decli e 
to do so on the ground that such procedure is contrary 
to the principle of international law. Yet in that case 
A 
of Philipps v. Bato an exception to this rule has been 
made in the case of a foreign judgment in personam con- 
cerning a matter accessory to divorce, as awarding dama eá 
to be paid by the co.wrespondent to the plaintiff,on the 
reasoning that the English court could not grant that 
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relief and the petitioner had to institute the respective 
proceedings in the foreign court.Although the decisión 
applies in terms only to the case of a "foreign country 
which is part of.the British Empire" and leaves the case 
of a judgment in any other foreign country op en, the same 
reason would apply to a case in which a deserted wife 
would be compelled to petition for divorce in the court 
of her husband's last domicil because of her being deserted 
under circumstances similar to those specified by sect.13 
of the MCA Act 1937.For these reasons it may be presumed 
that English courts will recognise a decree of divorce 
rendered by a court whose jurisdiction is based on grow n.ds 
similar to those laid down by sect.13 of the MCA .1937. 
(2). Matrimonial Causes (Dominion Troops)Act.(1919) 
(9 and 10 Gee 5 c 28)provides that where a marriage was 
goni:racted in the United Kingdom during the Great War by 
a member of His Majesty's Forces domiciled in any of His 
possessions or protectorates to which this Act applies 
the competent British Court in that part of the United 
Kingdom where the marriage took place has regardless of 
any question of domicil or residence jurisdiction to pro- 
nounce a decree of divorce,Provided that the married pair 
have at no time since the marriage residem4 in the country 
of the husband's domicil.This Act applies only to petitions 
which were commenced one year after the passing thereof. 
(3)By the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act 
(1926) 16 and 17 Geo,5 a 40)Indian Courts exercise juris- 
diction in natters of divorce over British subjects domi- 
ciled in England or Scotland in cases where the 
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mare ,ge has been solemnised in India or the marital 
offence conipla;ined of has bean committed in India; 
the petitioner must reside in India t the time of filing 
the petition and the last common home of the spouses 
:must also have been in India. 
The Indian court will refuse to exercise jurisdictbn in 
such a case if the petitioner is unable to show suffiec t 
cause why he or she is prevented from taking proceedingq 
in the courts of the country of his or her domicil. 
This Act has been extended to Kenya Colony ( Stat.Rul.& O. 
1928, Nr. 1635), further to 
the Straits Settlements ( S.R. & O. 1931, Nos.851,1103 
Jamaica ( S.R.& 0. 1932, Nos. 475,646,) 
tnongkone, ( S.R.& 0.,1935, No. 836) and 
Ceylon ( S.R.& 0. 1936, No. 562) . 
(4). Exception with regard to co- respondent: 
-. -- 
The jurisdiction over 'co- respondent is irrespective of 
their domicil, residence or nationality; the service of 
process upon a foreigner may take place abroad without 
leave in proceedings for divorce according to S.C.R.O.XI 
and li.C.Rule 9, but such order lacking the requirement 
of international jurisdiction will not be enforcéàbie ;py 
h foreign court, except a Scottish court under the judgment 
- xtension Act,1868 . 
l 
Rayment v. Rayment ( 1910) P . 271 and 
!Rush v.Rush(1920) 2. 242. 
Whereas domicil is the sole test of jurisdiction in 
divorce as above stated, English courts excercise 
jurisdiction to annul a void marriage 
4.a 
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(1) when the marriage was celebrated in England,or 
(2)where the parties are domiciled in England,or 
(3)where the parties are resident in England; 
finally the English courts exercise jurisdiction in petitions 
for a judicial separation where both parties to the marriage 
are resident or domiciled in Engglarf . 
Recognition of foreign judgments o ivor.ceL 
At common law English courts recognise a decree of disso- 
lution of marriage if the parties i.e.the husband has his 
domicil in the country ; of the court which has pronounced 
it;the wife's domicil follows that of her husband.This rule 
as to recognition of a foreign decree of divorce was ex- 
pressly stated in the decision of Shaw v.Gould (1868)12 3 HI, 55 
and in H Prvey v.Farnie (1882) AC 43,6 PD.35,in which latter 
case the theory of the exclusive jurisdiction of the so- called 
"English marriage" was expressly disapproved. In 
Pemberton c.Hughes(1899)1 Ch 781 a. decree of divorce on the 
ground of violent and ungovernable temper of the wife which 
was rendered by a court in Florida,was recognised by an 
English court,although the ground of divorce relied on was 
not admitted under English law.English courts also recoga ise 
a foreign decree of divorce although pronounced by a court 
other than that of the husband's domicil,provided that the 
law of the latter recognises it as well;decision of Armitage 
v. A.G.(1906)P.135. This proposition was by comparing the 
nature of a decree of nullity with that of a decree of divorce 
also clearly laid down in the nullity case of Salvesen v. 
Administrator of Austrian Proper.ty,(1927) AC 641;in this 
decision the principle has been established that a decree of 
nullity of marriage rendered by a court of the domicil is to 
be recognised in the English courts.It is doubtful 
'whether. English courts will 
see page 196 
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recognise foreign decrees of divorce rendered by non- 
judicial authorities; the recognitionof a religious 
divorce by Talaale was refused in R.v. Superintendent 
Registrar of marriages Hammersmith (1897) 1 KB 634; 
but cf.Sasson v.Sasson (1924) AC l067 in which case 
divorce of English subjects of Jewish religion domiciled 
A 
in Egypt, granted by a Rabbinical authority at Alexandria 
wasrecognised,and Spivak v.Spivak (193 6) 46 T.L.R. 243';245. 
Finally those two English Acts, namely the Indian and 
'Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act,1926, (16 & 17 Geo. e 4o ) 
;and the Matrimonial Causes (Dominion. Troops) Act,1919,; 
( 9 & lo Geo. 5 c 28) contain the rules as to recognition 
of foreign decrees of divorce, discussed above 
Territorial ( domestic ) Jurisdiction. 
This subject is treated merely in order to contrast 
the rules as to domestic juri.:duction with those con- 
trolling international jurisdiction; yet it must be borne 
in mind that jurisdiction in the international {.sense oT 
I 
its term only is a requirement for recognition of foreign 
(decrees of divorce. 
;A court has domestic jurisdiction if it is selected 
ratione loci ( as regards locality i.e. venue ) in accOr- 
3 
dance with the provisions of the relative municipal la* 
and if it has by the same domestic regulations the 
authority to entertain the action of the type brought 
efore it, ( ratione materiae ). 
Foreigners are subject to the lex domicilii and therefore 
equally treated as British subjects are. At common law 
the plaintiff was free in selecting the venue; later 
the practice developed of allaying motions to change the 
venue for reasons of convenience. In ordinary proceedings 
the court now may fix the venue by an order for directions 
showing place and mode of trial. 
fetitions for divorce are tried before the Divorce 
pivision 
in London and according to Matr. Causes Assizes 
Order 1937 the following classes of matrimonial causes 
may be tried and determined by a Commissioner acting 
under a Commission of Assize: 
(a) undefended causes within the meaning of the 
Matr. Causes Rules of 1937 and 
(b) causes brought or defended under Part IV of the 
Order XVI RSC, which relates to proceedings by and 
against door Persons. 
The venue is in such a case the respective Assize town- 
but may on motion be changed, if hearing is desired at 
anot herAzsize town with regard to the location of the 
parties and proposed witnesses. 
Scottish law: International jurisdiction. 
The rule that domicil is the sole test of jurisdiction 
in proceedings for divorce, since the decision in Le 
Mesurier v. Le Mesurier is also part of Scottish law, 
subject to the statutory exceptions contained in 
the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act,1926, 
( 16 and 17 Geo. 5 c 40) and the 
Matrimonial Causes (Dominion Troops)Act,1919( 9 and 10 
Geo 5 c 28) 
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This rule was followed in the cases 
Low v. Low 19, R 115, Barkworth v. Barkworth,(1913)SC 759; 
ï:iaoKärion's Trust v. Inland Revenue (1920) Sc (HL)171. 
Brown v. Brown ( 1928) S0 542. 
i 
I,s to the grounds on which previously divorce jurisdiction 
Was exercised the following observations are to be made: 
1s to the 'T special matrimonial" domicil. The doctrine 
of theT'special matrimonial domicilTTas test of jurisdiction 
as principally developed bi)the Scottish courts in the 
cases Shield v. Shield 15, Ere-ria. 2nd Series 142, 
Jack v. Jack 24OS. 467, Hume v. Hume 24..x: End Series 1342; 
As to residence: The Scottish courts exercised jurisdiction 
in proceedings for divorce where the husband was resident 
there and the wife was personally cited; forty days're- 
sidence was originally required. 
As to submission : Jurisdiction could not be founded 
by submission on the part of a defendent, as stated in 
Ringer v. Churchill ( 1840) 2 D 307; but cf. 
Watts v. Watts ( 1885) 12 R 894, where the opposite view 
was taken, that .there was no duty on the part of the 
court to raise a question of jurisdiction in those un- 
defended cases. 0f..Redding v.Redding 1888 15 R 1102. 
As to locus delicti commissi : The theory of locus 
delicti commissi whereby the courts of the place where 
the marital offence has beer committed and the defender 
had been personally cited, had jurisdiction in divorce 
proceedings ( Warrender v. Warrender 1835 S & M L 154 aid 
Stavert v. Stavert 1882, 9 R 519) is now overruled. 
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I'lace of desertion ( jurisdiction ex necessitate): 
¡Scottish cases for that proosition are : 
olphin v. Robins, 7 HIC.390, Pitt v. Pitt 4 Macq.627, 
ladassa v. Southerland 1 F 621, 
Redding v. Redding;; 15 R 1102, 
Pabst v. Pabst 6 SIT 116, 
Stezart v. Stezart 13 SIT 668, 
Ramsay v. Ramsay(1925) SIT 104. 
But there was no jurisdiction of a court of another 
place than that of desertion. 
Redding v. Redding 15 R 102. These cases could also be 
treated as cases of locus delicti commissi. 
1 
The divorce ( Scotland Act) 1938 contains no provision 
similar to that of sec. 13 of the English MCA 1937; 
accordingly ;sottish courts decline to exercise jurisdiction 
ex necessitate in proceedings for divorce by a deserted 
wife. i,Iangrulkar v. Mangrulkar ( 1939) S,C 239 . 
Recognition of foreign decrees of divorce.under Scottish law. 
By the earlier decisions Birt v. Boutinez LR Paw D.487 
and Edmonstone v. Edmonstone 1816 FC ( cited by Fraser 
2 nd ed. p. 1331) it was held that the Scottish courts 
Iwillnot recognise as valid a foreign decree of divorce, 
'unless the ground_ of divorce be adultery or desertion. 
In Scotland tke . is- -N4Q4K -the law as to recognition L, 
assimilated to that of England. Those decisions are now 
overruled by the recent authorities of 
4.umphrey v. Humphrey (1895) 33 Sc IT 99 and 
CIS v. AB ( 1908)737 in which it has been pointed out 
that a foreign decree of divorce is entitled to recognition 
in Scotland even although the cause for which it was 
g 
C, 
, f 'j't` 
granted might not be such as would entitle spouses domi- 
ciled in Scotland to obtain a decree of divorce in the 
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Scottish courts. 
Self governing dominions : 
Domicil is the sole test of jurisdiction in divorce 
in all parts of the British Commonwealth with some 
exceptions, and the concept of domidi1 in the English 
sense of this term is recognized universally throughout 
the British Empire. 
Statutory provisions similar to that of sec. 13 of the 
English MCA 1937 have for long been in force in most IVy 
self,governing dominions. 
(a) Australia: In all Australian jurisdictions a statu -ory 
provision has obtained for many years whereunder a 
deserted wife is deemed to have retained her domicil 
at the time of desertion by her husband for the purposl 
of proceedings for divorce. 
(1) in New South Wales: s.16 of MCA,1899,Nr.14, as 
amended by the ActsNo.3 of 1922 
and Nr. 5 of 1929. 
( 2)in Queensland: s. 3 of the Act of 1923 Nr. 38, 
(3) South Australia :s.43 of the Act of 1929 Nr.1889 
(4) Tasmania: s. 3 of the Act of 1919 Nr. 65, 
(5) Victoria: s. 75 of the Act of 1928 Nr. 3726 
(6) Western Austlia: s.3 of the Act of 1929 Nr. 7, 
Ott 
(b) Canada: By the Dominion Act c 15 of 1930.äs provided 
:that where a married woman has been deserted and has been 
living apart from her husband for at least two years, 
and is still living, she may in any of the Canadian 
provinces possessing divorce jurisdiction petition :or 
divorce, notwithstanding that her husband may have 
ghanged his domicil, but provided that immediately prior 
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to the desertion was domiciled in the Province in which 
the proceedings are commenced, 
(c) New Zealand; Sec, 10 of the Divorce and T,atrimonial 
Causes Act of 1928 confers jurisdiction in divorce in the 
case of " any married person " domiciled in New Zealand . 
for two years at least immediately prior to the petition. 
Sec. 3 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes ( Amendment) 
Act of 1930 concerning a deserted wife provides as 
follows : 
" Where a wife living in New Zealand prays for divorc 
or_ any ground and has been living in New Zealand for 
not less than three years immediately preceding the 
filing of the petition, and has such intention of re- 
iding permanently in New Zcaland as would constitute 4 
''New Zealand domicil in the case of a feme sole, and haS 
been living apart from her husband, for a period excee - 
'ding three years, she shall he deemed to be domiciled ir_ 
New Zealand, and to have been at the time of the petition 
domiciled there for two years at least within the 
section 10 of the Act of 1928." 
(c1) Ind.ia and the British colonies: 
For the details on the Indian and. Colonial Divorce juris- 
diction Act 1926 ( 16 and 17 Geo 5, c,40) reference is 
made to p.P4 -. Insofar COmmon Law prevails in the 
British colonies the courts exercise jurisdiction in 
;divorce including recognition of foreign judgments in 
laccordance with the same principles as those followed 
in. England. 
t is noteworthy that the Divorce and Matrimonial Ordinance 
Hof 1934 of New Guinea which follows in its general 
, 
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: structure the legislation in force in Australian States, 
contains the following provisions as to the position 
of a deserted wife; 
(1) . A deserted wife whose husband was domiciled in the 
Territory at the time of desertion is deemed to retain` 
her territory domicil, notwithstanding a change of her, 
husband's domicil. 
(2). Similarly, a wife petitioning on the ground of 
ninon - payment of maintenance, whose husband was domiciled 
in the territory when the arder to pay maintenance or t he 
agreement for separation was made, retains her 
'Territory domicil, notwithstanding that her husband has 
acquired another domicil. 
(3). A wife petitioning for divorce on any ground. who 
'has been li tg in the Territory for not less than 
three years immediately proceä.ing the filing of the 
petition, and has such intention of residing in the 
Territory as would constitute a Territory domicil in 
the case of a single woman, and has been living apart 
from her husband for a period exceeding three years, 
is deemed to have a Territory domicil, and to have 
had this domicil for two years, 
-251- 
C h a p t e r XIV. 
A law on international jurisdiction. ..Y,ro,g_ 
The states of USA except the state of South Carolina -74-.4..A,4,1,. 
which does nöt recognise the institution of divorce fro ,., 
& II f 
bond of matrimony by their statuios exercise jurisdiction 
in divorce on different grounds, as matrimonial domicil, 
or separate domicil of either spouse or residence. 
It is clear that a decree of divorce rendered at the place - 
where both parties are domiciled is recognised everywhere. 
In most jurisdictions the matrimonial domicil is the scge 
test of jurisdiction; by matrimonial domicil is meant 
- according to the decision in the Haddock case - the 
place where the parties lived together with the intent 
of making that place their home and which was still 
the domicil of the one spouse when the suit for divorce 
was instituted. 
erkins v.Perkins 225 Mass. 82, Colleban v.Colleban 65 
isc. 172, 121 NY S 39. 
n other jurisdictions there is also Separate domicil 
of either spouse as stated in the Restatement recognised 
as test of jurisdiction: A state can exercise juris- 
diction to dissolve the marriage where one of the spouses 
is domiciled within the state and the other outside the 
state if (1) the spouse not domiciled has consented that 
he other acquire a separate home or by misconduct accor 
ding to the law of the state where they were domiciled at 
he time of separation, has ceased to have a right to 
bject to the acquisition of a separate home or is per- 
sonally subject to the jurisdiction of the state which 
grants the divorce or (2) the state is the last state 
-252- 
in which the spouses were domiciled together (para.113 
Restatement). In Morris v. Morris 160 Misc.59.289 , 
NY.Sup.636 Dom.Rel Court 1936, the court refused to 
allow a deserting husband to retain the power to change 
his wife's domicil, and in Delanoy v.Delanoy 216, 
Cal. 27.13 P 2nd 715.86 ALR 1321, 1932, the husband had 
to establish the pr 3r.kty of his separation from his 
wife as a jurisdictional requisite. The action may be 
nought at the domicil of either spouse 
ewal V. Sewall, 122 Mass.156.23 Am.Rep. 299.1877, 
atkins v. Watkins 135 Mass. 83,1885. 
13ut some statutes provide that the action for divorce 
(lust 
be brought at the domicil of the petitioner; in 
White v. White 18 RI 292.27 A.506,1893, an action for 
divorce by a wife brought at the domicil of her husband 
vitas dismissed because she was resident elsewhere. 
By para. 43 Restatement a judgment rendered without 
jurisdiction is invalid eveeyahere including the state of 
rendition. 
The statutory period of residence requirec'. for juris- 
lotion differs greatly in the diverse states, from 
hree months in Nevada to five years in Massachusetts. 
eco nition of foreign decrees; 
The courts of USA. recognise in general decrees of 
divorce pronounced by courts of other states of USA 
or foreign countries on the basis of the Matrimonial 
domicil i.e. the domicil of the husband. 
Although a wife may acquire a separate domicil of her 
own in case of consent or Muilt on the part of the 
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husband causing the separation, in such a case a decree) 
of divorce will be recognised under certain conditions 
only. In Atherton v. Atherton ( 1901) 181 US 155 the 
facts were as follows 
The husband domiciled in Kentucky married a woman domi- 2i4t44_,/ 
ciled in New YorT. The latter des rted her husband and 6 
returned to New York. The husband brought a suit for 
divorce in ,Kentucky and was successful; the wife also 
petitioned for divorce in the court of New York which 
declined to recognise the decree of the courtsL'ôf 
'Kentucky, but was required to do so according to the 
" full faith and credit clause." 
leading case on thi_ question is Haddock v. Haddock ! 
4 
. (1906) 201, US 562; the facts of this case are as follows: 40,` °a 
bhe spouses were livin îin New York; the husband went t 147 
Ç:or_necticut and was granted a decree of divorce there; 
tthe wife remaining in New York secured in New York a 
lecree of divorce and the decree of the court of Conn.ec-icut 
leas 
not recognised since New York was the matrimonial 
domicil; it was held that the New York court had lawful) y 
disregarded the Connecticut decree since the matrimoni j 
domicil had never been in Connecticut. 
The Haddock case does not ,purpo t:,to: ovOrrule the Atherton 
ase. In the Haddock- case Chief Justice White pointed 
out as follows: 
" It has, moreo "vex,bcen decided that where a bona 
fide domicil has been acquired in a state by eithe' 
of the parties tg a marriage , and a suit is brought 
by the domiciled party in such state for divorce, 
the courts og that state, if they acquire personal 
jurisdiction, also of the other party, have authority 
to enter a decree of divorce, entitled to be enforbed 
in every state by the full faith and credit clause" - 
1 
citing Chever v.Wilson,76 US 108. 
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The recognition of :ua.ch decrees of sister states flows 
of only from the principle of comity but it is also 
4 constitutional duty owing to the "fu1JPfaith and credit 
clause" art. IV of the Constitution which runs : 
" Full faith and credit shall be given to the public 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every 
other state. And the Congress may by general law 
prescribe the manner in which such acts,records 
and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect 
thereof." 
a decree of divore has been granted at the domicil hiere 
f one spouse alone without taking regard to the reouire- 
ents laid clown in the decisions cited above, there the 
6ourts of a sister state cannot be compelled to recognise 
such a decree since the full faith and credit clause is 
inapplicable thereto but voluntary recognition has been 
adopted by some states of the Union. See decision in 
Doughty v. Doughty 28 NJ. Eq. 581 in which case 
Beasley C.J. pointed out : 
"A judgment of divorce resting entirely on such a 
contracted foundation as the domicile of one of 
the parties alone, bears with it, into other juris- 
diction, a title to respect and in some cases a claim 
to voluntary adoption. In such instance, I regardthe 
question whether the judgment shall be extraterrito4 
rially enforced to be one eétirely resting on the 
consideration that, in a matter of unusual interests 
of this nature, an obligation restsupon every govern- 
ment to carry into effect, as far as is reasonably 
practicable, and as may be consistent with its own 
policy, all foreign judgments. But an appeal of this 
hind to interstate comity shpuld, I think, never 
prevail, when the judgment sought to be accredited 
has been rendered in violation of that fundamental 
axiom of justice that the parties, before their 
rights are adjudged, shall have an opportunity of 
being heard. A judgment of divorce proceeding from 
a jurisdiction founded on domicil would not contravene 
essential rules of natural justice, if actual notice' 
to appear has been served on the defendant residing 
abroad." 
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This decision was followed by the decision of 
Felt v. Felt ( Court of Errors and Appeals, 59'Ea_.606ÿ 
45 Atl. 105). 
As to the recognition of decrees of divorce pronounced 
by courts of other foreign countries there is no pro- 
vision to be found in the Constitution and the states 
of the Union are free to pass the respective statements 
in their statutes but, in general they conform to the 
sane rules.. Some states have adopted Secton 22 of the 
Uniform Annulment of ,Marriages and Divorce Act which 
is entitled TT Evasion of Laws TT and reads as follows: 
ft Full faith and credit shall be given in all the 
courts of this state to a decree of annulme±t 
of marriage or divorce by a court of competent 
jurisdiction in another state, territory or 
possession of the United States when the juris- 
diction of such court was obtained in the manner 
and in substantial conformity with the conditions 
prescribed in Sections 7 - 10 of this Act. 
Nothing herin contained shall be construed to 
limit the `ower of any court to give such effect 
to a decree of annulment or divorce by a court 
of a foreign. country as may be justified bythe 
rules of international comity; provided that 
if any inhabitant of this state shall go into 
another state, territory or country, in order to 
obtain a decree of divorce for a cause which 
occured while the parties resided in this state 
a decree so obtained shall be of no force or 
effect in this state." 
The statutes of two states Haine ( RS 1930, CH 73, 
Sect. 12) and Massachusetts ( G.Z. 1921, CH 208, 
Sec. 39) contain a s¢niliar statement, applying to 
divorce pbtained in f o r e i g n countries as well 
as in sister states. 
Territorial ( domestiv) jurisdiction. 
According to the various statutes courts of different 
,,.-.r 
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character such as district courts, equity courts, probate 
courts, courts of common pleas, etc. exercise juris- 
diction to grant absolute divorce. The method of fixing 
v-nue also varies greatly, some statutes,for instance, 
enact that the suit for divorcees to be brought ir. the 
county or district where the plaintiff is resident, others 
ordain that the suit maybe brought in the county where either 
;plaintiff or defendant resides; some statutes require 
residence in the county for a definite period, in addition 
to residence in the state, as a pre- reuisite to suit, 
C H A P T E R XV 
French law on international jurisdiction. 
For some time the French courts held that they possess 
exclusive jurisdiction over French citizens; this view 
was founded on art. 3 C.C. under which statutory proves- e --n,t,, 
ions relating to status apply to French citizens,even 
though domiciled in a foreign country; accordingly 
French courts refused recog tion- to judgments of divorce . 
obtained by French citizens from foreign courts. The 
French courts following a reviewed interpretation. of 
tiKR 
art. 3 C.C. now hold that their jurisdiction over French 
citizens in matters of divorce when both parties to the 
marriage or one of them are domiciled in a foreign country 
is optional only; hence foreign decrees of divorce obtained sec 
abroad under such circumstances are recognised by French 
courts, provided that the requirements for recognition 
exposed below are compied with. 
If one spouse is of French citizenship and the other a 
foreigner, the former may petition French courts for R1 
`$7 
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divorce according to art. 14 C.C.,althougli the foreigner 
spouse is not residing in France and even in the case 
where neither of them is domiciled in France. 
Paris, Dec. 11, 1885, Sirey 1885, 2,302. 
Art. 14 C.C. reads as follows : 
" An alien, even not residing in France, may be 
summoned before the French courts, fortthe 
fulfilment of obligations contracted by him in 
France, towards a French person; he may be cal 
before the French courts for obligations con- 
tracted by him in a foreign country towards 
French persons." 
ed 
AF common opinion of writers and courts the expression 
contract " in that art. includes marriage and marital 
tatu since by French law marriage and its incidents 
are treated as a TT c i v i 1 "contract and as its ir_ei- 
i 
cents respectively. 
French courts also exercise jurisdiction in the converse 
case, viz : in a petition for divorce brought by an alien 
against his or her consort being of French citizenship 
,even when the latter is not reSid.ing in France. The 
elative statutory provision of art. 15 C.C. equally is 
deemed to be enacted in favour of French citizens since 
their cases are thus to be determined by the "natural's 
French judge. The wording of art. 15 C.C. is to the 
ollowing effect : " A Frenchman may be called before a! 
I 
rench court for obligations contracted by him, in a 
foreign country, even towards an alien. TT 
As above stated French courts following the basic principle 
of nationality exercised exclusive jurisdiction over a 
French citizen and on the same reasoning refused to hear 
divorce cases in which both spouses were of foreign 
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.citizenship; but since this view often produced great 
hardship especially in cases in which the foreigners 
could not have their disputq3 decided elsewhere and thus 
hat attitude of 
1 
French courts was equal to a denial 
f justice the French courts finally exercised jurisdiction 
o dissolve marriages of foreigners both being domiciled 
France; 
). When they could not petition for divorce the court 
f the state to which they belonged. 
P4 
7e3 
1/eq. June 25, 1918, S. 1918, 1,206. 
Oeine Nov. 19, 1920, Clunet 1921 p. 184. 
there, on the other hand, a spouse, for instance a Germ , 
may sue or be suit for divorce in his national courts, 
French courts decline to exercise jurisdiction. 
Seine, January 20, 1 '002, p. 809. 
Stringent prove of domicile of both parties to the marriage 
gis required by the courts: Stine, Nov. 19, 1920 , 
Clunet 1921, p. 184; 
yet in cases where a wife may under her national law 
acquire a domicile separate from that of her husband,ani 
establishes such domicile in France, French courts 
lassumed jurisdiction in divorce, provided the wife has 
o opportrinity of petitioning in her own state. 
Oeine, May 14, 1926. 
Present defacto matrimonial domicile is sufficient for 
jurisdiction. As long as the Hague Convention of 1902 
on divorce and separation was in force in France, a suit 
for divor.cecoíd also be brought at the last common domicile 
of the spouses, according to art.5 of that Convention; 
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French courts applied this rule also to parties belonging 
to states such as Great Britain, which were not signatories 
to the 6onvention_. 
Seine, March 23, 1908. 
1But since France renounced. that Convention the courts 
are reluctant to recognise the test of the last common 
omicile as basis of juri sdictión_,the matrimonial domicile 
now must be present, not past in order to found juris- 
diction thereon. 
eine, April 26, 1923, Clunet 1923, p. 850. 
b). When the respondent submitted to the jurisdiction 
f the French courts ,submission to jurisdiction may be . 
xpress or implied by omitting to ,ple , to jurisdiction 0e/ ;k7 
f 
in due time. A 4 
Seine, April 26, 1923, Clunet 1923, p.850. 
(e). French courts base their jurisdiction also on a 
round similar to -í lh_at laid c',own by sec. 13 of the 
English MCA. 1937 in a petition for divorce by a deserted 
wife. 
Seine 21, July 1932, Clunet 1933, 354. 
he Wife may under stich circumstances sue for divorce 
in the court of the last matrimonial domicil ( Nancy, 
J 
July 4, 1888, Recueil des arras de Nancy 1889,p.66) f f 
or in the court of her residehce.( Paris,Nov.12,1895, 
Gaz.Pal. 1895, 2776). 
(d). Where the crime of adultery was committed in France 
French courts exercised jurisdiction with regard to the 
principle of public order: Cass.Dec.8,1920,Clunet 1921, 
(Affaire Gould v.Gould).See the second Gould case on p.228. 
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,Recognition of foreign decrees: 
Ble1 ane only three articles namely arts.2123 and 2128 CC 
and 546 CCP in the French Codes relating to enforcement 
of foreign judgments. The wording of these:articles is 
as follows : Art. 2123QC. 
i' A judicial mortgage results from judgments either 
contested or be¿rdefault, final or provisional in 
favour of those who have obtained them. It also 
results from acknowledgments or verifications 
contained in the judgments from signature affixed 
to an instrument under private signature creating 
an obligation. It can be enforced upon the existing 
real Mate of the debtor and the real estate he 
may afterwards require, with the restrictions 
hereinafter mentioned, Decisions of arbitrators 
only carry with them a mortgage when they are 
accompanied by an order of the court of their 
execution. Neither can a mortgage result from 
judgments granted in foreign countries, unless a 
French court has declared that they shall be en- 
forced ; without prejudice to the provisions to 
the contrary which may exist in political laws or 
in treaties." 
.Art. 2128 CC. 
" Contracts entered into in a foreign country do 
not establish a mortgage on property in France,un- 
less there are provisions contrary to this principle 
in the political laves or treaties." 
Art. 546 CCP. 
T Judgments rendered by foreign courts and recorded 
by foreign offices,shall be succeptible of execution 
in France only in the manner and cases contemplated 
by arts. 2123 and 2128 CC." 
Three theories exist on the interpretation of these 
obscure provisions: 
(1) Some writers and earlier decisions took the view 
that foreign judgments against foreigners might be enforced 
While foreign judgments against French subjects were not 
enforceable in France. The partisans of this view held 




orìgs still in-force and that from the latter in connection 
with the articles cited above, the sense follow Fwhich 
they attached to those articles. 
K2). Other writers and some decisions reject that.inter- 
retation and take the view that with regard to the 
eneral wording of those articles ther. _.is- not- 
i st inid.1betwe en 
foreigners and those rendered against French subjedts 
ànd that raler all foreign judgments are to be treated 
foreign judgments rendered against 
on the same footing : they are to be recognised as con- 
elusive i.e. as res judicator. ( French: 1Ta:utorit de 
la chose jugée) but are enforceable ( French: force 
executoi.re ) only if the exequatur is granted. by 
French courts after having 6amined tiled with regard t 
certain specified points such as jurisdiction of the 
foreign court which has pronounced them, to the questio% 
1 
of whether they are repugnant to the order public and the 
like. (Paris,Febr. 23, 1866, S 66.2.300 ) 
Seine, July 5, 1881, Cl.;net 1881, p. 530. 
Civ. May 9, 1900, S lt)ol, 1,185. Requ.Tiov.10,1908,S 1909,1,172. 
(3).The theory of the so- called tt revision au 
of full zeview8.bi±°tyof foreign judgments is 




foreign judgments are neither recognisably: as 
nor enforceable by way of execution unless an 
is granted by the French courts.after having 
on their merits. 
Paris, May 11, 
Aix, Febr. 9, 
Civ. Dec. 9, 
1869, D 71.2.119, S. 70.210 
1888, D 89.2.281 ,S 91.1389 
1903, DP. 1906 I 354. 
7572;.. 
..74 
3. 6 2. 
res judibata 
execivatfr ma/ 3 ,h er" .;, 




There is one exeeption to this rule, namely : foreign 
judgments relating to status, such as decrees of divorce 
are recognised in France independently of any exaquai - 
decleration,save in case where this judgments involve 
proceedings leading to material execution on property 
or to constraintof persons. 
Civ. Febr. 28, 1860, S. 60, 1,210. in which case a 
divorcee was allowed to remarry without having obtaine4 ^; , 
an exaqua tt3r; Sein_e,April 12,1923,C1rn et 1924,107, . , 
(concerning a German judgment of divorce). f 
At the time when divorce was prohibited under French 
law ( from 1816 to 1884) the courts decided otherwise. a z et 
In the famous case of Beauffrement- Bibesco S 1876,2,249, 
Clunet 76.350 and S 1878, 1,201,Clunet 78.505 the 
French court of Cassation declared the second marriage of 
the Princess BeaufrVmont to Prince Bibesco void on the 
reasoning that the divorce obtained by her in fraud of 
the French law abroad was void, since a French subject 
must even though residing abroad obey the law prohibiti 
divorce; the court held further that the German natura- 
isation was void for want of consent thereto by her 
usband and therefore German law was not applicable. 
ether in case of decrees of divorce obtained abroad 
i 
the foreign court had jurisdiction to render thgn s to be 
ecided by French conflict rules as to jurisdiction. 
eine, Dec. 18, 1931 Clunet 1932, 680. and 
eine, Febr. 6, 1901, Clunet 1901, pag. 138. 
In the latter, the French court declinedrecognition 
to a German decree by which a. divorce between Italian 
nationals has been granted; the reason given was that 
g 
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the German court applied according to Prussian law 
( the German Civil Code was then not et in force) 
d o m i m i l i a r y law to the divorce in question. 
which was inconsistent with French conflict rules because 
according to the latter n a t i o n 1 law only is 
applicable to questions of status,.. Yet when a foreign 
divorce judgment is rendered by a competent court in 
accordance with the conflict rul s as to jurisdictbn and 
choice of law, recognition will be granted by French 
courts as above stated. 
reach jurisprudence distinguishes clearly between re- 
cognition and enforcement of foreign judgments: 
See Trib.civ,Seine,xpril 12,1923,Clunet 1924,r.107. 
erritorial (domestic)jurisdiction: Jurisdiction in divorce 
's exercised by the civil tribunals of first instance;there 
's no special chamber or division of the court reserved 
or proceedings in divorce, except for the court in Paris. 
s marriage is treated ascivil contract under French law 
he provisions relating to actions in personam also control 
he question of venue in proceedings for divorce.The venue 
J.n proceedings for divorce is the respon_dentTs residence', 
rt.234 cc and art.59 ccp,failing a residence ,the respon- 
entTs abode.Cass.Jan. 11,1928,D 1928,102. 
Doubtful is where the venuei -ß of a petition based. on art 14 
pr 15 cc.It is commonly deemed to be the domicile of th4 
plaintiff although the defendant has never lived in France 
P ari_s,Dec.11,885,S.1885,2,302. 
It is immaterial whether the defendant is a French citizen aI 
or a foreigner. Cass. 16,1916, Gaz. Pal, May 22.1919. / 
464- 
,Austrian law on international jurisdiction. 
(1) As to Austrian subjects. 
.he Austrian courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction in 
.i.vorce over Austrian citizens, irrespective of their 
domicil or the place of celebration of their marriage. 
Para. 81 ( 3) Of the law relating to Fxecutorji l Procedx e 
f May 27, 1896, Imperial Law Gazette 79,decisions of 
he Supreme Court of Jan. 12, 1909,G1.U.N.F.4494 and of 
July 4, 1911, Gl.U.NF. 5525. 
,(2) As to foreigners. 
The Austrian courts exercise jurisdiction in divorce 
over foreigners whose last common matrimonial domicile 
was within Austria. It was doubtful whether a foreigner, 
of resident within Austria, :Night contract to submit to 
he jurisdiction of Austrian Courts in divorce proceedings; 
the view of the Austrian courts was in the affirmative; 
Decision of the Supreme Court of Dec.l4,1909,G1U.NF.4821. 
Recognition of foreign judgments. 
(1). The statute of May 27,1896,Imp.Law Gaz.Nr.79 rela ing 
to execuli,c.i8lproceedings does not contain any statemen 
concerning recognition of foreign judgments. 
The rules off governing the recognition of foreign divor e 
'judgments have developed in accordance with the relative 
general principles of private international law and the . 
enactments of the statute mentioned above concerning 
enforcement of judgments. 
The Austrian Supreme Court declared in its decisionsi- ,,)-..,c7 
1 
he bound by general principles of private international 
law to recognise foreign divorce judgments over foreigners 
-265- 
if rendered. by a competent court. The Austrian courts 
investigate, first ó'± all, whether by its own conflicts 
rules as to jurisdiction any court of the foreign state 
had jurisdiction in the subject- matter; it is immaterial 
according to para. 80 (1) of the statute cited above, 
whether the parti.cuj ar court had jurisdiction or 
competency of deciding the par_tteul.ar cause. 
Dec. F:b. 21, 1911,G1UNF 5374 , May 17;913,G1UNF.5374. 
According to the authoritative interpretation given to 
para. 240 CCP a foreign judgment may afford a plea of 
res! judicata, provided it is not repugnant to the 
public policy of Austrian law. 
(2) Applicability of the rules stated in point (1) in 
case of a change of rationality of Austrian ditizens. 
Itts stated above, the Austrian courts exercise according 
to para.76 and 100 of the Jurisdiction Rules and 
para; 81 (3) of the statute relating to execution pro- 
ceedings exclusive jurisdiction in divorce over Austrian 
citizens, wherever domiciled, accordingly, they rofuee'. 
ittM'recognitionpRA judgments of divorce obtained by 
ustrian citizens abroad. 
Territorial ( domestic) jurisdiction. 
;. 1) Under Austrian law no special court, comparable to 
the English Divorce Division, exercises jurisdiction inj 
proceeding for divorce. The civil courts of first instance, 
Regional Courts, ( Landgerichte) exercise jurisdiction 
in divorce along; with that in other ordinary litigation.. 
(Sec. 50, paras. 1 and 2 of the Jurisidc.Rules). 
-2'66- 
Prior to 1938 there was an exception to this rule insoflar 
as a divorce by mutual consent of Jewish marriages was 
heard before the lower county courts. ( Bezirksger i chte 
(2).(a) As above stated, the Austrian courts exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction in divorce over Austrian citizen. 
i 
The courts of the place where the spousesT last matrimonial 
domicil was, exercise this jurisdiction; this venue is 
an exclusive one and cannot be changed by an agreement 
etween the spouses. ( sec. '76 of the Jurisdiction Rules). 
(b). Failing a general or special venue according to 
ec. 76 JR. mentioned above, the court of the petitionerTs 
reneral venue is competent, o_° in case where even a 
eneral venue does not lie within Austria the court of 
irst instance ( Landgericht of Vienna) is competent. 
he last mentioned. rule as regards venue ( 2b) applies 
also to the petition of a wife whose husband at the time 
f the marriage was an Austrian citizen an subserueitly 
ve),up or lost his Austrian citizenship. 
(3)(a) To petitions of foreigners applies the same rule 
a 
s to venue as stated above in point 2 a with regard to 
Austrian citizens. Dec. 28,1910, GlUI`F 5280. 
(b). In case ßf_.ì foreigners who are domiciled abroad 
and had no last matrimonial domicil within Austria,the 
Austrian Supreme Court fixes on application the venue 
according to para. 28 of the Jurisdiction Rules. 
Dec. of the Supr. Court Dec. 14.1909, G1UTüF 4821. 
(4) Retaliatory Jurisdiction against foreigners. 
Finally it is noteworthy that Austrian courts exercise 
in petitions against foreigners a retaliatory jurisdiction 
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according to para. 101 of the Jurisdiction Rules which runs: 
" If in any other state actions on civil causes may 
be brought against Austrian citizens in such courts 
which under the present statute possess no juris- 
diction at all or a limited jurisdiction only,the 
sane jurisdiction is founded also against the sub- 
jects of that state in the Austrian courts.' 
This retaliatory jurisdiction applies, for instance, 
as against French citizens; for under art. 14 of the 
rench Civil Code French courts exercise jurisdiction 
ver foreigners, even not residing in France, in dispute 
r 
ising from contracts entered into by them with French 
itizens. Since under French law marriage is regarded 
s a civil contract, this article 14 applies also to 
uestions of marital status; hence actions for divorce 
may be brought before Austrian courts against French 
subjects, even though they are not resident in Austria. 
German law on international jurisdiction. 
($).Exclusive jurisdiction. 
German courts possess exclusive jurisdiction in divorce 
where the husband is domiciled in Germany and 
(1) both of the spouses are of German citizenship, 
(2) the husband has lost his German citizenship ;(it is 
A mmaterial in this case whether he has acquired- anóther 
citizenship or not) and his wife retains her German citizeniihip;or 
(3) both spouses have lost their German citizenship and 
the husband cad not acquire /another. citizenship. 
( para. 606,(I)of the German Code of Civil Procedure). 
(B). Optional jurisdiction. Where both of the spouses 
(being of German citizenship are domiciled in a foreign 
country , German courts recognise foreign divorce decrees 
provided that they have been pronounced by a competent 
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court and that the requirements specified ir. para.328 
CP. are subsisting. A'suit for divorce may at the 
nstance of either spouse be instituted in the court 
f the place of the hug =bandT s last domicil in Germany f 
when the husband is of German citizenship 1though. not : dell. 
in Germany; if he had no domicile in Germany, the suit 
may be instituted in the court of the capital of that 
German Province to which the husband before 1934 belonge 
if he did not belong to any particular German province, 
the suit may be brought in a court of first instance pf'. 
Berlin. 
(C). As to spouses both of whom are foreigners domicil d 
in Germany : 
Art. 17 of. the Introductory Act to the Code Civil decla es 
the jurisdiction of the German court in such case to be 
conditional on the recognition of the decree of divorce 
y the national law of the husband. Decision of the 
mperial Court of January 5, 1925, RG 109,101; RG 126,3 3. 
ere the national law exercises exclusive jurisdiction 
n divorce, German courts will not assume jurisdiction. 
o the question whether the foreigners are domiciled in 
ermany the relative rules of the foreign law apply. 
ecision of the Imperial Court of Nov. 21, 1929,126.363. 
D). As to spouses having no nationality, the German 
courts exercise jurisdiction unconditionally even iftthe 
Ate' 
spouses have no domicile in Germany but their abode there. 
(E). Where the spouses beside their German nationality 
have also another nationality those provisions only app .y 
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which are applicable to spouses of German nationality. 
Decision of the Imperial Court RG 150,382., 
(F). As to spouses of more than one nationality,all of 
them being foreign, jurisdi cti on of the German courts 
is conditional on the recognition of the divorce decre 
by the national law of the husband. 
(G). There is further a subsidiary jurisdiction provid d 
for a wife of German citizenship by the statute relating 
to r' the application of German law as to divorce " 
of Jan. 24, 1935 ( Imperial Law Gaz. l,pag.48); by 
art. 2 (1) the wife of German citizenship may,where nose 
of the grounds of jurisdiction of a German court under 
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure exists , 
institute proceedings for divorce in the court of 
h e r domicile or residence in Germany. 
This provision applies, for instance, where a woman of 
German citizenship marries a foreigner and retains her 
German citizenship, or where a married wife alone 
acquires German citizenship while her husband retains 
his foreign citizenship. 
(a)Reco aition of foreign judgments of divorce. 
Insofar as the German courts exercise exclusive juris- 
diction they refuse to recognise foreign judgments of 
divorce. ' See J.W. 06,167. Hence when a wife obtains from 
4 court in U.S.A. a decree of divorce against her husbañnd 
being of German citizenship and domiciled in Germany su +h 
decree is invalid in Germany. W 15,144. 
(b) In all other cases the German courts will recognise 
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judgment of divorce if the requirements specified inf 
para. 328 of the CCP. are complied with. 
Para 3u8 COP contains the requirements for recognition 
of foreign judgments, whereas Tara. 722 CCPand para. 723 CCP 
:3 Contain those of their enforcement; thus Lerman law 
distiguishes clearly between recognition and e :forcement 
; :of foreign judgments. 
The entering of a judgment of divorce in the registers 
`concerning Civil Status is not deemed to be an act of 
enforcement but merely of recognition and therefore 
admissible under para. 328 CCP. without obtaining a 
judgment declarative of its enforceability ( "Vollstreckungsurte3l") 
as required by paras.722,723 CCP. for enforcement.Decision 
of the Imperial Court of May l8. 1916 RC.88,244. According 
to para. 328 CCP.the requirements for recognition of 
foreign judgments are ktatedby specifying th- grounds 
on which recognition is excluded. 
Recognition is excluded: 
(1) if the courts of the foreign country according to 
German law have no jurisdiction. Decision of the 
imperial Court RG. 6 5, 330 . 
'(2) if the unsuccessful defendant is a German national 
and has not appeared in the proceedings insofar as the 
original summons has not been served upon him in person 
in the country of the foreign court nor been served upon 
him through German legal channels, 
(3) if in the judgment certain. provisions of the introductory 
Act to the Civil Code(Art.17) have been disregarded to the 
detriment of a German national. Thus the question whether 
the ssubsttive law has been applied, may be of i.mporte.9ce, 
'f the conflict rules of art. 17 of the Introductory Ac 
CC. have not been applied; but if the law according to 
here conflict rules has been selected, it is immaterial) 
hether there has been an error in the application or 
nterpretation of that law by the foreign court. 
4) . Recognition of the judgment offends against rules 
f common decency or against the avowed purpose of a Ger 
an legislative enactment and 
5) if reciprocity has not been conceded.. 
or detailed discussion of the points(4)and(5)reference 
is made to 2.771284. 
The examination of the foreign judgment in respect of 
the requirements stated above is to be made by the 
courts ex officio. Decisions of the Imperial Court 
RG 36,381, 75.48. 
Frankenstein is of opinion that this rule does not app) 
to para. 3 of 328 in which case it is left to the party 
of German nationality to show that the non -application 
f the relative statutory provisions was causing some 
detriment to h'er. Á4+w. 
f 
(Territorial ( domestic) jurisdiction. 
It must be observed that under German law the Civil 
courts of first instance ( Landgerichte) exercise 
jurisdic ttenta uivorce along with that in other ordinary 
litigation; and there is no special chamber or division 
of the court hearing such causes. 
With regard to the fact that nationality is by German 
law the test of jurisdiction in mattersof divorce German 
Citizens even when domiciled abroad may institute proceeding 
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An a German court; 
the venue is to be determined by the domicileof the 
husband ; when domiciled abroad by the last domicileof -Ole 
husband in Germany,and failing a last domicile in 
Germany the venue is the capital of a German province 
r Berlin according to para. 15 CCP'as stated above. 
n favour of a wife of German citizenship-whose husband 
is a foreigner or of no nationalitythere is by art, 2 
yf the law of the January 24, 1935 Imperial Law Gaz. 1,48 
'the venue declared to be the place of h e r domicile or 
residence in Germany, provided that s s.,noneof the 
provisions of the CPO regarding the determination of the 
venue applicable thereto. 
In the case of forei«ners domiciled in Germany the venue 
of the divorce proceedings is to be determined by the 
-fllace of the husbands domicil. See p. -?8 
Swiss law : 
International jurisdiction. and recognition of foreign 
judgments of divorce. 
(A). Swiss courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction in 
divorce ofer Swiss citizens domiciled in Switzerland, 
(13) As to spouses of Swiss nationality domiciled abroad& 
(1) Swiss courts possess optional jurisdiction in divo ce 
as regards such spouses who may also petition for divorce 
in the courts of their foreign domicileaccordingto 
paí'a. 7 g (1) of the Final Title to the Civil Code. 
(2) . Swiss courts recognize a foreign decree of 
dissolution of marriage of Swiss nationalstprovided 
that the foreign court had jurisdiction to pronounce it 
by the law of that foreign country. (a)-.. 
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( para. 7 (3) 1.c. and Cogs de Geneve SIZ 26,359, 
¡Federal Court 56,2,335. Clunet 32.225. 
(0) (14s to spouses of foreign nationality: 
Jurisdiction of Swiss courts in divorce in such 
cases is conditional upon the petitionei{s domicile exist'ng 
in Switzerland and on proof that the constant legal practice 
of the national law recognises the jurisdiction of the 
Swiss court as well as the ground of divorce relied on. 
Tara. 7 h I. 1. c.()Thus in case where one of the spouses 
is of Swiss and the other of foreign nationality and both 
are domiciled in Switzerland, Swiss courts will exercise 
jurisdiction in proceeding for divorce by the Swiss 
spouse unconditionally, whereas in the case of the 
[foreigner spouse being the petitioner, jurisdiction of 
he Swiss courts in divorce is conditional upon the 
ame facts as stated in point (1). 
( para. 7 g I, l.c.) St. Gallen SJZ. 26,9. 
Where only the foreigner defendant ( an American) was 
domiciled in Switzerland, while his wife the petitioner 
was domiciled abroad ( Dresden) an action for divorce 
was dismissed by the Swiss court for lack of jurisdiction. 
Zurich, Oct. 7, 1930, Z. 43,47. 
Territorial ( domestic) jurisdiction. 
The test for the selection of the competent court is the 
domicileof the petitioner according to art. 144 ZGB. 
Though the domicileof the wife follows, as a rule,that 
of her husband (art. 25 IZGB) the wife may a cauire a 
domicile different from that of her husband, in case her 
s 
husband's domicile be unlazown or when the wife is legally 
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bentitled. to live apart from her husband. Thus a wife 
having acquired a domicile separate from that of her hus- 
band ( by art. 25 I CC.) may bring the petition in the 
court of h e r domicile. The same rule applies to 
foreign petitioners except for the restrictions under 
er 
para. 7 (h) of the Final Title to the Swiss Civil Code. 
A 
Italian law: 
Recognition of foreign judgments of divorce. 
The institution ofdivorce is unknown to Italian law and 
b,s stated above Italian courts now decline to exercise 
jurisdiction in divorce over foreigners domiciled in 
Italy. On the other hand,they recognise judgments of 
divorce obtained by a foreigner from a foreign court 
according to his national law, on the reasoning that 
such recognition does not involve a " fieri TT because 
the foreign court has by its judgment established a 
legal relation without leaving any opportunity of inter - 
fering. 
Cass. Florence Dec. 6, 1902,Monitore D. Tri.1903,43. 
App. Milàno ;Jiz4r 10,1931,Rev. 1931, 295, 
App. Rome,Juie 26,1930. 
'° Monitore 1930,705. 
There are different views among writers and courts as 
to the extent of the examination of a foreign judgment. 
Some writers take the view that judgments on status_.: 
viz. judgments of divorce need not any"giudicio 
Aelibazione" and that the inquiry may be restricted to 
a specified set of formal requirements, whereas others 
are of opinion that in all cases a stringent inquiry 
1 y r_ 
( eJ- 
Must be made on the merits of the judgment, before 
ecognition can be granted. ( giudizio di delitazione) 
complete review of the judgment on his merits takes at 
ny rate place in case of a judgment in default; in suc 
case according to art. 941 CCP. as amended by the decre 
f July 20,1919, the inquiry extends apart from that as 
egards international jurisdiction also to the question 
f territorial ( domestic) jurisdiction of the foreign 
court which rendered the judgment and the case may also 
be retried. 
n case of a change of nationality by the spouses of 
talian nationality he new national law concerning 
divorce is to be applied, except for the case of fraud 
in acquiring the new foreign nat' onality. In the latter 
case ( of fraud) the courts refuse to respect the new 
ational law of the spouses and apply only their last 
common law. Appel. Bologna in Riv.31,567. 
ince under Italian law, divorce a vinculo matrimonii í 
of recognised, Italialis often procure the dissolution 
of their marriage in the following way: 
hey take up residence for some time in Hungary,where 
divorce is recognised, and acquire, mostly by means of 
a process of adoption, Hungarian citizenship,and then 
obtain L. +ivorce from the Hungarian court in the plat 
of their residence. The Italian. courts hold such 
divorce decrees as valid without any further examinatio* 
into the validity of the change of nationality of the 
spouses they consider , however,this rule as applicable 
{ 
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where both of the spouses have acquired the forei 
nationality, and taken up their domicile in the respective 
foreign country. 
App. Roma Rev. 23, 1933. 
ence where the Italian husband only acquired the for.eidn 
ationality and took up his residence there, while the 
ife retained her Italian nationality and did not follow 
im, the Italian courts regard such foreign decree of 
divorce as invalid' on the reasoning that it was fraudu- 
lently procured and therefore the last common law 
(Italian law) governed the question of divorce. 
Decision of the appellate court of Florence,:l rch 104119 3, 
Journal de droit international privê (Clunet)50 (1923)1 21. 
The rules as to jurisdiction and choice of law laid dov 
in the Hague Convention II of 1902, on divorce and 
judicial separation, to which Italy still is a signatord, 
are applied by Italian courts not only as regards 
nationals of states signatories to that Convention, but 
jimiversaily. C hap t e r XVI. 
eoi rocity as requirement . eco igt ition. 
Anglo - American systems. 
t common law no reciprocity is required. for recognitio 
r enforcement of foreign judgments. As %t, will be sho 
below;the requirement of reciprocity now is adopted by 
some English statutes regulating the enforcement of 
foreign judgments and orders. So far as common law äßf 
the Anglo- American systems is concerned reciprocity 
is no requirement for recognition and this point is 
AK) 
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expressly stressed in the decision of Schibsby v. 
Westenholz. LR 6 Q B 155; In this way Còmmon Law 
would seem to remove one of the obstacles to international 
intercourse. The.statutes mentioned above, on the other 
hand, apply mainly to the British Commonwealth. Hence 
the requirement of recognition is a matter of indif±ereice 
because the. main principles of the law system are common 
to all parts ; second, since these statutes apply in 
Iregard to the subject discussed here only to matters 
ccessory to divorce, they might indirectly only be 
perative in respect of decrees of divorce. 
he same rule obtains in U.S.A. in general ; see decision 
f Dunstan v. Higgins 138 NY 70 (1893) , NY. Col=t of 
ppeal, 
Austrian law. 
It is doubtful whether reciprocity is a requirement for 
recognition of.foreign judgments of divorce. Some writers 
take the view that para. 79 at seq. of the statute 
relating to executory proceedings concerns only enforce- 
ment of foreign judgment; hence the requirement of 
reciprocity contained in that section does not extend 
to recognition of foreign judgments. 
German law. As above stated, reciprocity is among the 
(4 7 Q_) 
requirements for recognition of foreign judgments. But 
der para. 2 of sec. 328 of CC-2. no reciprocity is 
equired in the case of a litigation of non- pecuniary 
character provided, that jurisdiction of a German court 
or that controversy did not subsist under the German 
onflict rules as to jurisdiction. 
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;By reciprocityis meant that the courts of the state in 
e 
question mra-executliqg the practice of recognising 
foreign decrees of divorce in a manner similar to that 
of Germany; on the other hand when tb.:: courts of that 
state do not recognise foreign decrees of divorce at ali 
or do so only upon conditions prejudicial to foreigners 
or upon conditions more stringent than those prevailing 
in Germany, no reciprocity is deemed existent, as for 
instance in the case of the French courts which recognise 
foreign judgments only upon retrial of the whole cause 
of controversy, or in the case of Italian courts which 
are by their law required even to investigate whether 
the foreign courts had the so- called territorial 
(domestic) jurisdiction besides that of the international 
jurisdiction. 
A general definition of reciprocity is not given by the 
Civil Code. 
rt. 31 of the Introductory Act to the German Civil Code 
reats of TT retaliation"which is an entirely different 
otion from that of TT reciprocity". 
y art. 31 1.c. with the assent of the Federal council 
t may be ordered that a right of retaliation be applied 
against ä foreign state as well as against its subjects 
and their legal successors. Thereis no case of such a 
retaliation order known as regards family law. 
2.The _rinciple of aublic policy 
English courts will refuse recognition of foreign jud ents 
if they are repugnant to English public policy. That 
:to say if they involve infringnent of fundamental 
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t-principles of English law or of the English idea of 
morality.An exact definition of " public policy " ca.nnt 
be given since this principle is susceptible of consta t 
change to suit the chancing conditions of society. The 
marriage relation and all legal relations based thereo 
are governed by the principle of public policy; as for 
instance, the husband's liability for the wife's main - 
tEna.nce is based on general public policy. The law of 
marriage and divorce is thoroughly affected by this 
principle. In the recent decision Fender v.St.John 
Mildmay 1938 ti (E 1 ) the authorities concerning 
application of the principle of public policy to questins 
of the marriage relation have been reviewed and it has 
also been pointed out there how different the policy of 
law as to marriage before the Reformation has been from 
that after the Reformation; it was held. in that decisio 
ill 
a promise made by one spouse after a decree nisi 
to marry a third person after the decree nisi has been 
ade absolute was not void as against public policy and 
action for damages for breach of the promise was maint4R- 
.ble by the third person. 
he determination of what is contrary to the so- called 
¡policy of law necessarily varies from time to time and 
Lt. +4, 
in. this connexion that significant dictum of Borough J. 
in Richa:rCson v. Mellish ( 1824) 2 Bing 229 may be men- 
- 
~^ tioned which was to the f'llowing effect : 
" Public policy is a very unruly horse, and when 
once you get astride it you never know where it 
will carry you." 
53614,r0.4,..21 
-2,80- 
There is, first of all, to mention that with regard to 
he English conception of morality the jurisdiction of the 
glish courts in matrimonial.matters is confined to a 
onogamous marriage and therefore inapplicable to poly - 
amous marriages although the latter might be recognise 
n some other respects. 
yde v. Hyde. LR 1, P & Id. 130. 
ex v. Harnersmith Superintendant Registrar of Marriage 
( lt17) 1 KB 634, 
achimson v. Nachimson ( 1930) P 217. 
he English courts recognise divorce decrees pronounced 
y competent courts, upon condition that the proceeding 
own to the decree do not offend against the principle 
f natural justice. Lack of knowledge of the action by 
he respondent is a ground for refusing recognition to 
he decree , in that way proc;.ired. 
Again, if the litigant was prevented by the foreign 
court from presenting his case, this is regarded as a 
iiolation of the fundamental axiom of justice that the 
arties, before judgment is rendered,shall have an oppor 
unity of being heard. Rudd v. Rudd.(1924) P 72. 
ut not every irregularity of procedure is deemed to í - 
ffend against public policy and natural justice 
espectively. 
Pemberton v. Hughes ( 1899) 1 Ch 781.799. 
A divorce decree of a foreign competent court is 
recognised by English courts even when the (-round of 
divorce relied upon is not known to English law. 
udd v. Rudd (1924) P 72, 40 LTR 197. 
arvey v. Farnñe ( 1882) 8 AC 43, 
emberton v. Hughes, 15 TLR 211,(1899) Ch 781 AC 
ater v. Bater ( 1906) P 209 AC, 22 TLR 408. 
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: Another `round for refusing recognition. to a 
oreign divorce decree is this that it has been obtained 
y fraud. 
olphin v. Robins (.1859) 7 HLC 390, 
onaparte v. Bonaparte ( 1892) P 402,Green v.Green (1893 
Armitage V. Att. General, Gilly V. Gilly (1906) P.135. 
onstantinicli v. Condtantinidi ( 1903) P 246. 
haw v. Gould ( 1868) 3 T-1-1 39c, 
) P 89. 
Yet an = n7lish court will not hold a foreign decree of 
divorce invalid on subsequent proof of collusion bet- 
ween the pa ties, although collusion is an absolute bar 
in English law if discovered before decree nisi is made 
absolute. 
Crowe v. Crowe (1937) 2 All E.R.723. 
If the court has acted fraudule,_ ,t'his may be a: ground for 
;refusing recognition to a decree of divorce. 
IA decree cannot be impeached by a third party who was 
not a party to the original proceeding 
'Eater v. Bater ( 1906) Y. 209. 
Lt any., rate; in cases only in which impeachment of a 
,foreign judgment is sought on the ground of fraud, re- 
trial -may take place, otherwise only,if the fraud goes 
to the root of jurisdiction, but not if it relates to trie° 
merits. Thus where the foreign court has been misled 
as to the question of domicil of the parties to the pro-1 Ck713,0 
3eedings. 
(1) There are statutory exceptions to this rule; sec.1 
subs.5 of the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction 
Act. 1926 provides that the decision of a High Court 
in India, or on an appeal therefrom, as to domicil of 
the parties to a marriage shall for the purposes c_' that 
Act be binding on all courts in England, Scotland and 
-2Ú2- 
-India. Henc:o r - he . ciedsion as to domicil had been 
obtained by fraud it is not empeachable on that ground. 
(b) A judgment regidtered tinder the Judgment Extension 
Act 1868 cannot be bmpeached on the ground of fraud un- 
less and until it is set aside by proper proceedings 
in the original court in Scotland or Northern Ireland as 
the case may be.i(othersppon v. Connolly (1871),9 M 510. 
4.Principle of ubiic policy under. U.S.A. law. The recognition 
of a foreign judgment is excluded if it is repugnant to 
any established an important policy or to the canons of 
In.orality of civilised dociety. By art. 4 pares. 1 of th 
Federal Constitution it is laid dowf UM in every stat 
f.uil faith and credit shall be accorded to any judgment 
ad in any other state of the Union; this clause precludes 
the operation of the principle of public policy between 
the states of the Union. 
5. Principle of public Lolicy under French law. 
Art. 3 cc declares that laws of police and public security 
are binding upon all those who live in the territory 
of France. Although this statutory provision does not 
expressly refer to private international law it was by 
the French writers interpreted as a conflicts rule and 
became in that way the basis upon which they built up 
the doctrine of the " ordre public ". 
IOrde_r ublic is the most important principle in French 
international law. The writers and courts have 
constantit searched d'or some phrases to express 
the exact idea, but since the subjects to,vhich this 
283- 
principle might be applied are of very different a 
character it was entirely impossible to give an adequate 
definition of that principle. 
Laurent takes the view that " acts against order public 
re such as infringe social rights, i.e. ,T rules rela- 
ing to rights of,society its conservation and perfection." 
AR- 
rocher distinguishes between " orde^rspublic interne" 
and " or public international ". To the former applies 
the rule controlling the particular subject matter,to 
the latter the " territorial law ". 
foreign judgment is deemed to be against public policy 
a) when it is based on a law which is not applicable 
y the French rules of conflict of laws and 
b) when it i,infringILg French substantive law relating 
e4 
o French citizens; Thus French courts decline to recog- 
ice Swiss judgments of divorce over French citizens 
n the reasoning that the latter renounced the appeal 
From that judgment andthereby made the judgment equal 
o a judgment by consent; since divorce on mutual conse 
ib not recognised under French law that decree was held 4- 
ciffend , against the Tiler public. The grounds of 
divorce are covered by the principle of public policy 
Tib. Seine May 2, 1918, Clunet 1918, 1182; mutual conse tt 
and insanity which are grounds of divorce under some 1 s 
are deemed repugnant to French public policy. 
6Princi le of .ublic olicy wider Austrian law. 
Under para. 2 and 4 of sect. 81 of the statute relating 
to executorial ocedùre.,f i xecutionsordnung ) Austrian courts 
are required to refuse recognition of foreign judgment 
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(a) if an act is to be enforced which is by Austrian 
law held to be immoral or inadmissible or if by the 
execution sought a legal relation itobe L ecognised or a 
claim to be effectuated which under Austrian law is void. 
or not actionable ;with regard to public policy or morality. 
The scope of the conceptions of public order and morali ty 
is very vague and all depends largely upon the circum- 
stances of the case. The meaning of these expressions 
is changeable according td the change of social and 
political views. 
Thus the statutory provisions ,of paras. 62 and 111 wher - 
under a marriage entered by a Roman Catholic as in- 
dissoluble were held to be of public character and 
ccordingly marriages of former Austrian citizens and 
he proceeding divorces obtained abroad were held void 
nd the change of nationality was disregarded. 
becision of the Austrian Supreme Court, July 1,1903, 
Gl UNF 2394. 
this decision was followed by series.. of others and 
lastly overruled by the decision of June 18, 1907, 
cl. UNF. 38111 by which such a judgment of divorce was 
recognised on the reasoning that the change of nat-onaliity 
being an administrative act is not reviewable by the court. 
7Princiyle of public policy under German law. 
As above stated it is provided by para. 4 of sec.328 CCP 
that recognition of a foreign judgment is to be declined 
if it offends against rules of common decency or against 
the avowed purpose of a German legislative enactment. 
INo exact test by which to des /ignate those provisions 
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_that fall within the scope of the above statutory pro- 
vision can be given. The Imperial Court defined the pr 
ciple of public policy in its decision RG 119,263 as 
follows : 
in- 
" The application of a foreign rule is deemed to be 
repugnant to German law when the political and soci 
views underlying the German law and the foreign law 
respectively are of such different a character that 
the application of the foreign rule would be an.atta k 
against fundamental principles of the German politic 
and economic standard of life H. 
Under German law its grounds of divorce are not coveredi 
by the principle of public policy; but they take account 
of this principle insofar as it is applied by foreign 1kw 
to divorce. The dissolution of a marriage of a foreigner 
by a letter of divorce ( religious divorce) was recognised 
since the national law of the foreigner concerned recog 
nised such divorce. 
Dresden, Dec. 22, 1931, I.P. Resp. 1932 Nr. 72. 
On the other hand, by the decision K.G. Febr. 16,1909, 
R.O.L.G. 19I46,a judgment of divorce obtained from the 
DoUrt_of_the_state -of New York was not recognised as be ng 
against public policy because it imposed a restriction 
pon the guilty party viz. forbidding remarriage till the 
eath of the innocent party. 
inally it was not deemed to be against German public 
olicy where parties obtained by collusion a decree of 
ivorce from a foreign competent court since the facts 
hat established the ground of divorce would also by 
German law amount to a cause of divorce. JW 28.3046. 
8.2i'inciple of _yublic policy under Italian law. 
IArt. 11 CC ( identicalwith art. 3 of the French CC). 
,' - 286 - 
and art. 12 CC relate to the principle of public policy;. 
<Iancini's doctrine that the law of a state consists of 
two parts , , Sze " national" law and the rules concerning 
,Ì public order, i.e. the "territorial" law and that the 
:;national low of a foreigner is to be recognised so far. 
as it is not repugnant to the rules concerning public 
order, was followed by the Romanistic school which detreloped 
further this doctrine of public order; they are till r-eAn- 
not in agreement as to the question which rules of a gifren 
:law fall into the scope of public order. Whereas some 
writers define public policy as consisting of the prohibitory 
érvles, others denor_ntte it as being distinct from the 
prohibitory rules. 
°As above stated Italian law recognises no divorce and 
Italian courts e A_ly decline to apply foreign national 
laws to matters of divorce as being contrary to public 
`policy. As Italy still is signatory to the Hague Convention 
of 19o2 on divorce and separation, the operation of the 
=principle of public order is precru ed with regard to 
persons belonging TO one of Zîie Tree4;,y Rowers. 
}9. .Principle oz public policy urger swiss law. 
:swiss cotants aecline to recognise juagments 01 aivorce 
uy declaration ( Dy letter of divorce ) since it is 
regarded as offending against Public policy. (r-the rest, 
judgments of divorce procured by foreigners from foreign 
courts are recognised even when the foreigners are domi- 
ciled in Switzerland. Decision of the Federal Court 46,1,458; 
56,2,334. But Swiss courts decline to recognise udgmen -bs 
if divorce in cases where they would have had exclusive 
urisdiction, i.e. in the case of Swiss nationals domiciled 
.1.n Switzerland or when the matter of divorce 
V 
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had already been decided by them. 
10.As to reco nition of decrees of divorce im- 
.posing restrictions E,Omarriage. 
As a rule, , the spouses after having obtal 
n absolute decree of divorce, are free to marry again, 
et there are some restrictions to the right of re - 
tarrying under the different systems of law . 
(A). Some of the laws restrict the right of a divorced 
lnife to re- marriage by a limit of time, so as to avoid 
y doubt as to the legitimacy of offspring. Under French 
d 
Clivil Code ( Art. 296) and. German Civil Code (A°t.11 of 
I 
the law of 1938) the divorced wife may not contract a new 
i 
mirriage befor 10 months have passed since the dissolution 
of the marriage. 
B) . Some of the laws on the other hand disallow remarriage 
where divorce has been granted upon adultery. 
S , Scottish law see p?-)-13... 
II. By French Civil Code ( Art. 298) and German Civil 
Code ( Art. 9 of the law of 1938) the spouse who has 
committed adultery mustnot marry his ( her) accomplice; 
under German law this restriction. is conditional upon 
.he fact that the adultery is stai.ìd in the decree of 
V 
divorce as ground. 
III. By Swiss law ( Art. 150 of the Civil Code ) the 
spouse, expressly by the decree declared guilty of 
kw).) , . 
divorce, is to be interdicted to contract a new marriage 
' d.i" . 
b.sre°'a period of 1 - 2 years, or in the case of a 
divorce granted on the ground of adultery, 'ae aie .fia period 
4-7 
of 1 - 3 years Y,, &--rra see -cl-. since the dissolution of the 
parriag,e. ; 
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-(a) Under English law restrictions regarding remarriage 
imposed by a foreign decree of divorce are disregarded 
in accordance with the general principles concerning 
recognition of foreign judgments, insofar as by the 
rules of classi #ication those restrictions are deemed d 
be of penal(quasi- penal )nature. 
Thus a restriction imposed upon a guilty party to a 
divorce by the South African Uour.t was held penal and 
the subsequent marriage contracted by that party valid; 
the relative statute provided that the guilty party must 
not remarry as long as the other party remained unmarried. 
See Scott v. Att. Gen. ( 1886) 11 P.D. 128. 
On the other hand, where a statutory provision forbids 
he parties to re- marry before a certain period has 
lapsed, this limitation was held operative in England 
Since the finality and conclusiveness of the decree of 
divorce was in the same way postponed as if it were a 
ecree nisi. 
ee V`Jarte.r v. Warter ( 1890) 15 P 152. 
(b) . French Courts equally hold such provisions 
restraining one of the spouses from re- marrying as repu - 
'ie 
nant to their " order publique " and refuse recognition 
to judgments restraining one of the spouses from re- 
marriage. See Trib. Marseille , Nov. 28,1925,Revue 1926,537. 
The same rule obtains in G rmany; as above stated,a 
ivorce obtained from a court of New York was not recog- 
ised by a German court as offending against publi polidy 
Úecause it imposed a restriction upon the guilty party, 
viz. forbidding re- marriage till the death of the innocent 
,party Decision K.G. Febr. 16,1909,R.O.L.G.1906. 
-w8g_ 
p a r t V. 
C hap t e r XVII. 
Enforcement of orders and judgments concerning matters 
ancillary to divorce. 
At common law. The rules as to enforcement of foreign 
judgments concerning ancillary matters to divorce are 
different from those as to recognition of foreign decrees 
of divorce, as above stated. 
Divorce itself is of constitutive nature, that is to say 
it constitutes the change of the matrimonial status by 
itself; the decree ,f divorce operates immediately and 
absolutely upon such change of status and no proceedin_ s 
are necessary in order to enforce such a decree. 
Yet the decree of divorce contains implicitly a judicia4. 
order directed. to the party against whom the decree of 
divorce has been granted, of quitting the conjugal home; 
because of shortage of accomod.ation or for some other 
reasons a case may arise in which the divorce declines to 
quit the hommon home, As a,' rule, it has hardly ever beet 
necessary to take executory proceedings for enforcing a tual 
separation from the divorceesince such questions are, 
usually settled by the provisional measures ordered by 
the court as soon as the petition has been instituted, 
sand th02e measures become definite by the decree absolute 
inrithout any further action being necessary. But there 
may be a great humber of judgments and ordersrelating t 
Tatters atcillary to divorce as to which the question v ry 
ften arises as th whether and under what conditions they 
are enforceable; such orders or judgments founded on a 
decree of divorce relate, for instance, to costs, the 
custodyof, and access to, children of the marriage,main 
tenance damages to be paid by the co- respondent,etc. 
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t common law foreign judgments can only be enforeced by 
n action brought thereon. The actions which are to be 
rought on such foreign orders or judgments are not 
ctions in rem, although they are based upon a decree of 
ivorce, but fall within the category of actions in per - 
sonam. To all the actions upon such foreign judgments or 
I 
irders apply the common law rules except for those covered 
y the statutes discussed below, under the heading.Statites on p.395. 
he requirements of the actionability of such foreign 
udgments or orders are similar to those relating to 
oreign_ judgments in.personam,subjject to some gualifi- 
iations, as will be shown presently. 
(a).First of all the plaintiff who seeks to enforce such 
a foreign order must prove that the decree of divorce 
upon which the order is founded, is v;:lid according to 
English law. In the decision of 
Simons v. Simons ( 1938) 55 TLR 120 the enforecement of 
foreign maintenance order was refused because the 
divorce decree was deemed to be invalid by reason of la 
of jurisdiction since the defendant's domicil was Engli 
(b).A further requirement for the actionability of a 
oreigr judgment or order is that it has been rendered 
y a court of competent jurisdiction, Such matters are n 
espect of jurisdiction controlled by rules different 
rom those controlling petitions for divorce. According 
to the decision of Emanuel v. Simon ( 1908) KB 302 ,the 
following ere possible grounds of jurisdiction of fbrei .21 
courts in actions in person= recognised by Common law: 
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(1) . Where the defendant is a subject of the foreign 
country in which the judgment or order has been obtaine; 
2), where he was resident in the forei47n country when 
the action began; 
(3) where the defendant in the charadter of plaintiff h. s 
selected the forum in which he is afterwards sued; 
(4) where he has voluntarily appeared; and 
(5) where he has contracted to submit himself to the 
:9!= in which the judgment was obtained, 
6) by the decision of Philipps v. Batho (1913),3 KB 25 
a sixth ground has been added to this list of Emanuel v. 
Simon. 
It may be observed that in this sixth case the exceptional 
rule applies whereunder nationality ( but not domicil) 
of the defendant was held a sufficient test of juris- 
diction of a foreign (Indian) court to make its judgment 
enforceable. This new class includes, at least, judgments 
in proceedings in personam ancillary or accessory to th 
dissolution of a marriage of persons domiciled or other - 
ise by command. of the Sovereign, within the jurisdiction 
f the court pronouncing the judgment, where both the 
ourt pronouncing the judgment and the Court enforcing 
t are courts of the same Sovereign, and where the cour 
nforcing it cannot itself grant the relief because it 
aas no jurisdiction over the marriae,vnd its dissolute 
,hough it can Fr.ant similar ancillary relief. 
(c From the standpoint of private international law, the 
most important and interesting requirement for actiona- 
bility of foreign judgments is that of the forur 
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iXonveniens, also called that of the effectiveness,under 
English law. If an English judgment were ineffective 
abroad or proceedings in England. were vexatious, the 
court may in exercise of its discretion refuse to enter- 
tain the action. 
Tallack v. Tallack ( 1927) P 211. 
The judgment would have been ineffective as there was no 
property in England. In the case of 
Goff v. Goff ( 1934) 2 107 the court declined to 
exercise jurisdiction in an action for variation of a 
marriage settlement founded upon an English decree of 
divorce on the ground of forum inconveniens -; the facts 
of this case were as follows 
The petitioner procured a divorce from an English court 
and brought an action in the English court for variation 
of her marriage settlement whose trustee was a New York 
Bank; since under New York law foreign judgments cannot 
e enforced. in any case where the defendant has not bee 
served personally within the jurisdiction of the court 
hick pronounced the judgment, the court after institut on 
f the action set the service aside on the ground of 
ovum inconveniens and refused to exercise jurisdictio . 
( d) The foreign judgment must be final and conclusive 
ccording to the rules of English law, which are laid 
own by the decisions of Nouvion v. Freeman 37 CH D 244 
nd Harrop v. Harrop ( 1920) 3 KB 386: 
rr In order that a foreign judgment may be enforceabl 
in an English court, it must be a final and cònclu ive 
judgment of the court by which it was pronounced, d 
it is not a final and conclusive judgment if that 
judgment is liable to be abrogated or varied by tha4t 
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court; but it is not prevented from being a final 
judgment by reason of the fact that it may be the 
subject of an appeal to a higher court." 
This rule was followed by the Irish case of 
Ic Donnel v.McDonnel 2 Ir. Rep. p. 148 in which an 
alimony order of a court of the State Montana was hel 
not enforceable because of lack of finality. Gordon J. 
said : 
d 
" Even though the plaintiff had a final judgment for 
each monthly instalment of maintenance, the order of 
the court of Montana, directing payment thereof into 
court until further order, was not a final judgment 
that the . deceased was indebted to the plaintiff in 
Z 480, the total of such instalments." 
The powers of the Court, under English law, to modifl- 
orders for maintenance are now regulated by s.14 of the 
Administration of Justice ( Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1938 (1"'_and 2 Geo. 6, c. 63). 
The court has power to alter even past payments; such 
be 
orders cannot, therefore, /deemed final. Since, in 
contrast,thereto by the law of the State of New York, 
the proper court of that State waa not competent to vary 
its judgment in respect of the instalments already accfudd 
due and in arrear, it was held in the decision of 
jj 
Beatty v. Beatty ( 1924) CA 807 that such a judgment oh- 
tained from a court of the State of New York *as' in 
respect of the said instalments so accrued due, a fin 
judgment and therefore in that respect enforceable. 
In the decision Sistate'_: v. Sistare 218 US 1 (1910) 
which was cited in Beatty v. Beatty, it was held that 
such alimony decrees are final in the sense that the 
"full faith and credit clause" was applicable to the 
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vested past due payments, even though subsequent payme is 
may be modified to conform to altered circumstances. 
In cases other than maintenance t_:judgment will be en- 
forced if this requirement of finality is comLlied 
With .(In cases concerning costs, damages, custody of 
children, etc.) 
( e) the foreign judgment must not be repugnant to, 
English public policy or against natural justice. 
For details on this subject reference is made to.76. 
(e). Foreign judgments concerning matters ancillary to 
divorce are, as above stated, judgments in rersonam ant 
therefore not merely impeachable for fraud going to the 
root of jurisdiction, as foreign decrees of divorce,buit 
also for some other kind of fraud, and by alleging that 
the person v'ho seeks enforcement of the foreign judgment 
has fraudulently induced the foreign court to reach a 
wrong decision;the original cause may be retried on its 
merits. 
Abouloff v. Oppenheim ( 1882 ) 10 QBD 295, Vidala v.hawss 
(1890) 25 QBD 310 and Ellerman v. Read ( 1928) 2 KB 144, 
Cnid v. Delap 92 LT 510 H 1 
(g). The amount of the sum of damages to be paid by the 
oo.t.respondent or of maintenance adjudged upon by the 
foreign judgment must be fixed . 
An action lies to recover costs awarded in a divorce 
suit by a foreign court, insofar as the requirements 
stated above are complied with. 
Russel v. Smyth ( 1842) 9 Y & W. 810. 
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(h) Finally, an English court will not enforce a foreign 
judgment, which cannot be sued on with regard to the 
Statute of Limitation. 
Tn which case it will also be necessary to inquire into 
the foreign rules as to limitation of acti ons,refer_ ence 
x made to the heading TOQt4nce and Procedure on p.187. 
tatutes. The 6ommon Law rules stated above relating 
o enforcement of foreign orders and judgments concerning 
atters ancilliary to divorce have been modified in some 
espects by statutes which will be discussed presently, 
he rule that a foreign judgment can be enforced only by 
n action brought thereon has been abandoned, at least 
n part within the purvue of these statutes, by enablin 
oreign judgments to be registered under these statutes 
f certain specified conditions are complied with; regis¡tra- 
ion is, however, optional only, the judgment creditor 
ay avail himself of the common law rule and sue on the 
judgment. After registration the judgment has the same 
force and effect as if it had been obtained from the 
egistering court on the date of the registration. 
The statutes which relate to enforcement of foreign judg 
ments are as follows : 
(a). The Judgments Extension Act of 1868 ( 31 & 32)Vict.c.54). 
This Act applies to judgments of Supreme Courts in the 
different parts of the United Kingdom; it deasedoto.ap »y 
o the Irish Free State. Since the Judicature Act 1873 
his Act applies to all judgments of the High court(in 
glaiid)pronounced in its respective divisions,but only 
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to judgments in which the cause of action has been a 
debt, damages or costs; it is immaterial whether the 
judgments are in default or in foro. This Act does not 
apply to judgments in rem; by sect. 8 it is provided 
that it does not apply either to judgments in absence 
pronounced by the Court of Session in Scotland where 
jurisdiction has been founded on arrestment. No action 
on the judgment is necessary for putting it into execution; 
if the certificate is registered the judgment has the 
same effect as if it were pronounced by the registering 
court. 
nder. this Act an order awarding damages or costs against 
6 co- respondent is registerable and enforceable. 
Rayment v. Rayment(1910) P 271 and 
1 
lush v. Rush ( 1920) P. 242. 
The registering court does not examine the judgment on 
cz 
is merit and if it is registered it is not impechtable 
r on fraud and even want of jurisdiction of the Court 
hich pronounced the judgment has been disregarded by 
cottish courts. Wotherspoon v. Connolly (1871),9 M 510. 
h1.) Administration of Justice Act 01920, ( 10 11 Geo.V c.81) 
Under this statute judgments rendered by a Superior C t 
of any British Dominion, protectorate: or mandated terri- 
:or are capable of registratichn in -che High Court 
of England or Court of ;session in Scotland, and vice ve rsa. 
According to sec. 9 of Part II of this Act ;the requiremi.nts 
of registration of such judgments are as _Follows 
fi Dominion. court judgment to which this Aot would other- 
wipe apply will not be re,g.5.ater. ed: if 
-297- 
W. there is no jurisdiction in the original court, 
(2). the judgment debtor did not voluntarily submit or 
agree to submit to the jurisdiction of that court. 
(ö). the judgment debtor being a defendant in the procee- 
dings was not duly served with the process of the original 
court and did not appear notwithstanding that he was 
orminarily resident or carrying on business within the 
jurisdiction of that court or agreed to submit to its 
jurisdiction; or 
(4) the judgment. was obtained by fraud; or 
(5) the judgment debtor satisfies the registering court 
either that an appeal is pending ór:that he is entitled 
and intends to appeal against the judgment;or 
(6) the judgment- in respect of a cause of action 
which for reasons of public policy or for some other 
similar reason could not have been entertained by the 
registering court. 
After registration the registering court has the same 
control and jurisdiction over such judgment as it has 
over similar judgments given by itself, but insofar onl 
as relates to execution under this section. According t 
this Act rules of the registering court provide for 
service on the judgment debtor of notice of the registr tion 
of the judgment, and for enabling the registering court 
on an application by the judgment debtor to set: aside 
the registration of a judgment under this Act on such 
terms as theéourt thinks fit.and finally for suspending 
the execution of a registered judgment until the expira ion 
of the period during which the judgment debtor may appl 
to have the registration set aside. 
The registration of a judgment under this Act is option 
only but according to section 5 the plaintiff is not en 
titled to recover an y costs of the action brought on t 
judgment unless an application to register it has previpusly 
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been_ refused or unless the court otherwise orders. 
This Act is to be extended by Order of Council to various 
parts of the British Cotmonwealth, insofar as similar 
reciprocal dnactments have been made by the relative 
legislature "It,, has, in fact, been extended to most 
of t1 _e colonies and self governing dominioDs.The áp.eratián 
of thisystatute ìs differeñt'-fròththat :b.f the: Jn,dgmentl4 
Extension Act of 1878 in that under the forme. Act the 
registering court has completely discretionary power to 
grant or reïuse registration. As regards matters dealt ith 
here this statute mightbe mde available only in respe t 
of enforcement of orders or judgments awarding costs or 
damages to he paid by a co= respondent. 
(o). Foreign Judgments ( Reciprocal) Enforcement Act 19$3 p 
( __ 23 Geo V, c. 13 ) . 
This Act makes provision for the reciprocal enforcement 
of judgments rendered by the courts of such foreign 
countries. as are prepared to give reciprocal treatment 
to judgments of the United Kingdom. By Orders in Council 
I 
of 1930 'ea.dt I of the Act was extended to France and j 
the same Fart I of the Act was applied generally to the 
dominions of the British Empire by an Order in Council 
of Nov. 10, 1933. 
By sec. 11 ( 2) it is provided that for the purpose of 
that Act the term " action in personam " shall not be 
deemed to include any matrimonial cause or any proceedi4gs 
;in connection with matrimonial matters; For the sake 
of clarity only mention has been made of that Act; sine 
it does not according to the provision just cited refer 
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1115t .7-4k 
to the subject matter treated in this thesis1114-Xili41ill 
not 1.3.e enter into a detailed discussion of that Act. 
Now I pass to the consideration of statutes which deal 
particularly with the subject matter of judgments or 
orders concerning matters ancillary to divorce, 
(d). By the Indian and Colonial Divorce jurisdiction 
Act , 1926, ( 16' and 17 Geo. 5 c 40) it is provided-. 
that Indian courts, if the requirement of jurisdiction 
are complied with ( see p262) may also as incidental 
to the exercise of their jurisdiction make any order 
for damages, alimony,or maintenance and custody.- -.of 
children, and costs; orders for alimony or maintenance 
and custody of children operate forthwith, whereas a 
decree or other order have effect only after registrá iOn. 
A decree or order of the latter sort made in India may 
be registered in the Principal Probate Registry in England 
or the books of Council and Session in Scotland,according 
as the persons divorced are domiciled in England or Scot- 
land and as from that date the decree or ord r has the 
same effect as if originally made in England or Scotland 
ás the case may be. Application for registration may be 
made by any person having any interest in the decre or 
order, including the respondent. This Act applies also 
to a number of colo..iee to which it has been extended; 
see the list of these colonies on p.242. 
Wilkins v. Wilkins ( 1932) W.N. 118. This Act is not to be 
extended to self-governing dominions. 
(e) Maintenance Orders (facilities for Enforcement)Act 
1920 , ( 10 & 11 , Geo V c 33 ) 
This act facilitates the reciprocal enforcement of orders 
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of periodical payment of sums of money for the maintenance 
or support of a wife and child if pronounced by a court 
of superior jurisdiction in any part of the British do- 
pinions to ,which the Act by Order in O1ouncil has been 
applied; such orders may be registered in the Divorce 
Registry for enforcement in the P.A.B. Division and vice 
versa such an order made in the Divorce Division may 
registered and enforced in the respective dominions on 
transmission of a copy of the order by the Secretary 
of State. 
Before the passing of this Act such orders could not be 
enforced because of lack of that requirement of finality 
dealth with on p. 92e.. 
Scottish law on enforcement of foreign judgments concernin 
matters ancillary to divorce; 
The leading Scottish case on this subject is 
Westergard v. üVesterga.rd ( 1914) SC 977. In this decision 
the court held that a foreign decree awarding custody of 
children which was rendered by a competent court in a 
divorce proceeding is to be recognised as binding upon 
the court ; this decision was followed in 
Radojewitch v. Radojewitch ( 1930) S C 619. 
In Yonder v. Ponder ( 1932) S C 233 the Court emphasised 
that such a custody awar. d, being, a decision as to statue , 
was a judgment in rem and had universally binding effect. 
U.S.A. law: 
By the decision of Hulton v. Guyot ( 1895) US 113 it was 
(laid down that foreign judgments in personam would be 
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conclusive evidence on the merits, unless there were 
lack of reciprocity, in which case it wa uld be presumptive 
evidence only. 
Yet, as a rule, reciprocity is, as under English coñmon 
law , no requirement of enforcement of foreign judgments. 
See decision of the New York court of Appeal in 
Dunstan v. Higgins, 138 NY 70 ( 1893) by which a foreign 
judgment is declared to be conclusive upon the merits 
nd impeaehable only for lack of jurisdiction in the 
international sense or-for fraud. 
(a) Iaintenance orders. 
By the decisions in Sistare v. Sistare 218 US (1910) 
and Yarborough v. Yarborough 290 US 202,2l4( 1933) the 
Supreme Court held that according to the constitutional 
" full faith and credit clause " maintenance orders must 
Ibe given extraterritorial effect, at least as to past 
'due payments. 
(b0 Custody awards. 
Custody awards made in divorce proceedings are granted 
extraterritorial recogniti also_ by reason of the 
" full faith and credit clause "; it is up to now not 
settled whether the latter clause is applicable to custody 
awards as non- pecuniary matters, since some decisions 
take the view that this clause is applicable to pecuniary 
matters only. 
A decree awarding custody of children rendered in 
divorce proceedings by a court of the child.renTs domicil, 
is recognised as final and conclusive as to the facts and 
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circumstances prior to the rendition, of the decree. 
People ex rel. Tall v. Tall 245 App. D 508,283 NYS 1831935 ). 
There are various views on the question whether the modz.- 
Í 
kfication of such custody orders by the court which ren- 
ered them is to be recognised in another state. Some 
decisions take the view that such orders being decisio3 
as to status- judgments quasi in rem and have a 
universally binding effect. 
ieretti v. Pieretti 13 NJMisc. 98, 176 At1.589,see al 
Yakefield v. Ives,35 Jowa 238 ( 1872) 
He01. °r v. Wheeler, 184 La 689, 167 So 191 (1936 '1 
pthe.rs decline to recognise such modification of custod 
i 
awards: 
Larson v. Larson, 190, 1. inn. 489, 252 NW 329 (1930) 
Finally, the view prevails that where a party who dis- 
regards a custody order e.g. by removing the child out 
of the jurisdiction into another state in spite of a con- 
trary direction by the court, seeks a modification of 
priginal order, such modification is to be refused in t 
¡other state. 
French law; 
iLs to arts. 2123 and 2128 CC. and art. 546 CPC concerning 
¡enforcement of foreign judgment see p.25;6' 
Unless a treaty on en.forcemekt exists, a foreign judgment 
can be enforced in France by virtue of the so- called 
exequatur only which a French court will grant after havir- 
ie.xamined it on its merits. The requirements of enforcer -- 
ment are as follows : 
(1). The person who seeks execution on a foreign judgment 
dust satisfy the French court that the foreign court 
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which pronomced that judgment had jurisdiction according 
to French rules of conflict of laws and that no rule of 
French procedure has been violated relating to a French 
citizen against whom execution is sought. 
i 
Paris, March 17, 1922(DP 124 - 2 - 81). 
( 2) The foreign law applied to the case in dispute must 
have been selected according to the French conflict rules 
as regards choice of law . 
(3) The foreign judgment must not be repugnant to the 
principles of public order. Thus in a case of a foreign 
judgment by default where the defendant has not been gi en 
due opportunity to be heard, the French court refused 
to grant the exequatur. 
Seine, Nov 23, 1922, Journal 1923 - 295) . 
The above rules apply to all kinds of judgments including 
those relating to matters ancillary to divorce. 
Austrian law: 
The requirements of enforcement of foreign judgments, 
unless provisions relating thereto are made by a treaty 
are regulated by the Austrian court concerning executory 
proceedings of 1896, Imperial Law Gaz. 79,(Executions- 
ordnung ) as follows : 
(1). Foreign judgments or orders are enforceable only if 
it appears from an ,Order published by the Minister of 
Justice in the Federal Law Gaz. that the foreign state 
concerned will accord reciprocal treatment to Austrian 
judgments. and if 
(2). The foreign court had jurisdiction in the inter- 
national sense to pronounce the judgment according to 
-304 - 
Austrian conflict rules ( para. 80, I lc ). 
(3). If the person against whom execution is sought 
has been served with the original summons in person in 
the country of the foreign court or by letters of request 
in another country ;. thus substituted service or service 
by publication is excluded.(Nra. 80,II ). 
(4) . if it is proved by a certificate of a foreign co i t 
that no appeal from the foreign judgment lies barring 
its enforceability ( para. 80 II l.c.) 
Although the requirements mentioned above are complie. 
with, Austrian courtrwill according to para. 81 of the 
above statute refuse enforcement ofaforeign judgmett 
(a) the person against whom executionis souht,has be e l 
prevented from being heard in the process by any irre- 
gularity caused by the foreign court. or if 
(b) an act is to be enforced by way of execution which 
is forbidden or not enforceable under Austrian law, or if 
(c).the foreign judgment concerns the civil status of 
an Austrian citizen and it is sought to. put it into 
execution against him, or if 
(d).by way of the execration a legal relation is sought 
to be recognised or a right is to be enforced which is 
under Austrian law inadmissible and not actionable wit 
regard to the principles of public policy and good morals. 
These grounds do not include any challenge of the deci 
on its merits, except in that degree as stated above. 
If the above requirerilents are complied with the court 
issues an order declaring the foreign judgment to be 
enforceable. 
The person against whom execution is sought may apart 
sion 
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from entering an ordinary appeal (iecours) from such 
order objedt to it within a fortnight from the date on 
'Which such order has been served upon him on the ground 
that the requirements are not present; the court which 
rendered the order after hearing both parties may affirm 
Modify or revoke its order as it thinks fit. (para.83,1.c). 
Ger.:.:Lan law : 
xn the absence of treaties a foreign judgment can be ren- 
dered executory by a judgment only which declares it to 
ie enforceable by way of execution. ( para.722 of COP). 
The requirements of enforceability of foreign judgments 
are; 
(a).that it is final and conclusive according to the law 
of the country whose court rendered it. 
(b) that its recognition is not excluded on a ground spe- 
,rified in para. 328, COP.; the latter. requirements have 
Teen filly discussed under the heading of recognition 
foreign judgments; yet certain additional remarks reo 
to be made in order to clarify the combined. operation o 
those sections 328, 722 and 723 CCP as to matters eneil4ary 1/ 
to divorce. Sec. 723 1 c. lays down that the foreign judg- 
ment is not to be examined on its merits and wherethe r 
quirements just stated are complied with judgment is to be 
iven pronouncing the foreign judgment enforceable.(vol - 
ptreckungsurteil). 
¡Die court is to inouire ex officio whether the rec+uirem-nts 
or enforceability of the foreign judgment are complied 
pith, except the case of No. 3 of sec. 328 CCP asabove 
stated. According to para. 2 of sec. 328 CCp reciprocity 
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is no requirement for recognition and enforcement of 
a foreign judgment if. the latter does not affect claims 
relating to real or personal property and. if according. 
to German law German courts have no jurtdiction, As, 
for instance, in case where enforcement of an award of 
non - pecuniary character, such as anaward of custody 
of children is sought; in all other cases,especially in 
case of money jud.g_ ent reciprocity is a requirement for 
its enforcement. 
Furthermore the foreign judgment must not be repugnant to 
rules of common decency or to the avowed purpose of a 
German legislative enactment. Thus adecree of divorce 
pronounced. by a court of the State of New Yorx awarding 
maintenance innocent spouse was not recognised:and 
its enforcement declined mainly (1) because it imposed 
a restriction on remarriage upon the. guilty party till 
death of the innocent party and ( 2) because the pro- 
cedural rules of the State of New York as regards divorce 
did not provide for intervention of the Public Prosecutor 
whose function under G:rman law was to safeguard the 
public interests inherent in the marital status. 
KG . February 16, 1909, ROIG 19,106,J.1911,286. 
Finally, the party against whom execution is applied for 
may sustain pleas based on facts only which subsequent to 
the the....entry,Lt of the foreign judgment extinguished 
the rights derived therefrom. sec.767 CCP: decisions of 
the Imperial Court RG 36,381; 75,l48. 
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Swiss law : 
Since the legislation concerning procedural rules is 
left to the cantons, each canton has its own. Code of 
Civil Procedure by which it is also regulated what 
qualities a foreign judgment must possess if_,it is to 
he enforced by way of execution. 
Thus by para. 752 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the 
Canton Zurich and para. 519 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
of the Canton Waadt it is required for the enforceability 
of a foreign judgment : 
(1) that the courts of the foreign country accord re- 
ciprocal treatment to Swiss judgments, 
(2) that the foreign judgment is final and conclusive 
and enforceable by way of execution under the law of 
the foreign country whose court pronounced it. 
(3) that the court which rendered the judgment had juris- 
diction to pronounce it, and 
(4) that the foreign judgment is not repugnant to public 
policy. 
The foreign judgment is not to be examined on its merits, 
Statutory provisions similar to those just men- 
tioned are in force in most Swiss Cantons. 
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of the native country reáuires Mr the recognition of 
foreign judgments. 
In 
ir rules obtain in the Continental systems of law 
concerned, except for German law under which the renuire- 
ment of due service in case of a foreign judgment in 
default relates to a defendant of German nationality 
only. ( para. 328 ( II) of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure). 
By arts. 4 and 8 of the Convation, in case of change of 
nationality or of diversity of nationality of the 
spouses the question whether or not divorce is recognised 
or a ground of divorce is admissible, is controlled by the ne: 
real law of boo t h spouses, while under German law 
/national/ 
these questions are governed by the /law of the husband 
alone. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the operation 
of the principle of public policy as to matters of 
divorce is excluded within the purviewof the Convention. 
For details on the subject of recognition reference 
is made to p. 167. The Convention contains no rules as 
to enforcement of orders or judgments concerning matters 
ancillary to divorce; except for provisional measures 
which the domiciliary law grants in view of the /essation 
of common life, in case where the spouses are not 
authorised to bring an action for divorce or separation 
in the country in which they are domiciled.( art.6 of 
the Convention.) 
-310 -- 
(II). It is further noteworthy that the Hague Con - 
vention of July 17, 1905 on International Civil Pro- 
cedure by abolishing the Alien security for costs that 
had to be given by a plaintiff alien, has secured as 
far as subjects of the states signatory to the Convention 
are concerned international execution of judgments in - 
respect of procedural costs awarded in such cases. 
( arts. 17 and 18 of the Convention of 1905). 
The only requirement for enforcement of such an order 
awarding procedural costs is that it is final and con -f 
elusive according to the law of the country whose court 
rendered it. ( art. 19 of the Convention of 1905). 
(III). In the absence of treaties each country formulates 
its own rules relating-to recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments. From the above discussion it is 
clear that the extent of the requirements for 
r e c o g n i t i o n of foreign judgments differs 
greatly from that of the requirements for their 
e n f o r c e m e n t. 
To the mode of execution itself the internal rules of 
the forum are exclusively applicable. The fact may. on_lÿ 
be stressed here that there are two main groups of 
countries with regard to the problem of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgment4: 
By the law of the one group the courts examine the 
foreign judgment on its " l e g a l i t y " only with 
respect of a certain. specified set of requirements such 
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' as (1) whether its own conflict rules as to jurisdictifOn 
have been observed and 
(2) whether the judgment offends against the principles 
of public policy and natural justice, but without any 
inquiry on the merits of the judgment; England,for 
instance, belongs to this group ; from the above 
discussions, however, it appears that statutes mainly 
regulate enforcement of judgments concerni g matters 
ancillary to divorce which have been pronounced by a 
court of a part of the British Commonwealth, while comion 
law controls enforcement of such judgments rendered by 
V 
courts of other foreign countries. 
The courts of the other group,on_ the contrary,examine the 
foreign judgment on its ??legality?? as well as on its 
merits;France,for instance,adheres to the latter group. 
Furthermore,in the Anglo -American systems of law the 
:validity of a decree of divorce rendered by a court other 
than that of the domicil of the spouses concerned. depends 
on.. whether the decree is recognised by the law of the 
spouses? domicil,while under t' e Continental systems of 
law the validity.of a judgment of divorce rendered by a 
court other than the national one generally depends on 
whether the judgment is recognised by the national law 
of the spouses concerned. 
(IV).Common to all systems of law concerned is this that 
no reciprocity is required for recognition of foren 
'judgments of divo_rce;but where enforcement of an order or 
judgment concerning matters ancillary to divorce is 
sought reciprocity is required under the Continental systems 
?of law; see p.276. 
-312- 
(V). Further similarities common to all those systems 
of law are: 
(a). A court deciding the question of recognition is 
required to ascertain only whether the foreign court 
which pronounced the judgment had jurisdiction in the 
international sense; except for Italy whose courts also 
inquire whether the foreign court had the soOdalled 
territorial (domestic) jurisdiction, 
(b). The requirement,whereunder the foreign decree must 
not be ugnant to public policy of the respective 
country is also common to all the systems concerned,yet 
the scope of the principle of public policy varies in 
each of them. The main difference as to the scope of this 
principle lies in that the theory of the Anglo- American 
system -takes only their own public policy into consideration 
while the Continental systems in many respects have regard 
to their own public policy as well as to that of the 
foreign cougtry concerned. 
,c). The rules as to enforcement of foreign judgments 
)revailing in the British Commonwealth have been modi- 
'ied and in many a respect assimilated to those prevai- 
ing in the Continental systems of law by the passing of 
he English Statutes on enforcement of foreign judgments 
iscussed in chapter pp. 295 ff, 
hereas under common law a foreign judgment could be 
nforced only by an action brought thereon, immediate 
xecution may now follow the foreign judgment registered 
ccording $o those statutes. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * -* 
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